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A NEW APPROACH FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PHILIPPINE  
PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS.

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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THROUGH POLITICAL LEADERS:  
A NEW APPROACH FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PHILIPPINE  
PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE  
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By

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## PREFACE

From the early steps in the development of my leadership framework to the final drafts of this dissertation I have sought and received assistance from scores of considerate people. The research and this report would have been delayed several months without their timely advice and efforts. My first thanks go to the people of Camarines Norte who gave so freely of their time and, in some cases, their deep personal feelings. I am also grateful to the East-West Center for the funding which made the field research possible, and to Professor Raul de Guzman and his staff at the Local Government Center for the facilities they provided for me while I was in Manila. The Computer Center at the University of the Philippines and the assistance of Mrs. Mila Reforma enabled me review and analyze much of the data before leaving the Philippines. The Dimensionality of Nations and the Computer Center staff from the University of Hawaii were helpful in setting up my remaining programs and resolving some methodological problems. Mr. Douglas Tinsler of the United States Agency of International Development in Manila provided helpful insights in reviewing earlier drafts of the dissertation. I owe the greatest utang na loob to my wife, Sally, who contributed more than any other individual to the success of the project with her encouragement and work from the initial typing and formulation of the research proposal, to the hours of interviews on hot Philippine days, to the endless

discussions of the findings, and finally to the drafting of the dissertation itself. Needless to say, the final responsibility of all that is reported here is mine.

L. P. B.

Honolulu, 1970

## ABSTRACT

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study has a two fold purpose: 1) to characterize the politics and political leaders in a Philippine province, and 2) to develop research techniques and analytical models that could be applied to other Philippine provinces or even other political systems. In Philippine provincial politics there exists a subleader level (analogous to the precinct captains of Western "boss" politics) called "lidars." It was my feeling that the key to understanding Philippine provincial politics was through these political lidars.

The province selected for the study was Camarines Norte, a peaceful, but politically competitive, province of Southern Luzon. The first part of this study concentrated on a description of the province and a history of its politics. The 101 lidars interviewed were characterized with standard socio-economic background variables, and their perceptions of provincial politics and leaders was derived with a form of the Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale.

The Second part of this study was designed to provide a political leadership framework to increase understanding about the provincial leadership positions, i.e., the governor and the congressman, and the relationship between those leadership positions and the subleaders. An adaptation of the Ohio State University Leadership Studies' Leadership Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ) was used to describe the leadership positions.

The next part of the leadership framework sought to answer the question of why a subleader would follow a leader. Also, the reasons of support were tested as possible dimensions for a model to trace the change in an electoral system. The relative importance of each of the reasons was established through scalings, rankings, and paired-comparisons.

#### THE FINDINGS

The leaders played an important political role in Camarines Norte. The leaders were influential primarily in their own municipalities, and economically, were better off than their town-mates. In spite of their positions, however, the leaders felt that politics was better in the past, and they were fearful that it would become worse in the future.

The position of the congressman was shown to be more powerful than that of the governor, and for each task-category of the LBDQ the congressman was expected to perform more frequently than the the governor. There was high agreement between groups of supporters of the leader described and non-supporters for role descriptions, but for behavior descriptions, there the group of supporters differed sharply with the group of non-supporters in their evaluations. This indicated that the role descriptions were probably objective descriptions of a leadership position. Factor analysis of the LBDQ scores revealed a task-set pattern consisting of five task-groups: superior-subordinant relations (representation, superior-orientation, integration, and persuasion), institution-building (persuasion, integra-

tion, initiation of structure), role assumption, consideration, and production emphasis.

Jobs, projects and money were shown to be the most important considerations for a lider to support a candidate for governor or congressman. Also utang na loob and family ties were important. Surprisingly, compadrazgo or fictive kinship ties scored poorly. Capability, issues, and threats were also placed last. A factor analysis of the components of support revealed six factors: personal loyalty, particularistic reward, issue-tasks orientation, party, threat, and chance of winning.

On the whole, the study showed that the political lider was a highly useful means of analyzing provincial politics and political leaders. Further, the leadership description and the components of support questions were successful means through which the liders were able to conceptualize the political leadership positions and the interaction of the occupants of leadership positions with their subordinates.



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## CHAPTER I

### THE PHILIPPINES AND A POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK

#### I. INTRODUCTION

##### The Setting

Since the Philippines achieved its independence after the Second World War, there has been a growing interest in the nature of sub-national politics.<sup>1</sup> However, a perusal of the literature of Philippine politics reveals gaps in the understanding of the relationship between subnational political leaders, namely the provincial governors and congressmen, and their supporters or subleaders. One of the reasons for the shortcoming is that there has been a lack of an adequate leadership framework within which to analyze the political leadership positions and the dynamics of the relationship between the leaders and subleaders. It is my feeling that with a properly constructed leadership framework the key to understanding Philippine provincial politics and political leaders is through the subleaders or liders.

Virtually every study of subnational politics in the Philippines mentions the part played by liders. Mary Hollnsteiner was one of the first to capture the nature of the political liders:

The word 'lider' though originating from the English word, 'leader', has been incorporated into Tagalog speech in

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<sup>1</sup> In the Philippines interest in local government was reflected in the research done by the Community Development Research Council and more recently the Local Government Center. For an interesting discussion of thinking on local development see Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston, 1964), pp. 365-396; and Jose Abueva and Paul de Guzman, Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics (Manila, 1969), Chapter 11.

Hulo with a very precise connotation. Whereas 'leader' in its more general English sense of 'head' is translated into Tagalog by 'puno', 'lider' refers to the person with a large following in a barrio who utilizes this support during political campaigns, where he pledges himself to campaign for a certain candidate or group of candidates. These candidates call him their 'lider' referring to his dominance over his particular followers rather than to say superordinate position he holds in relation to the candidates. On the contrary, the 'lider' in this instance is a staunch follower of the candidate he is supporting. The 'lider' has no official position as such but is often repaid by candidates with favors which can in turn be distributed to his followers, reinforcing his position. He is extremely important to candidates and their party, for few can command the loyalty of his barrio's voters as he can.<sup>2</sup>

The lider is like the political bosses of Eighteenth Century England or late Nineteenth Century United States, where the people in a ward were dependent upon the precinct captain or the political boss for social favors, and in return for those social favors the people would follow the dictates of the precinct captain in voting.<sup>3</sup> In the Philippines, the liders maintain their ties with similar social favors (e.g. being present at baptisms, weddings, and wakes; releasing constituents from jail, arranging special treatment at a health clinic, and so on) that are used to build strong feelings of debts of gratitude or utang na loob. In addition to social favors, family connections and fictive kinship or compadre relationships are considered important means of mobilizing support.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Mary A. Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality (Manila, 1963), p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> See Edward Barfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, 1963); and Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States, A Study of Twenty Municipal Bosses (Durham, 1930). For England see Sir Ivor Jennings, Party Politics, Volume I, Appeal to the People (London, 1960).

<sup>4</sup> Charles Kaut, "Utang na Loob: A System of Contractual Obligations among the Tagalogs," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,

In spite of all that has been written thus far about the nature of the lider, the lider's relationship to the top provincial leaders (the governor and congressman) has not been fully explored.<sup>5</sup> There is no question of the lider's importance in a campaign. In fact, several recent studies cite the lider as being an essential part of the political machine at election time. However, the rationale of why a lider supports a leader has not been probed.<sup>6</sup>

Since I first became interested in political leadership generally, and Philippine political leadership specifically, I have been intrigued by the relationship between the subleaders (liders) and the leaders. Therefore, one of the central foci for this study is on how a leader obtains and maintains a following among a group of subleaders (liders). It seems to me that if, in fact, the liders do control voters, as is contended by those who write about Philippine politics, then any questions as to why an individual supports a candidate should be directed toward the liders and not the voters.

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XVII (1961), 256-272. Hollnsteiner, op. cit. pp. 63-67, 77; and Jean Grossholtz, The Politics of the Philippines, a Country Study (Boston, 1964), pp. 86-91, 95-100, 187-188. For a comparative discussion see John Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV, (June, 1970), 411-425.

<sup>5</sup> Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties, The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven, 1965); and B. M. Villanueva, Municipal Government and Politics (Laguna, 1962) describe the relations between the liders and constituents, but only touch on the lider-leader linkages.

<sup>6</sup> Tito Firmalino and Nextor Pilar, The 1963 Local Elections in Aklan (Manila, 1968); Gabriel Iglesias and Elena Gamboa, The 1963 Local Elections in Lanao del Norte (Manila, 1968); Aprodicio Laguan and Roberto Pangilian, The 1963 Local Elections in Manila (Manila, 1968); and Romeo and Estrella Ocampo, The 1963 Local Elections in Davao (Manila, 1968).

A separate, but not totally different, problem that also has not been fully answered in studies of Philippine politics concerns the positions of the governor and congressman as political leaders in their province. The congressman and the governor of a province are considered to be the province's top elected leaders. Either one or the other controls the party and the politics of the province, and it has usually been the congressman. Surprisingly, until Remigio Appalo's study of Occidental Mindoro, both leadership positions had been largely ignored by the social scientist.<sup>7</sup> As for the congressman's position, the usual treatment was merely to mention that the congressman had access to pork-barrel funds not available to the provincial governor, and that the congressman was likely to be the most powerful politician in the province because of his connections in the national government.<sup>8</sup> On the provincial level, since the office of the governor derived its authority from the national government, the governor was unable to innovate to a large extent. He was handicapped because he had no provincial finances except those allocated to the province by the central government. However, in spite of the Philippines' unitary system which

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<sup>7</sup> Remigio E. Appalo, The Political Elite and the People, A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro, Unpublished Manuscript (Quezon City, 1966). Appalo used his knowledge of his home province to advantage to describe what he called "Pandanggo-sa-Ilaw" politics. For a report on his findings also see Appalo, "Pandanggo-sa-Ilaw: The Politics of Occidental Mindoro," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, VIII (April, 1964), 84-110.

<sup>8</sup> For examples see Lande, op. cit., p. 80; and Jose V. Abueva, "The Interrelations between Local Governments and Community Development," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, V (January, 1961), 52.

tended to reinforce the position of the congressman, the officials in the province from the governor down, were considered to have an inordinate amount of influence since the national parties supposedly originated at the local level.<sup>9</sup> With these considerations in mind, a second purpose of this study is to develop a leadership framework within which to compare meaningfully the positions of the provincial governor and the congressman.

My third concern in this study is to characterize the nature of the political system and the political leaders in the province through the perceptions of the political leaders in the province. In other words, the political leaders will become the medium through which to view and analyze Philippine provincial politics. However, before proceeding with the research, I had to determine the analytic tools with which the study would be carried out. This search led into two areas: studies of subnational leadership and general theories of leadership.

#### Subnational Political Leadership

Most recent studies of subnational political leadership relied on one or another of the community power methodologies. Yet, despite the variations and improvements that have been made on techniques, from Floyd Hunter's reputational up to and beyond Robert Dahl's event analysis, none of the methodologies adequately dealt with political leader-

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<sup>9</sup> Lande, op. cit., pp. 24, 79-82, 91, for a full discussion see pp. 24-40. Also see Institute of Public Administration, "The System of Local Government in the Philippines," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, III (1959), 7-8; and Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, pp. 365-396.

ship, particularly in developing nations.<sup>10</sup> For instance, Mary Hollnsteiner in her study of a Tagalog municipality used Floyd Hunter's methodology and borrowed items from the Robert Schulze and Leonard Blumberg questionnaire in an effort to analyze the elites in the municipality. After completing only 28% of the interviews, she noted: "As the questionnaire progressed, I became increasingly aware that something was wrong with the questions. The responses were so unconvincingly given, and clarification was so often sought that finally discounting that particular series of interviews seemed to be the only reasonable thing to do."<sup>11</sup> Although she was unsure whether it was the culture or the technique that was at fault for the poor reaction, others who have studied Philippine politics warned: ". . . when working with the common man in the Philippines it is not enough to take American instruments, such as attitude questionnaires, and merely translate them into the dialect. In using these instruments you are using American conceptualizations which have little relevance."<sup>12</sup> Further, "However well adapted these [American] models may be to the analysis of their own society's problems, they are ill-adapted to the needs of a prismatic, poly-communal and intelligentsia-dominated society."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> See section on community power studies in Bibliography.

<sup>11</sup> Hollnsteiner, *op. cit.*, p. 163. The questions used were "Who is influential behind the scenes?" "Who do you contact to get things from higher officials?" and so on.

<sup>12</sup> Charles K. Warriner, "The Prospects for a Philippine Sociology," *Philippine Sociological Review*, IX (January-April, 1961), 17.

<sup>13</sup> Fred W. Riggs, "A Model for the Study of Philippine Social

An alternative method adopted primarily by native Filipinos was what I would call "total immersion." Most of these studies were descriptive accounts of municipalities, and only a few were concerned with an entire province.<sup>14</sup> What was needed was an approach that would provide a clear method for analysis of changing leader-subleader linkage patterns at the provincial level.

Machine politics offered a useful model within which to think about changing relations between leaders and subleaders in an electoral political system.<sup>15</sup> Machine politics was characterized by influence at the enforcement stage rather than the legislative stage, and for a leader or boss to maintain a following he had to be able to offer particularistic rewards in the form of patronage positions or social favors. Machine politics was found to occur predominantly in the early stages of electoral systems such as Eighteenth Century England and Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century America. According to James Scott, this phenomenon has recurred in a number of developing nations, particularly those with electoral systems.

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Structure," Philippine Sociological Review, VII (July, 1959), 18. Recently a similar precaution was voiced by Dante C. Simbulan, "On Models and Developing Societies," Asian Studies, VI (December, 1968), 421-430.

<sup>14</sup> Good examples of "total immersion" are Jose V. Abueva, Focus on the Barrio (Manila, 1959); Tito Firmalino, Political Activities of Barrio Citizens in Iloilo as They Affect Community Development (Manila, 1960); Buenaventura M. Villanueva, op. cit.; and Raul P. de Guzman, ed., Patterns in Decision Making, Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration (Manila, 1963).

<sup>15</sup> The use of boss politics as a model for change was presented by James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LXIII (December, 1969), 1142-1158.

Based on the English and American experience Scott presented a schema that focused on support ties as they changed over time.<sup>16</sup> During Phase A authorities maintained vertical ties with subordinates through traditional patterns of deference such as family alliances. In Phase B vertical ties were sustained only through "concrete, short-run, material inducements." It was during Phase B that machine politics flourished. Loyalties in Phase C were based on ideological or policy concerns, and influence was at the legislative stage.

These three phases might be better characterized as dimensions. If the three dimensions were independent, the three factors would compose a three-dimensional space in which individuals or communities could be located on the basis of their scores on each of the three dimensions of support. Changes in an electoral political system could also be traced over time.




Figure 1. Dimensions of Support

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<sup>16</sup> The following discussion is based on Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 1145-1149. Scott pointed out that there was nothing deterministic or rigid about the movement from one phase to another, and that one phase was not exclusive of the others. He further qualified the schema by stating that it was most relevant in an electoral system.



It is within this three-dimensional context that the rationale for a subleader supporting a leader will be explored.<sup>17</sup> With the conceptual problem for the components of support resolved, I then turned to general leadership theory in search of a framework for leadership description.

### General Leadership Theory

Systematic studies of leadership in contemporary social science developed first in psychology and were focused on leadership in small groups.<sup>18</sup> Early in the development of leadership theory Cecil Gibb said that leadership was dependent on situation, that is, when a group was confronted with a situation the individual in the group who could best resolve the situation was "propelled" into a leadership position. Further, Gibb stated that when the leadership position became institutionalized, i.e. independent of situation, leadership ceased and domination or headship began.<sup>19</sup> Others in the leadership field were

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<sup>17</sup> The operationalization of the dimensions is discussed in Chapter II.

<sup>18</sup> Studies ranged from using school children in group interaction, such as F. Merei, "Group Leadership and Institutionalizations," translated and prepared by Mrs. David Rapaport for Human Relations, II (1949), 23-29; and evaluating leadership styles R. Lippitt and R. K. White, "The 'Social Climate' of Children's Groups," in R. G. Backer, J. S. Koumin, and H. F. Wright, eds., Child Behavior and Development (New York, 1943), pp. 485-508; to using industrial settings, such as R. L. Kahn and D. Katz, "Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Morale," in D. Cartwright and A. Zander, eds., Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, Second Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1960).

<sup>19</sup> Cecil B. Gibb, "The Principles and Traits of Leadership," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, XLII (1947), 267, 271-273. More recently Cecil B. Gibb, "Leadership," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, The Handbook of Social Psychology, Second Edition, Volume IV (Reading, Mass., 1969), pp. 205-282, discussed leadership as the interaction of personality, situation and group.

reluctant to accept Gibb's limitations. Richard Morris and Melvin Seeman developed a paradigm for the study of leadership in which they defined a leader as an office-holder, an influencer or a chosen person. Their paradigm suggested three areas for investigation: leadership behavior description; relationship between group and individual factors and leadership behavior; and relationship between group-centered and individual-centered evaluation and leadership behavior.<sup>20</sup>

The Ohio State Leadership Studies was the first large scale effort to describe leadership behavior using the paradigm. They developed the Leadership Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ) in order to describe what a leader did and how he did it.<sup>21</sup> Except

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<sup>20</sup> Richard T. Morris and Melvin Seeman, "The Problems of Leadership: An Interdisciplinary Approach," American Journal of Sociology, LVI (1950), 149-155.

<sup>21</sup> The LBDQ grew out of the work done by J. K. Hemphill, Situational Factors in Leadership (Columbus, 1949). Studies using the LBDQ were reported in Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons, eds., Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement (Columbus, 1957). Two strongly defined factors, consideration and initiation of structure, were uncovered when the LBDQ was factor analyzed. Since that time more dimensions have been hypothesized and tested. R. M. Stogdill, Omar S. Goode, and David R. Day, "The Leadership of United States Senators," The Journal of Psychology, LVI (1963), 3-8, used nine hypothesized dimensions. The results were factor analyzed until all residuals were zero. Nine factors were produced. In my study I have taken LBDQ--Form XII and selected forty items for eight of the twelve dimensions specified in the manual, R. M. Stogdill, Manual for the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire--Form XII, An Experimental Revision (Columbus, 1963). Where it was possible to obtain the factor loadings for particular items on the factors (Stogdill and Coons, op. cit., gave loadings for some of the items) factor loadings were used as a basis for selecting the questions to be used. The exact use of the LBDQ will be discussed in Chapter II. I am particularly indebted to Professor Ralph Stogdill for sending me the LBDQ questionnaires, manuals and his advice.

for one study of United States Senators,<sup>22</sup> the LBDQ was used with leaders in industrial and military organizations, but not political organizations or government. It seemed that political leadership did not lend itself well to the Morris-Seeman paradigm since leadership positions in politics were not as clearly delineated as were leadership positions in industrial and military organizations.

The study of political leadership needed a more general framework than that developed in psychology. It had to be broad enough to permit comparative studies of leadership between political systems and of leadership at varying levels in one political system. Lewis Edinger and Glenn Paige go a long way toward accomplishing this goal. According to Edinger there are two general methodological approaches: focusing on the leading actor or focusing on the interaction between leaders and context.<sup>23</sup> On a conceptual level, Paige lists six components of leadership: personality, role, task, organizational behavior, values and setting.<sup>24</sup> The general analytical schema used in the present study is a result of integrating and modifying the specific frameworks cited above and the general approaches suggested by Paige and Edinger.

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<sup>22</sup> Stogdill, Goode, and Day, op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> Lewis J. Edinger, ed., Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies, Studies in Comparative Analysis (New York, 1967), pp. 5-15.

<sup>24</sup> Glenn Paige presented his framework in a political leadership seminar at the University of Hawaii in Fall 1968. Glenn Paige develops these concepts in a forthcoming interdisciplinary reader on political leadership.

## 2. THE LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK

### Position, Role and Behavior

In order to clarify the concepts used in the leadership framework, I have borrowed terminology from organization and role theory. The object to be studied is a position, or "a unique point in organizational space."<sup>25</sup> In other words, position is a designated location in the structure of a social system.<sup>26</sup> I define political leader as the occupant of a recognized leadership position,<sup>27</sup> and the leadership positions to be used for this study are the offices of the provincial governor and the congressman. The incumbents of the leadership positions and the principal opponent of each incumbent will be referred to

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<sup>25</sup> Robert L. Kahn, Donald M. Wolfe, Robert P. Quinn, J. Diedrick Snoek, in collaboration with Robert A. Rosenthal, Organizational Stress: Studies In Role Conflict and Ambiguity (New York, 1964), p. 13.

<sup>26</sup> Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., Role Theory: Concepts and Research (New York, 1966), p. 11.

<sup>27</sup> There is both empirical and theoretical justification for defining a political leader as an occupant of a position of authority in a political system. Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography: Reflections on the Study of Leadership, II," Journal of Politics, XXVI (August, 1964), 649; and Morris and Seeman, op. cit., suggested it as a means of identifying leaders in an organization. Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York, 1964), p. 211, stated that "institutionalized authority is a source of power." Also defining political leader as such permitted a minimum number of assumptions about the political system to be made. In the case of the Philippines further justification was given by Hollnsteiner, op. cit., p. 191: "If a man holds a position of authority in Hulo, then he has power. . . . The officials are 'real' leaders, certainly by virtue of their authority, and probably also by reason of strong personalities and followings large enough to put them into office. Whether or not the official is merely a front for another powerful person, he is nonetheless a man with whom the outside innovator must reckon."

as top leaders. The subleader positions and the occupants of those positions are called leaders.

Methodologically, I chose to view members as occupants of positions in a political system rather than to view a political system as being comprised of individual members. The latter requires analyzing personalities and what an individual brings to a system. The former entails role relations analysis.<sup>28</sup>

To minimize confusion, I will use role to mean role expectations, where the role expectations of a position are the normative feelings about what an incumbent ought to do.<sup>29</sup> Role behavior, what the occu-

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<sup>28</sup> This dichotomy was made by Theodore M. Newcomb, Ralph H. Turner, and Philip E. Converse, Social Psychology (New York, 1965), p. 322; and Edinger, Political Leadership, op. cit., p. 12. Examples of examining the individual were S. E. Ayling, Portraits of Power (New York, 1963) and E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality (Princeton, 1967); another more recently was Philip E. Jacob, Henry Teune, and Thomas Watts, "Values, Leadership and Development: A Four-nation Study," Social Science Information, VII (April, 1968), 49-92, they hypothesized that "effective leadership for development is in part determined and predicted by the values leaders hold." This approach emphasized personality and value. The positions approach emphasized role relations analysis such as that used by Kahn, et al., Organizational Stress, op. cit.; and R. M. Stogdill, Ellis L. Scott and William E. Jaynes, Leadership and Role Expectations (Columbus, 1956).

<sup>29</sup> This particular concept of role was derived from Newcomb, et al., op. cit., p. 323, who referred to role as widely shared norms concerning what an individual contributed to a behavioral relationship; also Kahn, et al., op. cit., p. 14, who state, "The prescriptions and proscriptions held by members of a role set are designated as role expectations. The role expectations held for a certain person by some member of his role set will reflect that member's conception of the person's office and of his abilities." Stogdill, Scott, and Jaynes, op. cit., p. 10 used the term "expected behavior" to refer to normative descriptions of leadership behavior. Also see Edinger, "Political Biography," op. cit., p. 653.

part of a position does, that is, how he acts in a position, will simply be called behavior.<sup>30</sup>

### Task Set

The description of leadership role and behavior is circumscribed in a task-set. In other words, what a leader does fits into one of the categories of the task-set.<sup>31</sup> The first task-category, required tasks, are those tasks which the leader is compelled to carry out. These tasks are prescribed by law or tradition and are usually administrative, technical, or perfunctory. The second set of tasks are institution-building tasks (initiating structure,<sup>32</sup> organizing activities,<sup>33</sup> defining goals and means for achievement,<sup>34</sup> and directing

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<sup>30</sup> Kahn, et al., op. cit., p. 18; and Edinger, "Political Biography," p. 653.

<sup>31</sup> The task-set was derived from reviewing the leadership literature about specific tasks which a leader must carry out. Some of the tasks in the task-set could be represented by certain dimensions used in OSU Leadership Studies. For a full discussion of the dimensions used see Chapter II, Section 4.

<sup>32</sup> See Barnard M. Bass, Leadership, Psychology, and Organizational Behavior (New York, 1960), Chapter 5: "Leadership and Leadership." A. W. Halpin and B. J. Winer, "A Factorial Study of Leader Behavior Descriptions;" and E. A. Fleishman, "A Leader Behavior Description for Industry," in Stogdill and Coons, op. cit., specify one of the two dimensions uncovered with factor analysis as initiation of structure. The same dimension was used by Stogdill, Goode and Day, op. cit.

<sup>33</sup> Irving Knickerbocker, "Leadership: A Conception and Some Implications," in Clarence Browne and Thomas S. Cohn, eds., The Study of Leadership (Danville, Illinois, 1958), p. 9.

<sup>34</sup> Too many leadership studies mention goal-direction as a task of leadership to make listing them all practical. For specific references see Cecil Gibb, "The Principles and Traits of Leadership," and Launor F. Carter, "On Defining Leadership," in Browne and Cohn, op. cit.

strategies<sup>35</sup>). These might also be called policy forming tasks in which the leader structures the environment for his followers. That is, a leader has to have "the ability . . . to perceive and develop models for thought and behavior and to find models of communication."<sup>36</sup> Also, under institution-building I have included group integration. This task requires the leader to bring those under him together.<sup>37</sup>

Representation-tasks refer to a leader's representing the group to those outside the group. Part of this task is the type of relations the leader has with his superiors.<sup>38</sup>

Support-building tasks are the most relevant for leader-subleader linkages. These tasks deal with how a leader interacts with his followers, and how he maintains his base of support. These tasks are essential for the leader to obtain a dominant position within his organization.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> D. J. Goodspeed, The Conspirators (New York, 1961), p. 217.

<sup>36</sup> Philip Selznick, "Leadership in Administration," in Robert T. Golembiewski and Frank Gibson, eds., Managerial Behavior and Organization Demands (Chicago, 1967), p. 372.

<sup>37</sup> This was a dimension suggested by Stogdill, "Manual for the LBDQ-- Form XII." op. cit.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., and Stogdill, Goode, and Day, op. cit.

<sup>39</sup> According to Dahl, op. cit., p. 102, since loyalty and support were based on rewards and memories of rewards, leaders would try to maximize future rewards. In short, leaders had to make it enjoyable to be a follower, or discomfoting not to be a follower. Stogdill, op. cit., and Stogdill, Goode, and Day, op. cit., specify persuasion and consideration as two dimensions which fit into this category. Consideration was one of the two factors revealed by Halpin and Winer, op. cit., and Fleishman, op. cit.

### Role Set

Those individuals with whom the occupant of a position (the focal person) must interact are known as his role set, consisting of superiors, subordinates and peers.<sup>40</sup> In Edinger's terminology the role set is part of the context with which the leader interacts. Others such as Kahn and his associates examined the entire role set of the focal person;<sup>41</sup> however, I was principally interested in the relationship between the focal person and his subordinates, more specifically, between the leader and his subleaders. While the governor's and congressman's relations with their superiors are not totally ignored, the emphasis of this study and the discussion to follow is on the relationship between the political leaders and their immediate subordinates.

### Leaders and Supporters

Between a political leader and his constituents (voters) exists an intermediate level called subleaders.<sup>42</sup> The subleaders act as a buffer between a leader and his constituents. According to Robert Dahl, "The function of the subleader in the typical case is to 'go along' loyally and thus provide a suitable facade for the actions of the party leaders."<sup>43</sup> Although Dahl was referring to New Haven of the 1950's,

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<sup>40</sup> Kahn, et al., op. cit.; pp. 13-14; and Edinger, "Political Biography," op. cit., p. 653.

<sup>41</sup> Kahn, et al., op. cit.

<sup>42</sup> Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, 1961), p. 102.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 109.



a similar phenomenon can be traced as far back as electoral politics in pre-Nineteenth Century England, and late Nineteenth Century United States.

To more properly characterize the function of subleaders I will refer to the subleaders as supporters. Anthony Downs offers further insights into the leader-supporter relationship. The supporters are not nearly so meek, to him they are favor buyers ". . . who wish a party to act in some way which benefits them and will in return influence voters to support that party. Favor buyers claim to represent no one except themselves; they are merely engaged in trading their influence over voters for specific acts they want done."<sup>44</sup> Favor-buyers are intermediaries in peddling influence and goods (votes). They are bargainers who swap their influence over voters for preferential treatment for themselves and their constituents. This leads us to an important focus of this investigation which is why the supporter will follow the leader. Put another way the central question for this part of the study becomes "How does a political leader gain and keep a following among the supporters?"

#### Components of Support

To help answer that question, I turned to studies on superior-subordinant relationships. It is generally felt that a leader exercises a control function downward to supporters, and the supporters

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<sup>44</sup> Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957), p. 88.

exercise support and influence functions upward to the leader.<sup>45</sup>




Figure 2. Functional Relationships Between A Leader and Supporters

The overriding concensus among social scientists is that means available for a leader to control his supporters to ensure compliance are reward (offering inducements), punishment (imposing sanctions), or persuasion.<sup>46</sup> Since this study is set in a developing country the nature of these components of support take on added significance. If it is the case that the Philippines has machine politics, then the degree to which a leader is followed would be dependent on his ability to supply material rewards to his supporters, since material rewards would be the primary consideration of the subleaders.

As for influence and support functions, it is clear that the supporters are not totally at the mercy of the leader (assuming the

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<sup>45</sup> William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois, 1968) used the terms "social control" and "influence" for the relationship between the "authority" and the "partisan." Neil A. McDonald, Politics, A Study of Control Behavior (New Brunswick, 1965) used control and countercontrol for the relationship between a controller and a respondent. The discussion to follow has drawn heavily from these two sources.

<sup>46</sup> Notions of reward and punishment were taken directly from psychology. See B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York, 1968). McDonald, op. cit., suggested using coercion, persuasion, and scientific proof as means of control. The distinction between the three was the degree of discomfort caused. According to McDonald proof involved changing an orientation of the state of the mind and

absence of violence). In addition to offering support, the supporters exercise counter-control or influence.<sup>47</sup> It is believed that the more resources (e.g. votes or money) the supporter possesses, the greater his influence with the leader.<sup>48</sup> In other words, the supporter would be in a better bargaining position to make deals with the leaders seeking his support. However, it should be kept in mind that this supporter in turn would also be dependent on the leader for rewards or inducements which the supporter could, in turn, pass on to his followers. In summary, the type of control exercised over the supporters would depend on the degree of support given to the leader, and likewise the amount of support given to the leader would depend on the type of control exercised. The symmetry of the leader-supporter relationship would be contingent on such factors as the number of competing leaders, the resources of the leaders and subleaders, and the use of real threats of violence.

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persuasion was convincing the respondent that he could alleviate a future discomfort by doing as the controller recommended. Gamson, op. cit., posited that a person in authority controlled by isolating others, using positive or negative sanctions, and by persuasion.

Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, II (July, 1957), 201-215, suggested promises and threats. In the study persuasion was a component of the leader's task-set (support-building task) and the use of rewards and punishments (threats) was studied under components of support.

<sup>47</sup> According to McDonald, op. cit., p. 193, those under a controller can use some of the same techniques to control the controller as does the controller to control them. He suggests that the controller, unless he wants to rely on coercion alone, must be mindful of the respondents' feelings. Gamson, op. cit., says that constraints, inducements and persuasion are means of influence.

<sup>48</sup> Gamson, op. cit., pp. 146-147.

## CHAPTER II

### OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK

#### 1. SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE LIDERS

Although the operationalization of the leadership framework is designed to be broad enough to permit comparative studies to be undertaken in other provinces or in other systems at a future time, the concepts developed here were adjusted to be sensitive to the Philippine setting. Since the lidars are specified as the central element in the study, the first part of this investigation describes the lidars through the use of standard socio-economic background variables. In this study the use of the background variables is limited primarily to characterizing who the lidars are and what their life-style is. When similar studies are done, the social background data of the lidars would be more valuable, since it could then serve as a basis for comparing lidars across settings or across time.

#### 2. PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE

I was interested in two aspects of the lidars' perceptions of influence: first, who they considered as influential, and second, how influential did they consider themselves to be. A number of Philippine studies note that identifying the influential politicians in a province is not a difficult task--just ask somebody.<sup>1</sup> Basically this is the procedure that was followed. The respondents were simply asked to name the people in the province who they considered to be influential poli-

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<sup>1</sup> Hollnsteiner, op. cit., p. 191.

ticians. At first, I suspected that the lidars would list those influential politicians with whom they had personal contact, however this was not always the case. For the perceptions of self-influence, the respondents were asked to rate their own influence in barrio, municipal, provincial and national politics based on five frequencies: always, often, occasionally, seldom, and never. As a further measure, the lidars were asked how frequently they were able to contact higher government officials from the governor to the president.

The perceptions of influence section is designed to test a series of hypotheses. The first hypothesis regards the naming of the influential politicians:

- 1.1 If a lider is connected to a leader, then the lider will identify that leader as an influential politician.

The next hypotheses examined are interrelated and refer to the lider's perception of self-influence.

- 1.2 If a lider is a supporter of an incumbent, he will have a higher frequency of contacts with that incumbent than a lider who does not support the incumbent, and
- 1.3 The higher the frequency of contacts with a government official, the higher the self-influence rating.

### 3. PROVINCIAL POLITICS AND PROVINCIAL POLITICIANS

In order to permit the lidars to describe their perceptions of politics and politicians a form of the Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale was used.<sup>2</sup> The questions first asked the respondent to describe what

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<sup>2</sup> Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concern (New Brunswick, 1965).

the term "politics" meant to him; he was then asked what "provincial politics" meant. These two questions allowed the respondent to set his one frame of reference for answering the next two queries about the best and worst possible provincial politics. The respondent then ranked the provincial politics on the Cantril ladder (from 0 to 10) for 1969, just before the 1965 elections, and just after the 1973 elections.<sup>3</sup> The same procedure was followed for description of "politician" and "provincial politician". The open-ended questions afforded an opportunity to understand better what the respondent considered his political environment to be, and the rankings reflected his orientation to that environment.

Since low scores for present would represent discontentment and low scores for future would reflect pessimism, two hypotheses tested were:

2.1 leaders of non-incumbents will have lower ratings for the present and future than leaders of incumbents,

and conversely,

2.2 leaders of incumbents have higher perceptions of the present and future than leaders of non-incumbents.

#### 4. LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR AND ROLE DESCRIPTION

Morris and Seeman suggested that any leadership study should include a description of the leader's behavior by the leader and by others. Stogdill's application of the Leadership Behavior Description

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<sup>3</sup> The 1965 and 1973 years were selected to give the respondent a meaningful time period to think about since they were national election years.

Questionnaire to a leader and his subordinates did precisely this. However, Stogdill went further and asked the leader and the subordinates to describe what the leader ought to do.<sup>4</sup> For this study the top political leaders and each leader were asked to describe the congressman's and the governor's reported and expected behavior. The first method used was open-ended questions in which the leaders were to use their own words to characterize the two leadership positions. It was hoped that the open-ended responses would describe the required tasks of the task-set. The second method was an adaptation of the Ohio State questionnaire using eight hypothesized dimensions. The eight hypothesized dimensions fit into the other three task-groups. They are as follows:

Institution-Building Tasks:

- 1) Integration--maintains a closely knit organization; resolves intermember conflicts.<sup>5</sup>
- 2) Initiation of Structure--clearly defines own role, and lets followers know what is expected.
- 3) Role Assumption--actively exercises the leadership role rather than surrendering leadership to others.
- 4) Production Emphasis--applies pressure for productive output especially during a political campaign.

Representation-Tasks:

- 1) Representation--speaks and acts as the representative of the group.

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<sup>4</sup> Stogdill, Scott and Jaynes, op. cit.

<sup>5</sup> Descriptions of the dimensions were taken from Stogdill, op. cit., p. 3.

- 2) Superior Orientation--maintains cordial relations with superiors; has influence with them.

Support-Building Tasks:

- 1) Persuasiveness--uses persuasion and argument effectively exhibits strong convictions.
- 2) Consideration--regards the comfort, well being, status and contributions of followers.

For the close-ended leadership behavior and role description questions (LBRDQ) the respondent was first asked to score the frequency with which he thought the leader behaved in some manner (always, often, occasionally, seldom, or never). Then he was asked how frequently he thought the leader ought to behave in that manner. For example, a statement such as, "His arguments are convincing," was made. The respondent would indicate how frequently he thought the leader's arguments were convincing. Next, the respondent would give his opinion on how frequently the leader's arguments should be convincing. The answers were scored 5 (always) through 1 (never) (except for negative items when the scoring was reversed).<sup>6</sup> The items' scores on each dimension were then summated to obtain scores on each hypothesized dimension. This process yielded evaluations of the governor's and congressman's behavior and role. The behavior was referred to as reported behavior, and role as expected behavior. At this point analyses were carried out to test specific hypotheses.

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<sup>6</sup> See Appendix B for guide to LBRDQ items.



A purpose of the leadership description section of the study was to obtain a description of the positions of governor and congressman, and a description of the behavior of the occupants of those positions. A comparison of the governor and the congressman was made by checking their scores on each of the dimensions. Description of expected behavior was designed to yield a role description independent of the occupant of a position. The hypotheses tested were:

- 3.1 if the expected behavior (role) description represents an objective description of the role of the position, independent of the occupant, then there will be high agreement among the respondents on expected behavior description;

comparing the roles of the governor and congressman,

- 3.2 the higher the frequency of scores gives to the role description of a position, the more powerful the position.

In the sample there were descriptions of the governor and congressman from leaders who did not support them. In a dyad where there is a mutual negative feeling aversion tends to be reinforced.<sup>7</sup> A cognitive balance model offers an interpretation for the differences between reported and expected behavior of the leaders as described by the leaders.<sup>8</sup> The balance model consists of three parts: the person (in this case the leader), another person (the political leader), and attitude associated with the other person (reported behavior). A bal-

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<sup>7</sup> For a general discussion of balance theory see Newcomb, et al., op. cit., pp. 302-309. For a specific reference see F. Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organization," Journal of Psychology, XXI (1946), 107-112.

<sup>8</sup> Newcomb, et al., op. cit., pp. 125-136.

anced state is defined by all positive relationships among the three components, or two negative and one positive relationships. For example, if a lider is not a supporter of the incumbent he will have a negative feeling toward that leader. Generalizing this negative feeling toward the leader will cause a negative behavior description of the leader to be made based on negative perceptions. For the lider this would be a balanced state. Figure 3 represents this relationship.




Figure 3. Balanced State for a Lider:  
Negative Perception of Incumbent and Negative Behavior Description.

Assuming a cognitive balance model,

- 3.3 if the lider is not a supporter of the incumbent of a position, then the lider's reported behavior descriptions of that leader will be low.

and conversely,

- 3.4 if the lider is a supporter of the incumbent, then the lider's reported behavior description will be high.

##### 5. COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT IN THE PHILIPPINE SETTING

From what has been written about the nature of Philippine politics and the various appeals that are used to gain support, the general consensus is that support of a candidate by a lider is based on one or more of ten components: kinship ties, compadrazgo, utang na loob,

party, offering reward in the form of position, projects, or money, making threats, the capability of the candidate, the issues of the candidate, and the chance of winning.<sup>9</sup> The components of support section has particular relevance for the Philippines in terms of development of electoral politics. Much of that which was written during the early 1960's stressed the importance of the family and compadrazgo ties for political leaders. Supposedly, many of the politicians have read those studies and some politicians are changing their orientation. Some writers suggest that the Philippines is moving away from Phase A (authority through deference and reliance on traditional ties) to Phase B (reliance on particularistic rewards).<sup>10</sup> The components of support section is designed to test that assumption.

To determine exactly what the components of support are, both open-ended and close-ended questions were used. The open-ended ques-

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<sup>9</sup> It was generally considered that Filipino politics was not based on ideology. Politics was highly personalized. Political support depended on the family patterns, status and position, and self-interests according to Agpalo, op. cit., and Villanueva, op. cit. Lande, op. cit., suggested that Filipino politics was based on dyadic relationships between a patron and a client. He pointed out how the familial ties and status were important. However, his dyadic model was primarily applied to the lower levels. For purposes here his model will be used as a guide to Filipino cultural values in developing a leadership framework for the Philippines. Other authorities also stated that politics was based on reciprocal bonds and debts of gratitude. See Hollnsteiner, op. cit., and Grossholtz, op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> As an example, Jose V. Abueva, Conditions of Administrative Development: Exploring Administrative Culture and Behavior in the Philippines, CAG Occasional Paper (Bloomington, December, 1966) pointed out how the administrative personnel in Manila have tended not to honor their traditional family and compadre ties once they were away from their home.

tions were used to prevent closure from being imposed on the lider's responses. For the close-ended questions, the respondent was asked to rate each of the ten reasons on a seven point scale from "extremely important" (7) to "not important at all" (1). The respondent was then given a list of the ten and asked to rank the reasons from most to least important.

To obtain another scale of importance a series of paired comparisons was constructed in which the respondent was to select between two candidates with all characteristics the same except for one and the chance of winning. For the first forty-four respondents the question asked whom "he" would support between two candidates. For the second group the wording was changed to ask whom "liders he personally knew" would support. For instance, the questions would ask, "If the candidate of your party (the party of a lider whom you personally know) had no chance of winning, and the candidate of the other party had a 100% chance of winning, whom would you (most liders you know) support?" Assuming the respondent chose the candidate who had a 100% chance of winning, the respondent would be asked, "If the candidate of the other party had a 90% chance of winning, would you (the lider) support the candidate of the other party?" If the respondent said "yes," the questioning would continue moving from 90% chance of winning down until the respondent said that he (the lider) would support his party. The highest per cent figure before the switch would be recorded as the score, in this case, for adherence to party. If the lider would support his party's candidate even if the party's candidate had no chance of winning, party would be scored 1.0. Seven components (party, family,

compadrazgo, capability, issues, utang na loob, and money, projects and jobs) were dichotomized this way.<sup>11</sup>

The first seven questions paired candidates such that one candidate had the attribute and the other candidate did not, then the seven components were paired against one another and scored the same way. For instance, the respondent was asked: "Suppose that of two candidates, Candidate X is a member of the lider's party, and Candidate Y is a relative. Whom would you (most lideres you know) support?" After a determination was made, the respondent was asked: "Is there a per cent between 51% and 100% which you (most lideres you know) might switch from (candidate mentioned) to support (candidate not mentioned), if he had a better chance of winning?" The same procedure as outlined above was followed for the rest of the pairs. When the per cent was named where the lider would switch, scores were recorded for both components. For instance, in the case cited above, if the lider would switch to support the party candidate (assuming he said he would support the relative first) at as low as 60% chance of the party candidate winning, party loyalty would be scored .4 and loyalty to family would be scored .6. Scores were obtained on each of the seven components by summing item scores.

An underlying psychological concept tested was the degree to which group norms took preference over individual values. The paired

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<sup>11</sup> Money, projects and positions were constantly scored together on the 1-7 scoring and the ranking so for paired comparisons they were grouped. Threats was always scored last so it was excluded. Chance of winning was reflected in the level of switching.

comparisons were designed to put the lider in a series of role- or value-conflict situations. For instance, on the one hand, he might be compelled by social norms about utang na loob he had with a particular candidate, but on the other hand he had to provide for his following, and he could only provide for his following by backing someone who was going to win.<sup>12</sup> In this case he would be confronted with a choice between property reward and psychological reward. In other situations there would be other conflicts.

#### 6. QUESTIONNAIRES AND PRE-TESTS

The principal questionnaire developed in this study is divided into the five parts outlined above: social background, perceptions of influence, perceptions of provincial politics and political leaders, leadership behavior and role description, and components of support. (See Appendix A for entire questionnaire.) A second questionnaire for intensive interviews with top leaders and selected lider is composed of more general open-ended questions that allowed the respondents to answer the questions more fully. In the first questionnaire the respondents were sometimes limited by the close-ended questions. During the intensive interviews, given a few weeks after the first questionnaire, the respondents were encouraged to explain in detail their actions and attitudes. Using both the close-ended questionnaire and the intensive interviews I was able to obtain quantitative data com-

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<sup>12</sup> For discussion of role conflict see Newcomb, et al., op. cit., pp. 404-405. Also see Kahn, et al., op. cit., p. 19; and O. Oeser and F. Harary, "Role Structures: a Description in Terms of Group Theory," in Biddle and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 94-95. Oeser and Harary suggested that the group norm would take precedence over individual values.

plemented by qualitative interpretations.

Pre-tests of the first questionnaires were conducted in Honolulu and in Manila. The object of the pre-tests was to evaluate the proposed questionnaire using respondents that corresponded closely with the respondents used in the actual study. The first pre-test was conducted among thirty-two local party (both Democrat and Republican) workers and members of the Hawaii State Legislature. For the Honolulu pre-test words such as "lider" (changed to "party worker") and "compadre" (changed to "friendship") were adjusted. Next, the questionnaire was discussed at length with Filipino East-West Center grantees to determine whether the questions were relevant to the Philippine setting. The primary purpose of the pre-tests in Honolulu was to test the questionnaires for readability and clarity.

Respondents for the Philippine pre-tests in Manila were taken from participants in the Local Government Center seminar for local administrators. Seventeen interviews were conducted with local administrators or political leaders from seven provinces, and each respondent was encouraged to make any criticisms or comments that he felt might be helpful. On the basis of the interviews, the original questionnaire was modified slightly to clarify hard-to-understand sections. One surprising finding of the Manila pre-tests was that the respondents did not seem fatigued even after two hours of interviewing. The lack of fatigue meant the interviews in the province could probably be completed in one sitting.

## 7. SELECTION OF LIDERS AND ADMINISTRATION OF QUESTIONNAIRES

Initial interviews with the four top political leaders, the governor, the congressman, and their principal opponents, were conducted as soon as a convenient time was arranged. All the leaders were more than willing to talk for several hours. At the first interviews, which were more social than analytical, plans were made for future interviews. During the second interview session with the top leaders they were asked to name 1) their principal liders in each municipality, 2) those liders who had switched away from them in the last election, and 3) those liders who switches to them in the last election. Also, at this time the close-ended questionnaire was administered. A third interview with the top leaders was conducted with the open-ended questionnaire. During the third session the respondents were also given questions from the first questionnaire to be used as a validity check on the first questionnaire. The intensive interviews concentrated heavily on the relationship between the governor and the congressman, and between the top leader and his liders.

All four top leaders estimated the number of high level liders throughout the province to be no more than 200, and the number of lower liders was put between 4000 and 5000. For the sample of liders to be interviewe<sup>d</sup>, the names of 187 high level liders were obtained from the four top leaders. The 187 liders were placed into four categories: supporters of both the governor and congressman, supporters of the congressman but not the governor, supporters of the governor but not the congressman, and supporters of neither the governor or congressman. After grouping names by town and political affiliation



to assure a geographical and political balance, the names of 110 leaders were drawn at random. An additional two names were drawn for each municipality to be used in case some of those originally selected were not available.

Letters explaining the nature of the study were sent to the 110 selected leaders asking for their cooperation. Altogether 119 leaders were contacted, and of that number, 101 leaders completed the interview. As for the other eighteen leaders, two leaders were not reached, two leaders refused to be interviewed,<sup>13</sup> and fourteen leaders had language difficulty. The nine additions to the original list of 110 were made on the basis of the second random selection.

The respondents were extremely helpful and courteous. Most of the interviews lasted about ninety minutes depending on the language ability of the respondent. In only a few cases was respondent fatigue noted. Most of those interviewed were quite talkative and did not seem to mind the length. For our own sake, to speed up the interview the respondents were handed the questionnaire which they read aloud and then answered. This procedure maximized their comprehension since they could understand written English much better than our spoken American English. The presence of an interviewer enabled the respondents to ask questions if they were unsure of any of the questionnaire items. Thirteen of the leaders who showed a deep understanding or knowledge of the political situation in the province were

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<sup>13</sup> One refusal came from a civil servant who claimed that he could not get involved in politics, not even an interview. The other refusal was a Liberal Party mayor who thought that I had been hired by the Nacionalista Party to do the study.

selected to be part of the sample for the intensive interviews with the open-ended questions.

## 8. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

The study actually takes on a two-fold purpose: first, to characterize the politics and political leaders in a Philippine province, and second, more generally, to develop research techniques and analytical models that could be applied to other Philippine provinces or even other political systems. The format for this political leadership study roughly follows Paige's guidelines: setting, organization, role, task, behavior, and finally, value. Chapter III gives the setting and the rationale for selecting the province used in this study, and the chapter then goes on to describe the province itself and the politics of the province since it was formed. The leaders are considered the organization or context with which the leaders must work. Chapter IV describes the social background of the leaders. In the following chapter the setting and the political leaders are evaluated by the leaders. The subject matter in these first chapters is such that it is basically descriptive and at the present time limited to the Philippines.

The analysis of role and behavior within the context of the task-set is the first major section of a more theoretical nature. Beginning with Chapter VI a comparison of the positions of the governor and the congressman is made. Chapters VI and VII are based on open-ended responses of the leaders. They serve the purpose of sharpening the focus for the subsequent analysis based on the leadership behavior and role description questions (LBRDQ). In Chapter IX the feasibility of using

the LBRDQ in a non-American setting is tested with factor analysis. Since the chapter concentrates on the research instrument itself and the use of the research instrument in creating meaningful task-categories, the Philippines is referred to only as an example.

The analysis of the values, in this case, the reasoning for supporting a leader, is contained in Chapters X and XI. The chapters on leadership description and these two chapters on the components of support are of a similar nature. Chapter X describes the findings of the research, and Chapter XI has a discussion of the theoretical importance of the components of support, particularly in developing a three-dimensional model based on the components of support to trace the change within an electoral political system. With the course mapped out, let us first proceed to the province studied.

CHAPTER III  
CAMARINES NORTE

1. SELECTION OF THE PROVINCE

The major criteria for selecting the province were that the province constitute a single congressional district and be on the island of Luzon. Considerations of size and manageability prohibited using larger provinces. Originally, I had planned to do a comparative study of two provinces with the only difference between them the amount of foreign assistance they received. However, after checking with the United States Agency for International Development I found that the provinces selected by USAID were too large for the study and that USAID's considerations in choosing a particular province might well account for any difference I might find in the roles of the governor and congressman between the two provinces. After re-examining the purposes of the study I decided that one province would be sufficient to test the research instrument and accomplish the goals set forth.

From the list of single congressional district provinces, several were passed over due to violence in the last election, domination by one family, or other similar phenomena. The province selected was a relatively poor province, Camarines Norte. However the province boasted of being one of the most peaceful provinces in the country. Also, the Governor was twice the winner of the "Order of the Fighting Cock" award presented by President Ferdinand Marcos for being an outstanding governor. The politics in the province was considerably more competitive than other provinces and all indications were that

the politicians would be candid in their answers.

After deciding on Camarines Norte I contacted the Congressman in Manila and the Governor and the Congressman's and Governor's opponents in the last election in Daet, the provincial capitol. They all agreed to cooperate fully. Before beginning the formal interviews with the top leaders and their liders the history and past politics of the province was thoroughly investigated.

## 2. THE PROVINCE

Camarines Norte is located about two hundred miles south of Manila. At the time of the study Camarines Norte had eleven municipalities with three more on the way through the legislation of the Congressman. Most of the poblacions are clustered in the Southern part of the province around Daet, the capital. Politically, the top offices are the Congressional seat, the Governorship, the three Provincial Board seats and the municipal mayorships.

Income for the province comes from copra, lumber and abaca. Along the Pacific coast there is an iron mining town which exports its ore to Japan. Farther down the coast is another town which used to be called "Little Manila" in the pre-war days when it had thriving gold mining operations. Gradually the province has been losing its resources. For instance, there is now only one gold mine, and lumbering without reforestation has taken potential income away from the province.

Even though people have enough to eat with the increased production of rice and the prosperous coastal fishing industries, unemployment in the province is now the worst in the province's history.




Figure 4. Camarines Norte

The provincial government is trying to combat the economic problems by encouraging new industries and promoting tourism, but as yet there has been no sign of relief.

Although the province is considered in the Bicol region, most of the people are Southern Tagalog. In fact, over eighty per cent speak Tagalog and over sixty per cent speak English.<sup>1</sup> Those who speak Bicolano are concentrated in the Southern tip of the province. The people are ninety-eight per cent Roman Catholic, but the Iglesia ni Cristo sect is growing and fast becoming a force with which the politicians may have to bargain. The literacy rate in the province is well over eighty per cent, and is the highest in the country outside Manila.

### 3. PRE-WAR POLITICS

The politics in the province has been concentrated in the hands of a few prominent families from Daet or Vinzons (formerly Indan) who date back to the pre-American period.<sup>2</sup> In 1919 Ambros Camarines Province was split to form Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur. At that time there were two parties in the province, the Nacionalista and the Radicals (later changed to align themselves with the national Democrata Party). Gabriel Hernandez was the leader of the Radical-Democrata and for a while was an ally with his in-laws, the Pimentels of Daet and Miguel Lukban of Indan. The rest of the Lukbans were Nacion-

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<sup>1</sup> Presidential Economic Staff, Provincial Profiles (Manila, 1967), "Camarines Norte".

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of the families and their relation to politics see Appendix C.

alista. The governorship alternated between Hernandez and Miguel Lukban. Against the national trend which was overwhelmingly Nacionalista, the Radical-Democrata Party was continually returned to power during the 1920's. In the early 1930's when the national Democrata Party had almost ceased to exist Miguel Lukban and Froilan Pimentel switched away from Hernandez to the Nacionalistas, and in 1936 Froilan Pimentel was elected to the National Assembly and Miguel Lukban was elected governor.

In 1935 during the Philippines first presidential campaign Wenceslao Vinzons of Indan returned to the province from Manila where he had been organizing the Young Philippines Party. While a student at the University of the Philippines, Vinzons had distinguished himself as a powerful leader. In the province he campaigned for General Aguinaldo against Quezon. In 1940 Vinzons ran for governor and, with help of Gabriel Hernandez, defeated Miguel Lukban. A year later Vinzons was elected assemblyman against Froilan Pimentel. During the war Vinzons and part of his family were executed by the Japanese. After the war the older pre-war politicians were replaced by the generation who are now in their late forties and early fifties, and who control the politics in Camarines Norte from the governorship to the leaders in the municipalities.

Without exception the leaders interviewed expressed admiration for the pre-war politicians. Although some said that money was used in the pre-war days, it was generally felt that money did not play as decisive a role as it had in the post-war elections. The politicians were said to have been men who served the province rather than



enriching themselves or taking advantage of their office, and many had died poor men.

#### 4. POST-WAR POLITICS

Since the war, politics has followed a definite pattern. The Congressional candidate of the winning Presidential candidate always wins, and the nominee of the congressman for governor loses.<sup>3</sup> Governor Pardo was the first exception. The liders characterized the province as basically oppositionist since the province would vote against the incumbent, whether it be the president, congressman or governor. The 1969 election was the first time the province voted in favor of the incumbent congressman and president.

Immediately after the war Froilan Pimentel was appointed governor by President Osmena. In 1945 a brother-in-law of Wenceslao Vinzons, Esmeraldo Eco, was elected to Congress on the Liberal Party ticket along with President Roxas. When Roxas assumed office, Governor Pimentel was replaced by Regino Guinto, another brother-in-law of Vinzons. Eco was originally with the Young Philippines Party, but after the war he aligned himself with the national Liberal Party of Roxas. In 1947 Eco could not control the gubernatorial race and Nacionalista's Wilfredo Panotes was elected governor. In 1953 the Magsaysay surge carried the Nacionalista candidate Fernando Pajarillo who had promised to cover the expenses of Magsaysay in Camarines Norte. The Liberals regained

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<sup>3</sup> The cases of the President of the Philippines carrying the congressional candidates of his party and losing support in the off-year elections was noted by Lande, see Leaders, Factions, and Parties, op. cit., "The National Party System", pp. 24-83.

control of the provincial government in 1955 when Eco was voted governor. In 1957 Pedro Venida defeated the incumbent congressman and won with President Garcia, but the provincial government still remained under the control of the Liberals who elected Dominador Asis governor in 1959. When Macapagal won in 1961 the Liberal Party's congressional candidate Marcial Pimentel was elected. In the off-year election, Young Philippines Party's Wenceslao Vinzons, Junior, was elected governor. However, in 1965 President Ferdinand Marcos and the Nacionalistas swept the province and Fernando Pajarillo was returned to Congress as Marcos' candidate. In 1967 President Marcos exerted influence to help an already popular Nicolas Pardo capture the governor's chair. In the 1969 election the province voted Nacionalista again.

#### 5. THE PRESENT SITUATION

At the present time there are three contending factions at the provincial level. Congressman Pajarillo is the organizer and inspiration behind the strongest, the "official" Nacionalista Party. He maintains a headquarters in the province to handle patronage and look after his more than two thousand leaders throughout the province. Pajarillo visits the province three or four times a month to meet with his party workers and leaders. Through his position as congressman he has been able to sustain the organization through patronage and pork barrel. He is a member of a political family, but he only works with his immediate family, primarily because the family is not the source of his power.

A rival faction which has been slowly emerging over the past two years is that of Governor Nicolas Pardo. The Governor is a die-hard Nacionalista and was sponsored by Pajarillo, but Congressman Pajarillo now perceives Pardo as a threat to his power. Apparently Congressman Pajarillo thinks that Pardo has ambitions about becoming a congressional candidate in 1973, especially if Pardo is re-elected to the governorship in 1971. If Congressman Pajarillo is able to declare his brother, Vice-Governor Amado Pajarillo, as the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, then Pardo would be without official party support. Pardo, however, has been doing his job without testing any of his old allies. He is still a little wary of what he might find. At this point Pardo can count on solid support from his home town of Labo, but outside Labo he has not been able to cement the ties firmly enough to force Pajarillo to stay with him. The governor does have another alternative - he could join the Liberal Party.

The two big questions over Pardo's switching to the Liberal Party are whether ex-Congressman Marcial Pimentel would break his commitment to support another man, and secondly, whether Pimentel would permit a potential challenger into his party. The thinking within the Liberal Party is that it would be better to let the Pajarillo-Pardo split develop to better the chances of the Liberals in 1971. Further, Pimentel appears reluctant to give up the control over the party apparatus that he has been sustaining since the early 1960's when he succeeded Eco and Asis as head of the Party.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE LIDERS

In Camarines Norte there are several levels of leaders with influence ranging from an entire section of the province to just a few friends. The leaders selected for the study primarily consisted of leaders immediately below the top leader level. In other words, the leaders were usually the chief lieutenants of candidates who ran for governor or congressman in the last election. On the basis of the leaders' office, experience and number of voters controlled, sixty-four of the leaders were judged by the researcher as major political leaders or high level leaders. Thirty-two were minor or second level leaders and five were not considered leaders at all.<sup>1</sup> The leaders were divided into four groups: supporters of Congressman Pajarillo, supporters of Congressman Pajarillo and Governor Pardo, supporters of Governor Pardo, and supporters of neither Governor Pardo or Congressman Pajarillo. An effort was made to keep the subsamples equally balanced between supporters and non-supporters of Pajarillo and Pardo. Table I gives the distribution. By party affiliation there were thirty-three

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY SUPPORT

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Supporters of Pajarillo only	11
Supporters of Pajarillo and Pardo	40
Supporters of Pardo only	13
Supporters of neither Pajarillo or Pardo	37*

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\* Includes five independents.

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<sup>1</sup> Although the five individuals were named by the top leaders, the leaders themselves said they were not leaders or the researcher felt

Liberals, fifty-four Nacionalistas and fourteen independents.

Most of the liders interviewed held some governmental position. There were fifty-one present or former municipal officials from mayor to appointed technical assistants. Only seventeen liders held no official positions at all. The complete distribution of the liders by their government position is given in Table II.

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF LIDERS BY GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

Mayors	8	Ex-Mayors	6
Vice-Mayors	6	Ex-Vice-Mayors	2
Councilors	18	Ex-Councilors	2
Municipal Secretaries	4	Appointed Municipal Officials	5
Board Members and Vice-Governor	4	Present or Former Appointed Provincial Official	9
Present or Former Civil Servant	7	Party Official or Aid to Leader	12
No Position at all	17		

Another consideration in the selection of the liders was by municipality. The selection of liders by municipality was done on the basis of the size of the municipality and the number of liders given by the top leaders for each municipality. Santa Elena was the only municipality not represented.<sup>2</sup> The number of respondents

that since some had no influence over voters they could not be classified as liders in the true sense of the word, however the five will still be included in the sample.

<sup>2</sup> After going over 120 kilometers of dusty, mountainous road to reach Santa Elena, I found that one of the liders was not there and the other liders could not speak English.

for each municipality is given in Table III.

TABLE III. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY MUNICIPALITY\*

Basud	9	Mercedes	4
Capalonga	8	Paracale	10
Daet	26	Talisay	6
Jose Panganiban	11	San Vicente	7
Labo	16	Vinzons	8

\* The numbers include both top leaders and liders.

It was found that women did not play an overt role as political liders; the total sample included only four. The age of all liders ranged from twenty-three to seventy-eight with the largest group of liders (47) between forty-five and fifty-four years old. The second largest group (32) was from thirty-five to forty-four, but more than half of this group was older than forty-two. Most of the liders (89)

TABLE IV. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS

Less than thirty-five	8
Between 35 and 44	32
Between 45 and 54	47
Between 55 and 64	16
Over 64	2

were married and most of them (57) had five children or more. Those with fewer children were either single, newly married or could have no more. When asked about over-population, sixty-seven said it was not a problem, and forty-eight of the sixty-seven thought it might be a problem in the future. Ninety-four liders were Catholics who said that religion was very important to them and the others professed no

religion. There were no Iglesia ni Cristo members in the sample.

As would be expected, most of the leaders were native to Camarines Norte (89) or the Bicol Region (6). One lider was born in Spain and only nine liders were from outside the Bicol Region. The liders spent their growing years primarily in the poblacion of their municipalities, and only a few remained in the barrio by the time they were twelve.

TABLE V. LOCATION OF RESIDENCE FROM BIRTH TO AGE TWELVE

	Barrio	Poblacion	City*
From birth to age six	22	73	10
From age seven to twelve	15	76	14

\* Manila, Naga City or Lagaspi City.

The first language for sixty-three of the liders was Tagalog while thirty-five first spoke Bicolano. Of those whose first language was Tagalog fifteen could not speak Bicolano, but all Bicolanos could speak Tagalog. All the respondents spoke English and seventeen knew additional foreign languages. Their English language facility was good, even for three liders who had had no formal education and eight who had had only an elementary education. The majority had gone to college or beyond.

TABLE VI. EDUCATION LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS

No formal education	3
Elementary education only	8
High school education only	26
Some college	46
Some post-graduate education	22

The news that interested most of the respondents (53) was national news. The others were concerned with international (32), international and national (7) or provincial (12). The sources of news most often used were newspapers or radio.

TABLE VII. SOURCE OF NEWS

Newspapers only	50
Radio only	10
Newspapers and Radio	31
Newspapers, radio and magazines	12
No answer	2

Manila newspapers were read everyday by over sixty per cent of the lidars while only twenty per cent read the Manila papers once a week or less. The provincial newspapers were not as popular, less than fifty per cent read every issue. As one lidar commented, "They [the provincial newspapers] just reprint what the Manila papers say."

As an indicator of the degree to which the lidars have contact outside the province they were asked to indicate how many days in an average month they spent in the province. The bulk of the lidars (89) said that they spent twenty-one days or more in the province. In fact, of this group only a few ever left the province, and the lidars who did leave were usually mayors in their municipalities. Eleven of the lidars spent less than seven days in the province. These were lidars who had businesses in Manila and came to the province only during fiestas, their vacations, or political campaigns.



TABLE VIII. NUMBER OF DAYS IN A MONTH SPENT  
IN PROVINCE BY RESPONDENTS

0 to 7 days	11
8 to 14 days	2
15 to 21 days	3
More than 21 days	89

The lidars were generally active in civic or religious organizations. Only nineteen were not a member of some organization. Of the other eighty-seven lidars who were members, only five were not officers of at least one organization.

TABLE IX. MEMBERSHIP AND OFFICIAL POSITIONS  
IN CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS

Membership		Official Positions	
None	19	None	24
1-2	35	1	38
3-4	17	2	13
5-6	16	3	20
Over 6	18	4	5
		Over 4	5

In order to give an accurate picture of the socio-economic level of the lidars a number of items were used since there were problems with some of the indicators. The single question which served to sharply divide the lidars into two distinct groups was whether they owned a car. Twenty-four lidars did. Asking about home ownership was not as useful as I had thought since a distinction was not made between a nipa hut and a cement house when scoring for ownership. The respondents were hesitant to answer questions about their annual income.

They wanted to know who wanted to know, or whether the Bureau of Internal Revenue would see the results. Only eight said they earned more than ₱ 50,000 (\$8,300) a year. The largest group made between two thousand and seven thousand pesos. The family background of the

TABLE X. TOTAL FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS

Less than ₱ 2,000	13
₱ 2001 to ₱ 7,000	50
₱ 7,001 to ₱ 15,000	21
₱ 15,001 to ₱ 49,000	13
₱ 50,000 and above	8

respondents has the same basic distribution. The class distribution by the occupation of their fathers is represented in Table XI.

TABLE XI. DISTRIBUTION OF CLASSES OF OCCUPATION OF THE RESPONDENTS' FATHERS

Lower-Class Occupation*	16
Lower-Middle Class Occupation	55
Middle-Class Occupation	25
Upper-Class Occupation	9

\*For examples of the various occupations for each class, see Appendix A, Part V.

The occupation of the respondents was also used to establish their socio-economic level. The researcher divided the respondents into five

TABLE XII. DISTRIBUTION OF CLASSES OF OCCUPATION OF LIDERS

Unemployed or Retired	9
Lower-Class Occupation	12
Lower-Middle Class Occupation	42
Middle-Class Occupation	30
Upper-Class Occupation	12

categories on the basis of their occupation with a similar result. The rise in the leaders' economic and occupational levels from that of their parents is also reflected in their answers to questions about their economic standing relative to that of their parents. Fifty-nine leaders said they were better off than their parents, thirty said about the same as their parents, and only fourteen said they were worse off. To arrive at composite scores for socio-economic levels the scores for seven measures were totaled for each respondent.<sup>3</sup> For instance, the question on parent's occupation would be scored from one (1) for lower class to four (4) for upper class. The totals for all the indicators yielded a more precise distribution of the socio-economic level of the leaders than the individual indicators taken separately. Notice that the majority of the respondents were in a middle to lower-middle range. It was found that the higher an individual's socio-economic score was, the more voters he controlled.

TABLE XIII. DISTRIBUTION\* OF RESPONDENTS' SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVELS

Groups	I	II	III	IV	V
Range	13-16	17-20	21-24	25-28	29-32
Frequency	16	33	31	7	9

\* Mean = 21      SD = 4.5

<sup>3</sup> The measures used included car ownership, house ownership, income, parent's occupation, status vis-a-vis parent, occupation, and foreign travel.

In Chapter III the family interconnections were discussed. On the basis of the findings it would be logical to conclude that being a relative of one of the primary candidates would be meaningless since more than one candidate would be a relative. The leaders were asked whether or not they had a relative who ran for governor and/or congressman in the last election and if so whether the leader supported him/them. In the sample of 101 respondents there were twenty-five leaders who were related to Governor Pardo or rival gubernatorial candidate Julian Lukban, and twenty-two who were related to one of the five candidates for Congress. The reason that more leaders support-

TABLE XIV. NUMBER OF LEADERS WHO SUPPORTED THEIR RELATIVE FOR GOVERNOR OR CONGRESS

	GOVERNOR	CONGRESS
Related to Candidate and supported relative	15	9
Related to Candidate and did not support relative	10	13
Not related to candidate	76	79

ed their relative for governor was that Pardo and rival candidate Julian Lukban were not related and those leaders who did not support their relative were largely Nacionalistas related to both Liberal Lukban and Nacionalista Congressman Pajarillo. The number that did not support their relative for congressman was large because Ligaya Vinzons and Congressman Pajarillo were related, and supporting one candidate who was a relative meant not supporting another relative. Most of the leaders felt that family ties were not the reason behind

their supporting a candidate anyway.

A similar finding was made when the liders were asked whether the candidates were their compadre, and if so, whether they supported their compadre. There were twenty-six compadres of either Governor Pardo or Candidate Julian Lukban and forty-five compadres of one of the five Congressional candidates. Again several liders did not support their tie. The unusual finding contradicted what had been

TABLE XV. NUMBER OF LIDERS WHO SUPPORTED THEIR COMPADRE FOR GOVERNOR OR CONGRESSMAN

	Governor	Congressman
Compadre of Candidate and supported Compadre	16	25
Compadre of Candidate and not support Compadre	10	20
Not a Compadre of the Candidates	75	56

found in other studies.<sup>4</sup> One lider explained that there were so many ways of becoming compadres that the compadre system was no longer relevant. Comments like "Everybody is your compadre" were the first signs that the compadre system was not as potent as it had been in the past.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Lande, *op. cit.*, p. 16; Hollnsteiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-67.

<sup>5</sup> For a further discussion of family and compadre ties see Chapters Ten and Eleven.

In political matters the lidars were highly talkative. The frequency of discussions of politics with their associates seemed to lend credence to the common notion that Filipinos talk about almost nothing but politics. It was certainly true with the lidars in the sample. As the averages indicated, the lidars would discuss politics more frequently with friends and politicians than they would with their families.

TABLE XVI. FREQUENCY OF DISCUSSION OF POLITICS WITH VARIOUS GROUPS

	In Early Life	Family	Friends and Compadres	Party Officials	Other Politicians
Never (1)	4	4	1	1	1
Seldom (2)	23	13	4	5	13
Occasionally (3)	32	22	20	15	21
Often (4)	24	37	43	45	35
Always (5)	22	28	37	39	35
Average (range 1-5)	3.4	3.7	4.1	4.1	3.9

In measuring the lidars' influence, a series of questions were used since various levels of lidars existed in the province. The lidars were asked to state how many lidars they had under them and how many voters they influenced, and how frequently they were influential at various levels of government. It was interesting to note that only a

TABLE XVII. NUMBER OF VOTERS AND LIDERS OF THE LIDERS

	Voters		Liders
Less than 300	23	0-30	41
301-775	9	31-70	22
776-1279	24	71-130	16
1280-2900	9	131-250	10
Over 2900	40	Over 250	16

few of the lidars did not have other lidars that they were sustaining.

Questions about the frequency of influence at various levels from barrio politics to national politics showed that the realm for most lidars was within their municipality. The fact that most of the lidars were municipal officials was reflected in the average taken for measures of influence at each successive level of politics.

TABLE XVIII. FREQUENCY OF INFLUENCE AT VARIOUS GOVERNMENT LEVELS

	Barrio	Municipal	Provincial	National*
Never (1)	5	1	3	19
Seldom (2)	9	10	16	28
Occasionally (3)	33	24	38	29
Often (4)	28	29	25	17
Always (5)	30	41	23	12
Average (Range=1-5)	3.7	3.9	3.5	2.8

\*Most of the lidars who said they were influential at the national level were referring to the campaign for the election of the Congressman.

The lidars as a whole identified the influential politicians in the province as the institutional leaders. The only leader named as an influential and not presently holding a governmental position was former Congressman Pimentel. Pimentel's name was mentioned primarily by the Liberals. The great majority of the lidars named Congressman Pajarillo and Governor Pardo as the only two influential politicians. To measure the top leaders' influence, the leader mentioned as the most influential was given a score of five, the second four, and so on until all the leaders mentioned were scored. To arrive at the final ranking the scores for the leaders were summated. Congressman

Pajarillo came out as clearly the most influential.<sup>6</sup> When asked why the leaders had selected the Congressman the common response would be "because he knows the President," or "because he has influence in Manila."

TABLE XIX. RANKING OF INFLUENTIAL POLITICIANS

Congressman Pajarillo	448	Board Member	
Governor Pardo	378	Edmundo Narra	24
Ex-Congressman		Mayor Ray Padilla	
Marcial Pimentel	148	from J. Panganiban	21
Vice-Governor		Others *	25
Amada Pajarillo	64		

\* Others included Board Members D. Eco and D. Caneba, Julian Lukban, and five mayors.

The leaders had no trouble understanding the question "Whom do you see for political favors?" Favors to them meant jobs, recommendations, and endorsements at election time. As was hypothesized (Hypothesis 1.2), the Nacionalista leaders said they would first go to the individual they had supported, either the governor or the congressman. The Liberals said that they either did not or would not ask for favors. If they had to request help they would go to a Senator or former Congressman Pimentel. Some of the leaders (23) made it clear that they did not believe in asking for favors. One lawyer responded bluntly, "I don't like to kiss ass!"

<sup>6</sup> Hypothesis 1.1 was confirmed when it was found that Nacionalistas mentioned Pajarillo and Pardo more frequently than the Liberals or non-supporters did.



TABLE XX. WHOM LIDERS WOULD GO TO FOR  
POLITICAL FAVORS

Leaders	Supporters of				Total
	Pajarillo	Pardo	Both	Neither	
Congressman Pajarillo	7	2	21	5	35
Governor Pardo	1	4	6	6	17
Both Pardo and Pajarillo	8	1	8	3	12
Marcial Pimentel	0	1	0	5	6
A Senator	0	0	2	3	5
Mrs. Ching de Guzman (candidate for Congress)	0	1	2	0	3
The President	0	1	0	0	1
Does not see anyone	1	4	2	16	23

It was obvious that those who had alliances with the office holders were in a good position to ask for favors in repayment for their loyalty. The frequency with which the lider contacted officials was also dependent on his party affiliation. The Liberals infrequently met with the governor, congressman, or president. On the other hand the Nacionalistas

TABLE XXI. MEANS OF FREQUENCIES\* OF THE LIDERS' CONTACT WITH  
OFFICIALS ACCORDING TO WHOM THEY SUPPORTED

Supporters of	Frequency of Contact with			
	Congressman	Governor	Senators	President
Pajarillo	4.27	2.56	1.81	1.63
Pardo	1.71	3.07	1.15	1.64
Pajarillo and Pardo	3.39	3.46	2.00	1.60
Neither	1.66	1.95	1.65	1.20

\* The frequencies were scored from never (1) to always (5), the groups were divided by whom they supported and then averages were taken for each group. The range is from one (1) to (5).

had frequently contacted their officials. However, the self influence rating was not related to the frequency of contact with officials. (Hypothesis 1.3).

Although the sample of leaders was drawn from a relatively elite group, the sample did include a few people from almost every social strata in the province. The sample consisted entirely of English speaking leaders, and the questions in the substantive sections of the study were phrased in simple English to reduce any language problem. The questionnaire, itself, was designed for the high level leaders. If the questionnaire were given to lower level leaders, the validity of the answers to questions, particularly in the leadership description section, might have been jeopardized.

The purpose of this chapter was merely to describe the leaders. The average leader in Camarines Norte would be described as being better educated, wealthier, and politically more active than most of the other citizens in the province. The average leader would control a few hundred voters and have about one leader to look after every fifteen to twenty voters he influenced, and he himself would have close ties with at least one top political leader. The leader would be a devoted Roman Catholic between forty-five and fifty-four years old, married, and have five or six children. His income would be just over ₱ 4500 a year. He would be influential in politics and active in civic organizations. On the whole, he would be similar to other provincial elites,<sup>7</sup> or for that matter, other rural elites

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<sup>7</sup> Agpalo, op. cit., and Villanueva, op. cit.

uncovered with community power methodologies in the United States.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown (New York, 1929); and Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman. Small Town in Mass Society (Princeton, 1958).

CHAPTER V  
PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICS AND INFLUENCE

1. POLITICS

The liders felt that provincial politics in Camarines Norte was better than national politics. As one lider pointed out, "We have not had any killings here yet." Some liders were neutral about politics--politics was simply the running for political office, and provincial politics was running for provincial office. Other responses were intentionally academic and did not reflect the actual feelings of the respondents. Those who defined politics as "the science of government" were unable to explain their answers further, yet when the formal interview with the questionnaire was finished the respondents spoke of politics as it affected them in realistic and personal terms. Those liders who viewed politics negatively prefaced their remarks by, "I hate to say it about my own country, but I would be lying if I did not," or "As a Filipino I am ashamed to have to tell an American these things."

To political liders in Camarines Norte, politics, more than all else, meant money. In fact, over thirty per cent specifically equated politics with money. "This is a time you become rich--if you are a person and want something you give this [money]."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Tagalog expression commonly used was "Ang lagay may lagay." (You give this to get that.)

In the 1969 national elections the Nacionalista Party was reported to have spent at least ₱ 250,000 (\$65,000) of party funds<sup>2</sup> to convince the voters of Camarines Norte to vote a straight Nacionalista ticket. Prior to the elections over two million pesos were released for public works funds by Marcos.<sup>3</sup> The congressional candidate of the Liberal Party, who himself was reportedly offered over ₱ 60,000 to support Marcos, was bitter about the election. He said that he could not afford to take the several hundred thousands of pesos away from his family that were necessary to guarantee victory. During the campaign Pimentel's liders would come to him telling that they had been offered money (in one case ₱ 5000) or a job to switch parties. The liders regretted having to switch but the financial situation of their family left them no other choice.

Most of the liders decried the vote- and lider-buying that went on, even those who were known to have been bought off. However, the politicians were not the only ones blamed for the vote-buying and corruption during the last election. According to a municipal councilor:

The people are also corrupt taking advantage of politicians. They expect money. Without [money] they will not vote. They will not move unless you pick them up in a jeep, and they will not get into the jeep unless they know they are going to be fed after they register or vote. It is hard. I go to a barrio and the man says, 'There are a lot of

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<sup>2</sup> Some liders said the figure was as high as ₱ 500,000 of which the Congressman was alleged to have taken at least ₱ 100,000 for his personal use, but ₱ 250,000 as the amount received and spent was cited by a number of reliable informants.

<sup>3</sup> In conversations with the Governor, Congressman and several liders the two million peso figure was verified.

mosquitos here.' What he is saying is that he'd like a cigarette. Then he says, 'The weather is cool,' and he is really saying he would like you to buy him some wine. Politics is hard.

Another common response to "politics" was that there was "too much" of it, or that politics was a "dirty game." When asked to explain what they meant, the liders described how the politics game had hurt them or others. In a few municipalities liders have had their electricity and water turned off by the mayor because they refused to follow the dictates of the mayor on whom to support. One lider even had his house condemned and torn down in order to make way for a new municipal park; however, none of the other houses in the proposed park area were ever razed. Discrimination in government services was a genuine source of dissatisfaction. For instance,

When they [the government] built a road through our land they did damage--I did not get paid. The others were paid. Maybe because they were a townmate of the governor or they were a secretary of the mayor--and my father was a Liberal--so they think I am a Liberal--that's politics. Politics is good if you are with the party in power. That's why people are being corrupt. Like the previous election--even here in a local election--there was money. So politics is not very good.

There was almost total agreement as to what constitutes the worst possible politics: vote-buying, guns and goons.<sup>4</sup> Several liders referred to the last election as the worst possible politics. Even the Nacionalistas admitted to some of the political chicanery such

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<sup>4</sup> Unlike the Honolulu sample which generally characterized the worst possible politics as incompetent public officials, the liders of Camarines Norte tended to view bad politics as politics affected them personally. Sixty-eight liders listed the use of violence, and with overlaps, fifty-seven listed vote-buying as attributes of bad politics.

as vote-buying, but they consoled themselves by accusing the other side of doing the same.

The best possible politics was characterized as free and honest elections without money. Capable officials or efficient administration was mentioned indirectly, but only a few leaders were able to go beyond generalities. To them government operated between elections to repay political promises. Politics and government were basically different. The respondents pictured politics as the support-building process that took place during a political campaign or an election. Therefore it was not surprising to find that a large number of leaders had never thought about competence as a criterion or even a part of good politics.<sup>5</sup>

There was dissatisfaction with the politics in Camarines Norte as a result of national and personal economic plights. The unemployed or the marginally employed felt the economic pinch of the de facto devaluation of the peso. They sensed that there was a connection between the money spent in the last election and their present suffering--even though they may have taken money during the 1969 campaign. The economic hardships made them angry and depending on whom they supported in the last election they placed the blame wherever they could.

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<sup>5</sup> Mary Hollnsteiner, op. cit., makes a similar observation. She used the election of the officers of the local ladies' periculture society as an example of this attitude about politics. Women of the dominant factions in the municipality enlisted the support of their husbands' entire leader structure for a show-down election. After the election no programs were initiated by either side.

Some leaders refused to speculate on the shape of future politics, but those who did felt that things were going to get worse politically. The politics that they were familiar with for so many years was changing. "The candidates want to win too badly--that's all, and they will do anything to ensure their victory."

Although President Marcos was still considered a hero to some of the Nacionalista leaders, they sincerely hoped that Marcos would stay completely out of elective politics, not only the constitutional convention delegate election, but the off-year elections in 1971 and the national elections in 1973. For them it was all too obvious that Marcos' intervention might well spark large scale uprisings even in a peaceful province like Camarines Norte.<sup>6</sup> When asked at what level politics would be after the 1973 elections some of the younger leaders replied that in 1973 there would not be any elections.

The Cantril Self-anchoring Scale reflected their pessimism. Their mean scores on a zero to ten scale started at 6.3 for 1965, fell to 5.7 for 1969 and dropped even further to 5.3 for 1973. Politics in

TABLE XXII. PROVINCIAL POLITICS RATED ON THE CANTRIL SCALE

	1965	1969	1973
Means	6.3	5.7	5.3

<sup>6</sup> More than a dozen leaders, Nacionalista and Liberal, specifically mentioned possible violent demonstrations in the province if Marcos interfered in future political campaigns.



the future was not being looked forward to as it was in the past. The liders were worried that they would soon find themselves threatened or doing the threatening, not unlike the Bantay, Ilocos Sur Province incident.<sup>7</sup>

The respondents were divided into four groups, according to whom they supported in the past elections. The scores for those who did not support the incumbent Congressman or Governor had the greatest drop from 1965 to 1969, 5.9 to 4.6. Even so, their scores dropped again for 1973 to 4.1. As would be expected the evaluations of those who supported either or both the Congressman and Governor rose slightly from 1965 to 1969, 6.5 to 6.6. Rating the future, however, scores dropped sharply to 5.8, indicating that even those who were supporting incumbents were skeptical about prospects for the future. The liders recognized that something was wrong with their

TABLE XXIII. PROVINCIAL POLITICS RATED ON THE CANTRIL SCALE ACCORDING TO WHOM THE LIDERS SUPPORTED

	1965	1969	1973
Supporters of Congressman (11)	6.4	6.9	5.0
Supporters of Governor (13)	6.8	6.5	5.2
Supporters of Both (40)	6.4	6.6	6.2
Supporters of Neither (37)	5.9	4.6	4.1

politics, yet they were reluctant to play against or outside the informal rules of the political game, even though they might not

<sup>7</sup> Two barrios who voted against the Nacionalista in the last election were burned by about 100 armed men in May 1970. The Ilocos Sur barrio-folk were given no protection by the authorities until nation-wide attention was drawn to their suffering.

have agreed with the rules.

## 2. POLITICIANS

Politicians were described in more negative terms than politics.<sup>8</sup> The politicians were after all the perpetrators of politics. There were those leaders who were ambivalent as well as those who thought well of politicians. On the Cantril ten-point scale, ratings for politicians did not differ from those of politics. Over time the change in scores between 1965 and 1969 was negligible, but the drop from 1969 to 1973 was from 6.1 to 5.4.

TABLE XXIV. PROVINCIAL POLITICIANS RATED ON THE CANTRIL SCALE

	1965	1969	1973
Mean	6.0	6.1	5.4

Dividing the sample as to whom they supported, those who supported the Congressman and the Governor were much higher in their evaluations for 1969 than 1965 or 1973. As for the Liberals or non-supporters of the incumbents, their scores for 1965 were 5.9 with drops to 4.9 for 1969 and 4.0 for 1973. On the composite scores the rise by the Nacionalistas made up for the drop of the Liberals. However for 1973, the outlook was the same regardless of the party: things are going to get worse.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Thirty-five negative references to politicians versus twenty-nine to politics and twenty-six negative references to provincial politicians versus twenty-one for provincial politics.

<sup>9</sup> Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 were verified. As would be expected,

TABLE XXV. PROVINCIAL POLITICIANS RATED ON THE CANTRIL SCALE  
ACCORDING TO WHOM THE LIDERS SUPPORTED

	1965	1969	1973
Supporters of Congressman (11)	6.6	7.2	5.7
Supporters of Governor (13)	6.8	6.1	5.3
Supporters of Both (40)	6.8	7.0	6.4
Supporters of Neither (37)	5.9	4.9	4.0

As with provincial politics, provincial politicians were thought of more highly than national politicians.<sup>10</sup> The ideal politician was the politician who cared about the welfare of the masses. He was the one who was honest and fair in his dealings. Several lidars made indirect references to a politician's competence; however, the lidars were not concerned with administrative ability, qualifications, or fitness. The lidars were unable to express a concern for capability beyond "he should do something for the masses."

The worst politicians were the ones who thought only of themselves and assumed that political office was for the sole purpose of enriching themselves. In contrast to their answers, the lidars admitted in their unguarded opening remarks that "getting rich" was why most politicians were in politics. It was generally accepted that the congressmen and governors all went out of office considerably wealthier

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these lidars who were not supporters of an incumbent had lower ratings for politics and politicians.

<sup>10</sup> There were nineteen positive references to politics versus twenty-nine to provincial politics and twenty-one positive references to politicians versus twenty-seven for provincial politicians.

than when they entered. For instance, one congressman had borrowed money and sold almost all of land holdings to finance his campaign. After his four years in office he was able to pay off all his debts, bought back his land, and actually increased his holdings by several hundred hectares. The leader mentioned above said that he was merely recovering the investment he had made while campaigning. A notable exception was another former congressman who did not enrich himself or protect illegal business (logging) operators. He subsequently lost the next election due to a lack of funds and support.

The leaders said they knew about hundreds of hectares of lumber concessions where conservation laws were being violated, and they said they knew about higher officials that were getting kick-backs for their "oversights." Yet, in spite of their pronouncements that leaders who sought public office to enrich themselves were the worst kind of leaders, most of the leaders in the province seemed incapable, unable, or unwilling to change the pattern.

### 3. SUMMARY

When asked about politics by an interviewer with an open questionnaire, the respondents gave stilted and artificial answers. After about twenty interviews, we did not open the questionnaire until this part of the interview was completed.<sup>11</sup> The respondents were more relaxed and more freely discussed the shortcomings and the realities

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<sup>11</sup> Of the first twenty-two who were asked about politics with an open questionnaire, seven answered "politics was the science of government" while only one of the remaining eighty-three answered "science of government". Ten answered "running for political office" compared to twenty-one of the eighty-three. The other three gave varied answers.

of politics around them. Answers such as "Politics is the science of government" or "Politics is good" were no longer mouthed. The leaders seemed to feel less restrained in discussing their avocation with all its pettiness, hurts, and joys. Their emotions ranged from pride in showing pictures of their standing with Governor Pardo, Congressman Pajarillo and the First Lady in Malacanang before the last election, to tears in expressing their outrage at a system that had maimed them socially and economically. On the whole, they viewed politics as a dirty game and politicians as those responsible for its continuation. Provincial politics and politicians were only slightly better than national politics or politicians. The leaders saw the political system at its best when it would operate free from coercion and money and when it was a public service helping the masses. The worst system was one of goons, pesos, and self-enriching politicians. For the most part, the leaders believed that provincial politics in the past was better than at present, and they felt that the future was going to be worse.<sup>12</sup> Politics had become too serious an enterprise, but the leaders were already involved in a system in which only a few could escape after becoming hooked.

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<sup>12</sup> This differed from the findings of H. Averch, F. Denton and J. Koehler, A Crisis of Ambiguity: Political and Economic Development in the Philippines, (Santa Monica, 1970), 37-41, which showed that Filipinos were optimistic about the future. The disparity in results could perhaps be attributed to the time the studies were carried out (before 1969 election vs. after 1969 election), the type of interviewers used (Filipino vs. non-Filipino), or type of sample drawn (random vs. high level lider). I would tend to think that the time that the studies were done would account for most of the difference.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE CONGRESSMAN AND THE GOVERNOR

A purpose of the study is to describe the role and behavior of the governor and the congressman. Since the behavior of the occupant of a position is usually determined not only by the position, but also by the occupant, brief accounts of Congressman Pajarillo's and Governor Pardo's political careers were included. Chapter VII contrasts the two positions based on the leaders' responses to open-ended questions. Chapter VIII discusses the results of using the close-ended leadership behavior and role description questions (LBRDQ). These three chapters compare the positions of the governor and congressman in Camarines Norte, and Chapter IX evaluates the LBRDQ as a research tool.

#### 1. CONGRESSMAN FERNANDO PAJARILLO

Although Congressman Esmeraldo Eco enjoyed a great deal of popularity during his tenure, in 1953 he was defeated. Eco had to run on the Liberal Party ticket headed by President Quirino who had been discredited by wide-spread graft and corruption in his administration. The Nacionalista's presidential nominee Ramon Magsaysay had become a hero to the people for his handling of the Huk uprising as Defense Secretary, and he was running a hard-hitting campaign. Magsaysay's only problem was finding enough financing. In Camarines Norte young Fernando Pajarillo, who had just been released from the army, was aware of Magsaysay's lack of funds and proposed that if he were named the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for

Congress from Camarines Norte, the Pajarillo family would cover the campaign expenses of Magsaysay in the province. The deal was advantageous to both sides and in 1953 Pajarillo was carried into office on the coattails of Magsaysay.

Governor Wilfredo Panotes, a former protege and supporter of Froilan Pimentel, was head of the Nacionalista Party in the province at this time. When Pajarillo was selected as the official candidate, the son of former Governor and Congressman Froilan Pimentel, Marcial Pimentel, split with Panotes and withdrew from the Nacionalistas to join the Liberals. Panotes maintained control over the Nacionalista Party throughout the 1950's even after his defeat to former Congressman Eco in 1955. In the province Pajarillo was not particularly strong since his four years as congressman were spent primarily in Manila. He had not sponsored any major legislation and had obtained only a few hundred-thousand pesos in public works releases for the province. One lider said of Pajarillo's first term, "All he did was eat rats. He even had his picture spread around the province," in reference to a government drive to kill and eat rats in which province leaders were shown eating rats.

When Pajarillo returned to the province in 1957 to run for re-election he found that the lidere in the Nacionalista Party had followed Panotes in selecting Pedro Venida to run as the official candidate of the party. Realizing that without the official nomination he stood no chance, Pajarillo returned to Manila to convince his close allies House Speaker Daniel Romauldez and Congressman Jose Laurel to force the provincial party to make him the official

candidate or at least declare the province a free zone without any official candidate.<sup>1</sup> There was a free-zone declared, but as it turned out Pajarillo was without support and finished third behind Venida and Marcial Pimentel, the Liberal candidate.

During this time the Liberal Party was controlled by Governor Esmeraldo Eco. It was he who named the official candidates of the Liberal Party from the congressman down to the municipal councilors. Marcial Pimentel, with the support of Eco, had been elected provincial board member in 1955 and Mayor of Daet in 1959.

As for Venida, he was probably the most honest Congressman the province ever had. While in Congress he refused to enrich himself and he refused to protect those people in the province that had given him financial backing. Venida had a fair congressional record. He was intelligent, but not a very good politician according to the liders.

When Venida sought re-election he was faced with a hostile Nacionalista Party that was now supporting Fernando Pajarillo, even though Pajarillo had been defeated for the governorship in 1959. In 1961 the Nacionalistas declared a free zone, but the Liberal's Pimentel took advantage of the split in the Nacionalista Party to win the election along with President Diosdado Macapagal. During his term in office Pimentel took over the leadership of the Liberal

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<sup>1</sup> In Philippine elections the provincial party will usually designate an "official" candidate to run under the party label. Sometimes the national party hierarchy can force the local party to change the selection, or if two candidates are strong, they declare a "free zone" without naming one "official" candidate.



Party in the province. However in Congress, Marcial Pimentel was more interested in speaking on the issues of the day and proposing legislation. In his first and third years in office he was named as one of the outstanding legislators, but back in the province Pimentel had not been maintaining his liders. Patronage was given only to a few top liders and public works releases were not as plentiful as they had been in the past. In the off-year election in 1963 former Congressman Fernando Pajarillo ran for governor but lost to independent Wenceslao Vinzons, II, the son of the World War II hero-martyr.

In 1965 Macapagal was not popular in the province, and Marcial Pimentel was in trouble. Hoping to find a good issue for his campaign Pimentel promised to close down a large iron mining operation for its alleged pollution of fishing waters. The pollution charge was false, and Pimentel lost the votes of the iron mining municipality and the election to Fernando Pajarillo.

By the time of the 1965 election Pajarillo was able to consolidate his hold on the Nacionalista Party. He had been the nominee of the Party for governor and congressman since his loss in 1957 and he had been sustaining the party with his money. During his 1965-1968 term in office Pajarillo established a provincial Nacionalista Party headquarters to take care of local patronage and recommendations. The Congressman called it "a local employment agency."

President Marcos' extensive building programs enabled Pajarillo to bring more pork barrel projects and other public works projects into the province than any other congressman. Pajarillo used his patronage positions well, rewarding those who would appreciate the

favor the most. He maintained his liders through his party organization and held meetings once every month or so to tend to their needs and problems.

When Pajarillo ran for re-election in 1969 he had the full power of President Marcos behind him, and that meant money. In the weeks prior to the opening of the campaign period Marcos had meetings with political leaders and liders from all over the country. For their trouble of coming all the way to Malacanang about forty liders of Camarines Norte were paid one thousand pesos each.<sup>2</sup> A few weeks later those liders who were still reluctant to support the Pajarillo-Marcos team were invited back and offered as much as three thousand pesos. From the national party Pajarillo was given about two hundred and fifty thousand pesos to spend on the re-election campaign of the Pajarillo-Marcos team. In addition to the direct party funds, two million pesos in public works releases came for the province from Malacanang. Every municipality was given cemented streets in their poblacion, the center of the municipality. Two mayors boasted that they had received direct public works releases of 300,000 and 500,000 pesos apiece.

Had the funds gone entirely to the projects for which they were designed, it would have been a tremendous boon to the province which badly needs new bridges, an improved irrigation system, and better roads; however, a great deal of the money went to pad payrolls.

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<sup>2</sup> This was reported by five liders. Two liders showed me pictures of the provincial delegation meeting with Marcos.

Liders were given as much as 300 pesos for working on a public works project when in fact they did not work. There were examples of roads that were to have been built according to the district highway engineer's office, but on actual inspection were not there.<sup>3</sup> At any rate, Pajarillo spent heavily. As a result he was returned to Congress, beating Pimentel by only better than one thousand votes of about sixty thousand cast.

Since his re-election Pajarillo made weekly trips to the province to maintain his party organization and mend political fences. His party headquarters in Daet was staffed with highly capable and loyal workers. The Congressman trusted them completely and left much of the footwork in the province to them. Fortunately for the Congressman they had no real political ambitions themselves.

## 2. GOVERNOR NICOLAS PARDO

Governor Pardo came from a poor farming family and none of his immediate relatives were ever involved in politics. After finishing his law degree and working in Manila a short time, an old high school friend, first term Congressman Fernando Pajarillo, tapped Pardo to become a judge in the Court of First Instance in Mercedes. Pardo remained judge there until 1959 when Pajarillo supported him for a position on the provincial board. Although Pardo was at first said to

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<sup>3</sup> During my stay in the province a group of Italians connected with the World Bank were doing a feasibility study on a Philippine government request for a loan to complete the Manila South road which runs through Camarines Norte. They cited several examples of where concreting was to have been done, but was done with inferior cement if at all, or where a hill was to have been leveled, but instead the road went around the hill, and so on.

have lost the election, after three years of litigation to hold a recount Pardo was proclaimed as Board Member just before the 1963 election when he ran for vice-governor. Again with the backing of Pajarillo, Pardo won. While he was vice-governor, Pardo worked well with Governor Vinzons and conscientiously did his job. When Pajarillo ran for Congress in 1965 Pardo campaigned strongly for his compadre.

In 1967 Governor Vinzons did not run for re-election for personal as well as political reasons. Pardo was placed on the Nacionalista ticket for governor to face young Board Member Julian (Jojo) Lukban. The election was a lopsided victory for Pardo who had the backing of Pajarillo and Marcos, and who appeared more mature and rational than his younger opponent.

By all indications Governor Pardo represented the type of politician that several leaders described as being their ideal. He did not play favorites in giving projects or jobs. If a mayor came into the office to see him, Pardo would not require the mayor to be loyal before granting a favor. The Governor's practice of indiscriminate giving worked against the Governor according to some of the Governor's followers. By giving to all regardless of their loyalty, the Governor had occasionally been unable to help his supporters when they needed it.

In other respects the Governor had to operate alone without the support of the board members or the vice-governor. To increase his exposure he formed the Camarines Norte Planning and Coordinating Council

composed of civic and political leaders. Pardo used the Council as a sounding board for his programs, but it rarely supplied Pardo with the support that he had hoped for.

Much of what Pardo tried to accomplish was discredited by leaders because most of his projects lacked an immediate return. For instance, "He [the Governor] spends money on Bagasbas resort or beautifying the provincial capitol. He should spend the money on projects that are of real help to the province." The problem that Pardo was faced with was financial. Unlike a congressman, he could not use his position to make large sums of money to supplement government funds for his projects. Many of his projects had no funding at all; he merely supplied the equipment for barrio self-help. The governor was limited to non-costly innovations such as agriculture seminars and cultural nights.

### 3. THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Congressman Pajarillo has the Nacionalista Party structure in the province completely under his control. He has carefully built up alliances and debts of gratitude with municipal and barrio leaders. Former Congressman Pimentel has also maintained the Liberal Party in the province, but of late without the help of national funds. Unlike Pajarillo and Pimentel, who are themselves wealthy, Pardo is handicapped in building, let alone in sustaining, a strong organization. In his past political campaigns Pardo was dependent on the support from the Nacionalista Party and Pajarillo. Now Pajarillo is skeptical of Pardo and it is no secret that the two are preparing for a showdown in the 1971 elections when Pardo runs for re-election.

Since Pardo was elected governor the relationship between him and Pajarillo has been cooling. In 1969 Pardo campaigned vigorously for Marcos and the other Nacionalista candidates except Pajarillo. Pardo's lack of support in 1969, as well as Pajarillo's suspicion that Pardo might have kept national campaign and public works funds for his own use in 1971, has all but assured the break between Pardo and Pajarillo.<sup>4</sup>

If Pardo runs alone as an independent or independent Nacionalista he will have a rough fight without money to finance his leaders. It was generally felt that if Pardo is without support he will perish. Pardo contacted the leaders of Pimentel about the prospects of running as a guest candidate on the Liberal ticket, but Pimentel was committed to a mayor who supported Pimentel and gave Pimentel a wide margin of votes in his municipality over Pajarillo in the 1969 campaign.

The mayor was a Nacionalista and had been a strong supporter of Pajarillo in 1965 in return for Pajarillo's support in 1963 when he ran as mayor. However, a personal feud between the mayor and Pajarillo broke their alliance. In 1967 the mayor and Pardo were also fighting and the town was placed under Philippine Constabulary control as a result of alleged police harassment of Pardo's supporters.

Pajarillo, sensing the necessity of the mayor's support in 1971 to defeat Pardo and have his brother Vice-Governor Amado Pajarillo elected governor, began to put the pressure on the mayor. First, there

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<sup>4</sup> Pajarillo did not state the reasons for the split. The reader should note that Pajarillo's "suspicions" were reported to me by leaders and not by Pajarillo. Further, there was no factual evidence of the allegations against Pardo regarding the funds.

were reported criminal charges of illegal detainment and harassment filed in court against him by Pardo and Pajarillo leaders. Secondly, Congressman Pajarillo threatened to split the mayor's municipality which would take a prime source of income away from the municipality, hence yielding the mayor powerless.

At the time of the research the mayor was negotiating between Pimentel and Pajarillo. Indeed, the fate of Pardo eventually rests with the mayor. If the mayor decides to stay with Pimentel and become the Liberal Party candidate for governor in 1971, Pajarillo would run his brother for the governorship as the official Nacionalista candidate and Pardo would be forced to run as an independent taking votes away from Pajarillo and almost assuring the Liberal's victory. However, if the mayor pledges his support to Pajarillo and to Pajarillo's brother, then Pimentel would more than likely take Pardo as the candidate of the Liberal Party and have more than an even chance to defeat Pajarillo.

The only way that Pajarillo would possibly come out ahead would be if he was able to obtain the support from the mayor and secure a position in the national government for Pardo. In this case Pimentel would be without an ally as he had in the last election. However, another problem Pajarillo would have to contend with would be claims that he was building a dynasty for his family.

## CHAPTER VII

### A GENERAL COMPARISON OF THE ROLES AND BEHAVIOR OF THE GOVERNOR AND CONGRESSMAN

Under the Philippine Constitution and law the governor of a province is to be the chief executive or the chief administrator of the province, and the congressman is to be the representative of his district in Congress. However, in the Philippines the congressman does much more than just represent his district.<sup>1</sup> As for the governor, in a unitary system where local authority is granted in national statutes and where provincial funds are given through national allocations, the governor is severely limited in his role as an administrator or executive unless he or his province is independently wealthy. In Camarines Norte Governor Pardo has been trying to exert strong leadership, yet he has been hampered by lack of funds and lack of cooperation with Congressman Pajarillo. For instance, Congressman Pajarillo has taken over the task of administering or at least overseeing projects for which he has worked to release national funds. Specific limitations of the governor vis-a-vis the strengths of the congressman were brought out in discussions with the leaders.

This chapter is based on responses of the leaders to open-ended questions about the role and behavior of the two top leaders. Before

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<sup>1</sup> Examples of congressman working outside Congress are cited in Raul de Guzman, ed., Pattern in Decision Making, op. cit., The extra-legislative activities of congressmen are spelled out explicitly by Ledivina Vidallon-Carino, The Politics and Administration of the Pork Barrel (Manila, 1966).



asking the respondents to answer the close-ended questions of the leadership behavior and role description questionnaire (LBRDQ), I felt it would be advantageous to permit the leaders to give their own impressions of the positions of governor and congressman. Allowing the respondents to answer freely at first prevented them from falling back on descriptions used in the close-ended questions.

The task-set developed in Chapters I and II listed four task categories: required tasks, institution-building tasks, support-building tasks, and representation tasks. It was hoped that the open-ended questions would yield descriptions of the required tasks since the LBRDQ was designed to handle the other three. As it turned out, this was the case. The leaders tended to think about the role and behavior of the leaders in relation to legal and traditional prescriptions.

#### 1. THE GOVERNOR

A province is created by the national Congress and the powers of the provincial government are prescribed by the national Congress. Unlike in the federal system of the United States, the governors in the Philippines are not autonomous, and their position can be altered by national laws.<sup>2</sup> The governors' position was first established during the American colonial period and since independence the governors

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<sup>2</sup> Romeo B. Ocampo, "The Formal Structure and Foundations of Philippine Local Governments" in Abueva and de Guzman (eds.), Filipino Politics and Government (op. cit.) pp. 437-446.

have been given increased power.<sup>3</sup> Money for the functioning of the provincial government came from the central government in the form of specific allocations based on the class and needs of the province. Fortunately for Governor Pardo the Presidential Arm for Community Development (PACD) received funding independent of specific Congressional allocations that he could use for projects of his choice. In fact, it was for his vigorous leadership in PACD projects and his encouraging self-help projects in barrios that Pardo was twice awarded the Order of the Fighting Cock Award by President Marcos.

The liders were usually brief when asked what the governor should do and what the governor does. Most of the liders referred to his formal, prescribed role as the governor. For some, the governor was simply the chief executive (17) or administrator (13) of the province. An interesting finding was that a sizable number of liders (30) preferred that the governor initiate projects that would solve unemployment rather than aid development. The belief that the governor's

TABLE XXVI. LIDERS' DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FORMAL ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR

Administrator	13
Executive	17
Provide projects to solve unemployment	30
Provide projects for development	8
No answer	36

<sup>3</sup> Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, Article III, Provincial Governor, Section 2082-2087, p. 873. According to the statute the governor was to be the chief executive of the province and as such he was to inform all the mayors of the province of any

role was to provide employment ranged from responses like, "As an underdeveloped country, the governor must help the masses of our people in their life's occupations to improve their income," to responses like, "The governor should stop unemployment by putting up industries and giving more attention to agriculture to make it easier for farmers." Three-fourths of the liders in a more general way said that they thought the governor should do something to relieve the suffering of "the masses." Little was said of the governor's informal roles, or better phrased, his person-to-person dealings. A few mentioned that he should practice good public relations (pakikisama) and be fair. A large number (24) felt that the governor should make personal visits to the barrios, but most of the liders (63) did not mention the governor's personal relations in describing his role.

When asked what the governor did the liders referred to specific projects that the Governor had developed. Only twelve liders mentioned the executive-administrative tasks in describing his behavior. His formal behavior consisted of conducting seminars (10), working on projects for development (12), and developing tourism and beautification (37), the latter Governor Pardo's two pet projects.

Pardo wanted to beautify the provincial capitol grounds by building an elaborate park, at least by standards in Camarines Norte.

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government action. He was also responsible for the suppression of violence and had control over the local police forces. Further he was to send annual reports on the province to the Secretary of the Interior. Republic Acts 2264 and 5185 expanded the powers of the governor giving him a little more autonomy, but the governor was still under the control of the national government.

The tourist project consisted of constructing a small ten-to-twelve-room hotel at Bagasbas beach (about 5 kilometers from Daet). The Governor supposedly was using private and PACD funds for both projects. The beautification project, the Governor contended, was in keeping with Mrs. Imelda Marcos' beautification projects. As for developing a tourist spot in the province, the Governor believed that many of the wealthy people from Manila would come down to the province for swimming, and that the increased tourism would create additional income for the province. However, the Governor's tourist development and beautification projects drew strong criticisms even from some of his supporters. One life-long friend of the governor remarked, "Beautification is fine, but first stabilize the economy. Attract tourists--okay, but they might find impoverished people, people suffering from deprivation. Only higher strata of society have been able to go to Bagasbas beach--but not yet for people still busy adjusting to sudden drops in income and spiraling prices."

The informal or personal relations behavior of the governor was rarely mentioned. A few leaders commented on his winning the Order of the Fighting Cock Award, and others said that he did go into the barrios for visits.

The general feeling about the way in which the governor was carrying out his role was favorable. However, dividing the leaders on whether they supported the governor or not showed that whom the leaders supported did affect the leaders' perceptions of the type of job the governor was doing. As was hypothesized, those leaders who supported the Governor rated him better than those leaders who did not.

TABLE XXVII. THE LIDERS' EVALUATIONS OF GOVERNOR'S BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO WHOM THE LIDERS SUPPORTED\*

	Supporters	Non-Supporters	Total
Positive Remarks	39	10	49
Negative Remarks	6	18	24

\* Five lidars gave no answer and 27 lidars gave neutral remarks. Chi-square test yielded score significant beyond the .001 level of significance.

Governor Pardo fulfilled everything that he promised when he ran for election in 1967 except settling a boundary dispute with Camarines Sur. During his term he vigorously pushed self-help and PACD programs. Every morning his day started at five o'clock. By eight he had visited all projects to check on their progress. He said that in this way the workers would not be "lazy and do poor work," if they knew that he personally inspected the project site. In his home municipality he established a prison colony to teach the provincial inmates new agricultural techniques and to offset the cost of running the provincial jail. After breakfast at home he would go to the office where he saw between five to ten people an hour. About three-fourths of those who came to see him wanted jobs, medicine, or financial help. The remaining quarter consisted of municipal or barrio officials requesting assistance for their locality. He would spend between twenty to forty pesos a day to cover bus fares, costs of medicine, and other miscellaneous handouts.

Each day he would sign around a dozen recommendations for jobs in private companies in the province. Occasionally he recommended

someone for a job in Manila. Whether they received the job or not the Governor did not know. He merely felt that he had done his part to help.

Once a month or so Governor Pardo would go to Manila to seek assistance for his province. However, he would not see Congressman Pajarillo on his trips. Most of his time was spent with bureaucrats and sometimes a few senators.

## 2. THE CONGRESSMAN

A congressman is supposed to represent his district in Congress. In a lone congressional district province a congressman has the opportunity to become a political leader in the province and control the politics of the province. Although in larger provinces a congressman is limited to just a portion of the province, in recent years politicians have overcome the obstacle of multiple districts. For instance, some provinces have a wife as the governor and the husband as the congressman. Another common practice is to have the province split so that each congressman can control his own provincial governor. The tendency to have the congressman control provincial politics indicates that the congressman does more than just legislate. He has a distinctive leadership role to fill in the province as much as he has a leadership role to fill in Congress.

The majority of the leaders (56) stressed that the congressman's role as a leader was to bring money and projects to the province. One leader pointed out, "As he [the Congressman] can secure the needed funds from the national government he should strive to bring to his

district the needed financial help for our province." The Liberals stressed that the role of the congressman should be as a legislator and a representative of the people. Reactions from Liberals, such as, "We need a voice in the Halls of Congress that will tell the nation that Camarines Norte is here," reflected the character of former Congressman Marcial Pimentel. As for the informal role of the congressman, the leaders said little. Only a few (13) suggested that the congressman should go out to visit the barrios, and as with the governor, a large number of leaders (63) said that the congressman had a responsibility to help the poor people of the province. Yet, there were not specific references made to what the congressman could do, nor that it was a primary responsibility of the congressman to help the masses as was the case with the governor.

The description of Congressman Pajarillo's behavior followed along the same lines as his role description. There were, however, some answers which could not be coded as either formal or informal behavior, rather they had to be interpreted only as negative remarks. For instance, "He has done nothing," had no substance in terms of projects, legislation or visitation. Unlike Governor Pardo, the evaluations of Pajarillo tended to be extreme. Consequently, for his formal behavior the frequencies dropped considerably, especially for Pajarillo's representation and legislation behavior. His informal behavior description showed a similar increase in the "no answer" category.

TABLE XXVIII. LIDERS' DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FORMAL ROLE AND BEHAVIOR OF THE CONGRESSMAN

	ROLE	BEHAVIOR
Representative	15	4
Legislator	18	9
Secure Funds to help province	56	43
No Answer	16	49

Just as with Pardo, Pajarillo's overall evaluation was positive. Yet when divided on whether the lidars supported Pajarillo or not, the evaluations again demonstrated that the perception of the behavior of the leader was affected by whom the lidars supported. It was interesting to note that the extreme descriptions of the Congressman was also reflected in the number of neutral remarks which was much less for Pajarillo (12) than for Pardo (27).

TABLE XXIX. THE LIDERS' EVALUATIONS OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE CONGRESSMAN ACCORDING TO WHOM THEY SUPPORTED\*

	Supporters	Non-Supporters	Total
Positive Remarks	38	10	48
Negative Remarks	5	34	39

\* Six lidars gave no answer and twelve lidars gave neutral remarks. Chi-square was significant beyond the .001 level of significance.

Congressman Pajarillo was never an outstanding speaker or an innovative legislator. He was a backbencher who supported his party and collected the rewards for doing so when the time came. He boasted that he was not a "butterfly" like other politicians who



would go from one party to another, rather he was a "die-hard" Nacionalista Party man. In fact, he was the Nacionalista Party in Camarines Norte. As for his legislative efforts, Pajarillo succeeded in passing six bills from 1965 to 1969. As a result of his bills a municipality was created, the names of two elementary schools were changed, two new positions for assistant provincial fiscals (prosecuting attorneys) were created, a sala was added to the IX Judicial District, and a school of arts and trade was established. Obviously, the Congressman created no waves in Manila while he was there. He loyally supported Marcos' administration measures and in turn for his work he was able to obtain a number of public works releases for his province.

One of his goals was to complete the Manila-South road through the province. Although he was undoubtedly aided by Marcos' philosophy of spending, the Congressman was able to obtain more money than any other congressman before him. For instance, in public works funds alone from the time he assumed office until he ran for re-election in 1969 he had brought into the province ₱ 2,240,960.<sup>4</sup> This compared to Pimentel's ₱ 823,000. In public highway construction Pajarillo's term saw forty-seven kilometers of cement road put in compared to 800 meters during Pimentel's tenure. The funds released for highways under Pajarillo were ₱ 18,248,689.<sup>5</sup> Of the ₱ 18 million, ₱ 2,429,000 was released between July 1 and September 30, 1969, before the 1969 election. Whether all of the money reached its destination

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<sup>4</sup> Statistics from Office of Public Works, Daet, Camarines Norte.

<sup>5</sup> Statistics from District Highway Engineer's Office, Daet.

was open to conjecture, but nevertheless, Congressman Pajarillo was able to do much more in the province than was Pimentel. Pajarillo used his patronage and money wisely. He was careful to select only those people that would appreciate the efforts which he made in their behalf.

In each municipality Pajarillo designated leaders. Usually the mayor was the Congressman's top man through whom he channeled projects and patronage for that municipality. In this way the Congressman was able to ensure that his leader stayed in office through debts of gratitude (utang na loob) with other leaders in the municipality, and that the leader would remain loyal to the Congressman for the same reason. The party headquarters in the province further acted as a source of dispensing favors and patronage.

The Congressman said that politics to him was difficult because at times "you say 'yes' when you mean 'no'." To him being congressman was as much being a job placement officer as it was being in Congress. When he was in Manila he would see as many as twenty-five people a day who would come to ask favors or jobs. Pajarillo would spend as much as fifty pesos a day for those who came to see him. He complained that callers even came to his house in the middle of the night if they could not see him during the day. Yet, in spite of all his protests, he seemed to relish this aspect of his work, people coming and asking, and his being in a position to give.

On the weekends Congressman Pajarillo went to the province to meet with his party-mates. He tried to visit every municipality at

least once a month or so. He understood the necessity of maintaining good public relations or "pakikisama". Most people agreed that Pajarillo had the best pakikisama of any Camarines Norte politician. In the province Pajarillo built a series of alliances going to all levels of politics. According to one Liberal lider, Pajarillo maintained his followers through "a little coercion, a little bribery, and a little cajoling," and he did it well.

### 3. SUMMARY

From the responses of the liders it became obvious that in Camarines Norte the congressman held more political power than the governor since the congressman was able to control more patronage positions and more money than the governor. The sources of revenue available to the congressman were considerably more than those available to the governor. For instance, if there would ever be kidkbacks from logging concessions, they would not go to the governor, because logging was regulated by national agencies with provincial representatives who owed the governor nothing and, generally, the congressman everything. Within the scope of financing a campaign alone, an incumbent congressman would have an advantage, unless he was running against someone who had tremendous personal wealth. Unfortunately for Governor Pardo in his upcoming re-election bid he will be without the wherewithal that Congressman Pajarillo has to finance his brother Amado, if his brother runs.

In order to arrive at a clear notion of the relative influence of the two leaders, the liders were asked to list the patronage positions, money and threats available to a governor and a congressman.

The question was phrased, "Can the Governor (Congressman) use projects or money to induce a lider to switch? If yes, what projects and how much money?" The overwhelming answer was "yes." The use of money was noted as being extremely important in the last election.

TABLE XXX. "CAN THE CANDIDATES FOR GOVERNOR OR CONGRESSMAN USE PROJECTS AND MONEY TO GET SUPPORT?"

Liders' Answers	Governor	Congressman
Yes, without Elaboration	21	20
Yes, with Elaboration	61	67
No	2	2
No, because there is no money available	7	3
No Answer	14	12

The liders said that the candidates themselves would just give money to their own liders to be used to finance the campaign expenses. Some liders contended that money played a larger role than just financing the expenses of a lider, "[a lider] will turn to the other party overnight . . . money plays a big part . . . the best man does not always win." Another lider from the Nacionalista Party observed, "It is sad to state that in our recent election there was mass vote-buying and eventually liders switched to those who gave money."

Projects as well as money were used as inducements. A distinction was made clearly between the projects that a governor could provide and the ones a congressman could. The governor was able to offer services such as scraping the street with a road-grader, aiding in self-help projects, or opening a feeder road. The congressman,

on the other hand, could build schools, pave roads, implement irrigation, and do numerous other projects. The breakdown of the use of projects shows that a congressman can do more, particularly in public works. The connotation of the use of projects was mixed and partisan. Those who supported the incumbent generally felt that using projects or money to gain support was an acceptable, if not commendable, practice. Those who opposed the incumbent were somewhat evenly divided between viewing the use of projects and money as good or bad.<sup>6</sup>

The liders also agreed in about the same proportions as above that the leaders used positions to gather support. Again the magnitude of the positions which a congressman could use as opposed to those that a governor could use further pointed up the disparity in the two positions. Congressmen simply have access to more and a wider range of job openings than governors. The fact that the governor's

TABLE XXXII. POSITIONS USED BY LEADERS TO GAIN SUPPORT ACCORDING TO LIDERS.

Positions	Governor	Congressman
Casual labor	43	38
Provincial Office or Technical Assistant*	20	13
National Office	0	15
Private Firms	7	6
No Answer	34	32

\* Provincial offices available to congressmen are department heads of national bureaus while governors can appoint only those that work in the provincial capitol.

<sup>6</sup> Chi-square revealed the separation as to whom the liders support and their view regarding the use of projects significant beyond the .01 level.

position is limited to the province accounts for most of the difference. The connotation of using positions to gain support was more favorable than the use of money and projects. Only a dozen leaders were opposed to using positions to gain support. The major reason was that the leaders felt capable officials were usually appointed in keeping with civil service regulations.

Threats to do an individual physical harm through goons or armed violence was not used in the province by candidates of either of the two leadership positions. When the leaders heard the term "threats" they usually thought of threats as terrorism and violence. The majority confirmed that threats were not used as a means of obtaining support. The specific references to the use of threats revealed that usually the top leader never threatened, but that high level leaders occasionally might. Thirty-two leaders cited types of threats that could be used in a campaign for governor and congressman. The similarity between the types of threats used suggest that it was

TABLE XXXIII. THREATS USED DURING CAMPAIGN OF LEADERS ACCORDING TO LEADERS

Type of Threat	Gubernatorial	Congressional
Job and Food	20	21
Tenants threatened with eviction	4	4
Physical harm or death	14	13
Against a community (creating a new municipality)	0	5
Enforce laws (forestry, transportation, customs)	3	3
Threaten with Bureau of Internal Revenue investigation	0	7
Threats used only in Jose Panganiban	3	1

the liders and not the leaders who did the threatening. The only difference on the use of threats between the congressman and the governor was the congressman's ability to have someone investigated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and to have a municipality split.

Essentially there were no new discoveries made with the open-ended questions.<sup>7</sup> The purpose of the open-ended questions was to give the liders an opportunity to describe the role and behavior of the top provincial leaders so that a meaningful comparison between the two political leadership positions in the province could be made. Since the congressman had greater access to patronage and public works funds he was able to exert more influence and accomplish more tangible projects than the governor.

I noticed that during the open-ended questions the respondents lacked a clear conception of what the leadership positions actually were and what the political leaders actually did. The liders were familiar with the political leaders' behavior and the liders had definite normative feelings about the leadership positions, but they had never been forced to evaluate specific leadership tasks. Studies of provincial or local politics usually stopped at this point and did not force the respondent to funnel his experiences into specific, limited conceptualization.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, in the next two chapters I will

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<sup>7</sup> For others who have pointed out the superiority of the congressman in provincial politics see Remigio E. Agpalo, "The Political Elite and the People," *op. cit.*, pp. 272-329, and Tito C. Firmalino and Nextor N. Pilar, The 1963 Local Elections in Aklan: A Study of the Recruitment of Political Leaders and Its Relation to Administration, (Manila, 1968), 7-8, 47.

<sup>8</sup> Agpalo, *op. cit.*, Robert Youngblood, A Study of the 1963 Mayor-

go beyond general impressionistic descriptions to descriptions where the respondents were compelled to describe the leadership role and behavior more explicitly.

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ality Elections in Iolo, Philippines, Unpublished Master's Thesis (Honolulu, 1966); Villanueva, op. cit.



## CHAPTER VIII

### LIDERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE TASK-SETS OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE CONGRESSMAN

The leadership description questionnaire (LBDQ) developed by the Ohio State Leadership Studies group had been used only once with political leaders.<sup>1</sup> The findings of the study of United States Senators suggested that the questionnaire could be useful in describing dimensions of leadership role and behavior in political as well as in business and military organizations. Some of the LBDQ items had to be adjusted to the Filipino setting, but on the whole the questions were not changed too much. The primary purpose for adopting the LBDQ format was to obtain clear descriptions of leadership roles and behaviors that could be readily analyzed using multivariate methods. A second purpose was to test the LBDQ to see if its items would still be able to delineate patterns of specific leadership tasks in a non-American culture.

The leadership behavior and role description questions (LBRDQ) were grouped into eight hypothesized dimensions or task-categories which were, in turn, placed into three task-sets.<sup>2</sup> The task-sets were defined as institution-building tasks (integration, initiation of structure, role assumption, and production emphasis), representation tasks (representation and superior orientation), and support-

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<sup>1</sup> Stogdill, et al. "The Leadership of United States Senators," op. cit.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter II, Section 4.

building tasks (persuasiveness and consideration). Since the analysis of the LBRDQ for the governor and congressman in this and the next chapter will be highly technical in spots, I have added qualitative interpretations of the findings based on the interviews with the leaders and my observations made in the field.

As in the past chapters, the discussion will first concentrate on the governor, move to the congressman, and then compare the two positions. There were several ways to present the data, but I felt that it would be better to begin with a simple explanation of means of the scores for each hypothesized dimension in order to compare the relative importance of each of the hypothesized dimensions. From this point the sample was divided between supporters and non-supporters of the leader being described. In Chapter VII it was noted that the leaders' impressions (positive or negative) of the leader's behavior were found to be a factor in differentiating between supporters and non-supporters of a leader. An important question now arises as to whether the behavior and role descriptions in the LBRDQ were similarly tainted. As was stated in Chapter III, an hypothesis to test is if the normative description represents an objective description of the role of the position, independent of the occupant, then there will be higher agreement among the respondents on the role description than on the behavior description (Hypothesis 3.1). In other words, regardless of whom the leaders supported, their descriptions of the role for the leadership position would be the same. Following the general comparison across groups, the behavior description of the incumbent are contrasted with the role description of the position.

## 1. THE GOVERNOR

Before beginning the interviews I suspected that the role description scores would indicate which tasks the governor was supposed to carry out most frequently. I assumed that among the frequently exercised tasks would be integration, superior orientation, persuasiveness and consideration. Since the governor was close to the province and was the chief executive of the province, it seemed natural that he would be in an excellent position to bring the people in the various parts of the province together. Initiation of structure and role assumption would have lower scores since the governor was generally limited in his resources. Superior orientation would rank higher than representation since the governor would be making contacts outside the province in the capacity of a subordinate approaching a superior (e.g. senators or the President), rather than a delegate speaking to a forum. Persuasiveness and consideration would necessarily be important if a governor expected to maintain a following, or keep his pakikisama.

The results were slightly different than had been expected. The means clustered between twenty-one and twenty-two on a twenty-five point scale. The difference between the means was negligible, indicating that either the dimensions were not distinguishing clear patterns of roles or that the leaders merely felt that each of the task-categories should be exercised equally. When the means for the dimensions were taken separately for the supporters and non-supporters the means began to pull apart. However, there was still no meaningful difference between the means for the dimensions. Even

with these restrictions in mind, it was surprising that integration was ranked seventh and initiation of structure was second.

TABLE XXXIV. MEANS OF HYPOTHESIZED DIMENSIONS  
ON GOVERNOR'S ROLE DESCRIPTION

Dimension	Total Sample		Supporters		Non-Supporters	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Persuasion	21.93	1	21.93	4	21.94	1
Initiation of Structure	21.88	2	22.11	2	21.64	4
Superior Orientation	21.86	3	21.99	3	21.72	3
Representation	21.69	4	21.60	6	21.78	2
Consideration	21.68	5	21.76	5	21.58	5
Production Emphasis	21.68	5	22.42	1	20.86	8
Integration	21.51	7	21.55	7	21.48	7
Role Assumption	21.31	8	21.24	8	21.58	5

To test the hypothesis that the role description would be independent of whom the leaders supported, the scores for the supporters and the non-supporters of Governor Pardo were contrasted. Taking the task categories individually the difference between the two groups was only slight except for production emphasis. As was pointed out earlier, Governor Pardo was continually pushing deadlines and working hard. This was perhaps a case in which a highly salient behavior of a leader affected his supporters' orientation toward the leadership position. However, on the whole it would be false to state that in the case of the governor, the role description of the leaders was indeed independent of whom the leaders supported.

When the means for the hypothesized dimensions did not differ significantly for the role description, the reliability of the LBRDQ was drawn into question. The behavior description presented an opposite picture. The means on the different dimensions spread out, suggesting that the leaders' role descriptions showed that the leaders merely expected the governor to act within each of the task categories at roughly the same frequency. The means of the behavior description corresponded closely with the frequency with which the governor carried out specific task categories as I observed him. As would be expected, production emphasis came out as the behavior which Governor Pardo manifested most frequently, and the other dimensions continued down from there.

When the sample was divided by whom they supported, the rankings of the dimensions were in high agreement. Yet, the difference between the behavior description means of supporters and non-supporters averaged 2.7, as compared to the difference between the role description means of 0.4. All of the task category means differed greatly between supporters and non-supporters except for representation. The reason that representation did not differentiate as well as the other seven dimensions was apparently a result of the items being more impersonal and specific than the questions for the other dimensions. Therefore, the leaders who had not supported Pardo would not distort their description of his behavior as much as they might on more general and personal items. The leaders were familiar with the way in which Pardo had represented the province and they felt that Governor Pardo

TABLE XXXV. MEANS OF HYPOTHESIZED DIMENSIONS  
ON GOVERNOR'S BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

Dimension	Total Sample		Supporters		Non-Supporters	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Production Emphasis	20.47	1	21.76	1	19.04	2
Representation	20.35	2	21.07	3	19.56	1
Initiation of Structure	19.73	3	21.11	2	18.21	4
Consideration Superior	19.68	4	20.95	4	18.28	3
Orientation	19.20	5	20.51	5	17.76	5
Role Assumption	18.86	6	19.91	8	17.70	6
Persuasion	18.79	7	20.44	6	16.98	7
Integration	18.50	8	20.13	7	16.70	8

was fulfilling their expectations, as was indicated in the high score for behavior description. When Governor Pardo was acting as a representative of the province he was acting in an official, non-personal capacity. Consequently, scores for representation did not differentiate as clearly as the others. These observations verified the second half of the hypothesis that behavior descriptions will be affected much more than role descriptions by whom the leaders support.<sup>3</sup>

It was no surprise that Governor Pardo scored so highly on production emphasis. Past discussions of the personal habits of Pardo have mentioned his drive and energy. In several instances the leaders commented that Governor Pardo was actually working too hard. His non-supporters lamented that he was trying to do too much. As was

<sup>3</sup> As a further measure of agreement, the average of the standard deviations for role descriptions was 2.8 compared to behavior descriptions' average standard deviation of 3.5.

mentioned earlier, his acting strongly in this task-category influenced his supporters and probably explained why the role description discriminated between his followers and non-followers.

Representation ranked second in frequency of tasks which Governor Pardo carried out. The non-supporters of Pardo scored it first; again reflecting the fact that the items were probably not personally sensitive questions to leaders. Representation and production emphasis were exceptions in differentiating groups by their behavior descriptions and role descriptions. Although nothing conclusive can be said at this time, the two anomalies implied that salient leadership behavior did influence others' perceptions of the leadership position.

TABLE XXXVI. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ROLE DESCRIPTION AND BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION MEANS FOR GOVERNOR

Dimension	Total Sample	Supporters	Non-Supporters
Production			
Emphasis	1.21	.65	1.82
Representation	1.33	.52	2.34
Consideration	2.00	.81	3.30
Initiation of			
Structure	2.14	1.00	3.40
Role Assumption	2.45	1.33	3.68
Superior Orientation	2.66	1.48	3.98
Integration	3.02	1.42	4.78
Persuasion	3.14	1.49	4.95

Consideration scored highly as a result of Governor Pardo's policy of not "playing politics" when municipal or barrio officials requested assistance. Since Governor Pardo was in the provincial capitol almost every day he was easily accessible to those who were seeking favors. Following consideration was initiation of structure. Governor Pardo

had created new responsibilities for the position of governor. He dominated his staff meetings. He let others know how their job was to be done and he expected complete cooperation. Role Assumption was closely related to initiation of structure. Pardo's followers were pleased by his forceful leadership, but his non-supporters insisted that Pardo fell short of being a strong leader. A limitation on Pardo was his conflict with Congressman Pajarillo. The feud had lessened Pardo's ability to gain credit of undertakings in the province and to present himself as dynamic a leader as he would like to be.

On the negative side was superior orientation. Governor Pardo had only a small amount of influence at the national level because he was from a small province and because he had a conflict with the congressman from the province. During the election in 1967 President Marcos came to Daet and said that if Pardo was elected, what Pardo wanted from Malacanang, Pardo would receive. The Liberals cheerfully pointed out that Pardo had received very little. Even Pardo's own supporters acknowledged his inability to obtain more releases for the province as one of the Governor's major failings.

Integration within the province was not a major concern of the Governor's. Most of the projects which he implemented were done in his home municipality. The leaders resented his not coming to their municipalities to see them more often. Another reason for Pardo's shortcoming was that he lacked a comprehensive political support organization. A few of the questions under integration specifically referred to the leader's involvement with his political organization, and since Pardo did not have a firm support organization his scores were lower.



The largest difference between role and behavior for the Governor was persuasion. Governor Pardo admitted he was not a good speaker, particularly in large groups. To hear the Governor speak one was reminded of a student giving his first speech before a speech class. Pardo mixed in a few jokes with his presentations, but he was not convincing in his arguments and his major points were never clearly delineated or emphasized. Paradoxically, the leaders designated persuasion as the highest frequency which the governor should perform, yet in reality it was Pardo's major weakness.

For the governor's position the LBRDQ adequately gave descriptions for role and behavior. Through the use of the questions the hypothesis regarding the independence of the role description was tested. The mean scores for the role descriptions clustered between twenty-one and twenty-two on a twenty-five point scale, and the role descriptions were not significantly influenced by whom the leaders supported.

The behavior description for Governor Pardo was useful in pinpointing his strengths and weaknesses. Pardo met his role expectations well in production emphasis and representation. He performed moderately in consideration, initiation of structure and role assumption. His weaknesses were integration, superior orientation and persuasion. It should be noted that low scores in role assumption, integration and superior orientation were in part attributed to the hostile relationship between Governor Pardo and Congressman Pajarillo.

The task-categories which I had thought would be exercised highly (integration, superior orientation, persuasiveness, and consideration) by the governor turned out to be performed the least frequent. A second surprise finding was that the governor was expected to act and

acted as a representative of the province much more frequently than I had anticipated.

## 2. THE CONGRESSMAN

Before beginning the interviews I assumed that the congressman would have higher scores on all eight task-categories for role description, and as it turned out this was the case. On the role description scoring, the first three task-categories for the congressman were superior orientation, integration, and persuasion. As had been indicated earlier, the role of the congressman was to obtain funds from the national government for the province.<sup>4</sup> The congressman was supposed to act as a procurement officer. The items used for superior orientation were suggestive of a subordinate requesting assistance or material from a superior. The leaders' description of the role of the congressman in the open-ended questions was further verified by the LBRDQ scoring.

Integration was scored highly for the congressman because of the vast resources at the command of the congressman to maintain a political network. Since both Congressman Pajarillo and former Congressman Pimentel maintained their respective organizations, several leaders interpreted the integration items to specifically refer to party politics rather than province-wide politics or integration. Persuasion was an important tool for anyone who served in Congress. The fact that the non-supporters gave persuasion a higher score than the supporters indicated the influence that former Congressman Marcial

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<sup>4</sup> See Chapter VII, Section 2.

Pimentel had on his followers' expectations.

Representation was much lower than had been anticipated. Since the congressman was supposed to be a legislator and delegate from the province, it seemed natural that representation would be scored highly. However, as mentioned above, the liders expected the congressman to be a broker and not a representative, and this feeling was further substantiated by the role descriptions with the LBRDQ.

TABLE XXXVII. MEANS OF HYPOTHESIZED DIMENSIONSON  
CONGRESSMAN'S ROLE DESCRIPTION

Dimension	Total Sample		Supporters		Non-Supporters	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Superior						
Orientation	22.94	1	23.21	1	22.68	1
Integration	22.74	2	23.13	2	22.36	3
Persuasion	22.50	3	22.46	5	22.55	2
Production						
Emphasis	22.20	4	22.48	4	21.92	4
Initiation of						
Structure	22.16	5	22.44	6	21.89	5
Representation	21.96	6	22.56	3	21.38	7
Consideration	21.83	7	22.31	7	21.36	8
Role Assumption	21.71	8	21.67	8	21.75	6

It was shown that the LBRDQ was useful in verifying the hypothesis regarding the effects of whom a lider supported had on perceptions about the behavior of the governor. A question then asked was whether the LBRDQ would also discriminate well for the descriptions of the congressman's role and behavior. It was found that the means for role description did not differ significantly for the congressman, except for representation. At first I thought that any difference in

role description of representation would be explained by the fact that the Liberals would be thinking of the way that Pimentel had served in the House. However, on inspection, the means of the two groups indicated that the supporters of Pajarillo had higher scores for representation than did his non-supporters. The only explanation which seemed plausible was that those who were not leaders of Pajarillo felt that he should represent the province less since he would not be concerned with their point of view or interest.

The spread of the behavior description means was wider than the role description means. Of the top role description task-categories only integration and superior orientation remained as being exercised often. The scores for the behavior descriptions yielded meaningful differences between the groups of supporters and non-supporters for all task-categories. These results further verified the hypothesis

TABLE XXXVIII. MEANS OF HYPOTHESIZED DIMENSIONS ON CONGRESSMAN'S BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

Dimension	Total Sample		Supporters		Non-Supporters	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Production						
Emphasis	20.16	1	21.56	4	18.74	1
Consideration	19.91	2	21.75	3	18.12	2
Integration	19.86	3	22.58	1	12.21	6
Superior						
Orientation	19.68	4	21.90	2	19.49	4
Initiation of						
Structure	19.40	5	21.48	6	17.36	5
Role Assumption	19.39	6	20.79	7	18.02	3
Representation	18.87	7	21.54	5	16.25	7
Persuasion	17.42	8	20.67	8	14.23	8

regarding the distortion in behavior description. The rankings of the task-categories on the behavior description between the supporters and non-supporters was almost identical, but the difference in the absolute frequency assigned to a dimension was not. The average of the differences for role descriptions was only .5 compared to 4.3 for behavior descriptions. Further, the dispersion about the mean scores was less for the role description. The averages of the standard deviations for role descriptions was 2.7 compared to 3.5 for behavior descriptions.

Matching Congressman Pajarillo's behavior description to the role description further demonstrated the effects of whom leaders supported on behavior description. The difference between does and ought for Congressman Pajarillo tended to be highly polarized between supporters and non-supporters. The mean difference of does and ought for supporters was 1.0 compared to 2.9 for non-supporters. Pajarillo best matched consideration role descriptions with his behavior description. The close matching was a result of Pajarillo's accessibility and understanding of the political system which required face-to-face relations.

Production Emphasis scored well because the leaders generally viewed the questions in the light of a political campaign. Pajarillo was said to be a hard campaigner who never let his supporters take time off from their electioneering, but after the campaign was over the Congressman did not usually work quite so hard. Tied in with production emphasis was initiation of structure and role assumption.

TABLE XXXIX. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ROLE DESCRIPTION AND  
BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION MEANS FOR CONGRESSMAN

Dimension	Difference of Means		
	Total Sample	Supporters	Non-Supporters
Consideration	1.92	.56	3.24
Production Emphasis	2.04	.92	3.13
Role Assumption	2.32	.88	3.73
Initiation of Structure	2.76	.96	4.52
Integration	2.88	.55	5.14
Representation	3.09	1.02	5.13
Superior Orientation	3.26	1.31	5.68
Persuasion	5.08	1.79	8.32

Congressman Pajarillo had a well-run machine in the province. His top supporters at the headquarters in Daet and in his office in Manila were highly capable and loyal to the Congressman. Although he left a great deal of work for them to do, he made sure that they understood what and how they were to act. As a leader in the province Pajarillo exerted his fullest influence into every municipality. There were no misunderstandings or qualifications when the item, "He is easily recognized as the leader of the province," was read. The leaders answered, "Always."

Since Pajarillo had such a tight running organization he was able to work throughout the province. Integrative tasks took a great deal of his time and attention. Attending fiestas, planning feeder roads and paving of the Manila-South Road were all construed by Pajarillo as being integrative tasks. Because Camarines Norte was a single district province and because he had the resources, Pajarillo exerted

a strong influence throughout the province.

Pajarillo was only marginally successful in representation and superior orientation tasks. His scant legislative record was reflected in the ratings. In fact, when asked how frequently Congressman Pajarillo represented the province at outside meetings some of his non-supporters would chuckle. On ceremonial occasions the Congressman acted as a representative of the province, but even with the low importance placed on representation Pajarillo has scored poorly. As far as superior orientation, the non-supporters and supporters alike gave Pajarillo only moderate scores in spite of all the funds which he brought into the province. Some leaders hinted that Pajarillo was having difficulties getting along with Malacanang and the House leadership of the Nacionalista Party.

Pajarillo's principal weakness was persuasion. As a public speaker he was even worse than Pardo, although the position of congressman according to the leaders required someone who was eloquent. Pajarillo was aware of his shortcomings, but countered that he used other means of convincing people than verbal argumentation.

### 3. SUMMARY

The LBRDQ added further substance to the assumption that the positions of governor and congressman have basically different roles. On the whole, a congressman was expected to operate within each of the task-categories more frequently than a governor. In Camarines Norte the position of congressman was a stronger political leadership position than that of governor (Hypothesis 3.2). A comparison of the rankings and the frequency scores for the role description of the two

leaders showed that the greatest potential for the strengthening of a congressman lies in his ability to master superior orientation and integration tasks. These two tasks were of less importance for a governor. Since a governor would not be in a position to approach or contact his superiors as frequently as a congressman, the leaders naturally scored the governor's role lower. With regard to integration, a Congressman simply would have resources at his command which

TABLE XL. A COMPARISON OF THE ROLE DESCRIPTIONS  
OF THE CONGRESSMAN AND GOVERNOR

Dimensions	Congressman		Governor		Difference of Means
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	
Superior Orientation	22.94	1	21.86	3	1.08
Integration	22.74	2	21.51	7	1.23
Persuasion	22.51	3	21.93	1	.57
Production Emphasis	22.20	4	21.68	5	.52
Initiation of Structure	22.16	5	21.88	2	.29
Representation	21.96	6	21.69	4	.28
Consideration	21.83	7	21.68	5	.15
Role Assumption	21.71	8	21.31	8	.40

would facilitate his operating on a wider scale throughout a province. Persuasion was another important asset for a congressman. For instance, after scoring the persuasion items the leaders sometimes commented that a congressman had to be able to convince others that his ideas were to their advantage or else he would be useless as a congressman. High role scores for the congressman vis-a-vis the governor on production emphasis and role assumption again underscored the disparity between the potential power of the two offices particularly in Camarines Norte.



The actual behavior description of the leaders, however, suggested that Governor Pardo was operating in as many task-categories and just as frequently as Congressman Pajarillo was. Although the non-supporters of the Congressman lowered his score considerably with all groups considered, it was apparent that Governor Pardo had been exerting his

TABLE XLI. A COMPARISON OF THE BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTIONS  
OF THE CONGRESSMAN AND GOVERNOR

Dimensions	Congressman		Governor		Difference of Means
	Means	Rank	Means	Rank	
Production Emphasis	20.16	1	20.47	1	-.31
Consideration	19.91	2	19.68	4	-.53
Integration	19.86	3	18.50	8	1.36
Superior Orientation	19.68	4	19.20	5	.48
Initiation of Structure	19.40	5	19.73	3	-.33
Role Assumption	19.39	6	18.56	6	.54
Representation	18.87	7	20.34	2	-1.48
Persuasion	17.42	8	18.79	2	-1.37

energies into several of the task-categories. Surprisingly, the categories in which Pardo did considerably better than Pajarillo were persuasion and representation, the two categories in which one would think that Pajarillo would excel. On the Congressman's side, integration remained his strength for the reasons cited above. The differences on the other categories were not significant, but did indicate that Pardo, with less role potential, had equaled Pajarillo's behavior in a number of categories. However, Pajarillo was still considered to be in a stronger leadership because of his position as congressman and the access to resources which the position provided.

The LBRDQ proved more than adequate to delineate patterns of behavior to evaluate the roles and behaviors of the governor and congressman. It also provided a means by which to test the hypothesis regarding the distortion of leadership behavior description. As a result of Philippine politics being highly personalized, particularly at the leader-to-lider level, it was found that behavior descriptions tended to polarize between supporters and non-supporters while role descriptions clustered together (Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4). In more complex provinces or communities where personal contacts of a leader would be limited, one might expect to find a different pattern develop where role expectations for a position would disperse and behavior descriptions cluster. Therefore, it would be useful to apply the LBRDQ in several provinces in the Philippines, or elsewhere, varying the degree of economic stability, or other variables, between the provinces to see if differing conditions would affect the evaluations of the role and behavior of political leaders. For instance, in multi-district provinces the position of the governor is considered to have add importance vis-a-vis the position of the congressman. The LBRDQ would be one manner in which to test that assumption and also to specify which task-categories would receive increased frequencies and which would receive decreased frequencies.

On the whole, the LBRDQ was successful in describing leadership positions in Camarines Norte. In order to make comparisons with the studies carried out by the Ohio State Leadership Studies group, and to test the independence of the hypothesized dimensions, the scores for the task-categories were factor analyzed. Although the discussion

of the factor analysis could have preceded the presentation above, I felt it would be better to describe the task-categories in detail before launching into a technical analysis of the hypothesized dimensions.

CHAPTER IX  
DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP ROLE AND BEHAVIOR

The dispersion of the scores on the task-categories indicated that the task-categories might be considered as independent leadership task-dimensions. Ralph Stogdill and others in their study of United States Senators derived nine factors from nine categories,<sup>1</sup> they also combined the individual task-categories that had moderate to high factor loadings with each factor to define the factors. However, they grouped categories which had factor loadings as low as .21 and included in their discussion factors which accounted for less than ten per cent of the variance. Actually, the categories which they used were independent since each of the factors usually had only one category loading highly on it.

To test the independence of the task-categories for the role and behavior descriptions of the Philippine study, principal factor analyses and orthogonal rotations (varimax method) were performed for each of the four sets of scores: governor behavior description, governor role description, congressman behavior description, and congressman role description. In all four cases the intercorrelation matrices of the descriptions had a large number of high correlations (above .50) between the hypothesized dimensions.<sup>2</sup> When the principal factor solution was found, all the categories loaded highly on the

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<sup>1</sup> Stogdill, et al., op. cit., reasoned that since the number of variables was small they would rotate the factors until the residual variance was zero.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 0 for correlation matrices.

first factor. For instance, in the case of congressman behavior description the principal factor accounted for 65.3% of the variance. As a result of these two findings it was questionable whether the task-categories were independent. Yet when the factors were rotated until the residual variance was zero, the amount of explained variance was spread across all the rotated factors evenly with each factor having only one high factor loading. The rotated solution suggested that the intercorrelation matrices and the unrotated factor matrices had given a false impression of the hypothesized dimensions.<sup>3</sup>

To check the findings of the rotated solution, step-wise regression was run selecting one of the hypothesized dimensions at a time as a dependent variable and regressing the other seven on it. The partial correlations revealed that when the other variables were controlled for, the correlations dropped to insignificant levels in most cases. As a further check, oblique rotations were made using the biquartimin solution. The primary pattern matrix substantiated the pattern found by the orthogonal rotations in all four cases, and the independence of the dimensions was confirmed when it was found that the oblique factors were uncorrelated.<sup>4</sup> The results raised two interesting methodological questions, 1) why would the principal factor take out such a large percentage of the variance, suggesting dependence among the variables, while the rotated solution showed that

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<sup>3</sup> See Appendix E for the rotated factor matrices.

<sup>4</sup> The correlations between the oblique factors in only a few instances rose above .23.

the variables were strongly independent, and 2) what should be the number of factors rotated to yield a meaningful solution?

#### 1. TEST FOR RESPONSE SET

The principal-factor model of factor analysis was designed to have the first factor delineate the most general pattern of relationship among the data and account for the most variance among the variables. Consequently the factor loadings and the eigenvalue for the first principal factor are usually high.<sup>5</sup> In the four LBRDQ factor matrices the first factor accounted for over 50% of the variance in each case. The eigenvalues for the other seven factors were less than one, the usual criteria for rotation. In Table XLIII notice the extreme eigenvalues for the first factors.

The rotated factor solutions gave another picture. Rather than have the bulk of the variance explained by one factor, the explained variance was parceled over all the factors. It was clear, not only through the orthogonal rotations, but also through the oblique rotations, that the hypothesized dimensions (task-categories) were independent task dimensions. The question of why the dimensions had clustered on the first unrotated factor still remained. A plausible answer was that a response-set was occurring which caused the loadings to converge on the principal factor, and the rotated solution delineated a more accurate pattern of the variables by controlling for the principal factor. If this was the case, a way to test for the response-set would be to combine the LBRDQ scores and carry out factor

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<sup>5</sup> R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis", Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, 4 (December, 1967).

TABLE XLII. EIGENVALUES AND COMMUNALITIES\* FOR THE UNROTATED FACTOR MATRICES

Factor	Governor Role		Governor Behavior		Congressman Role		Congressman Behavior	
	Eigenvalue	$h^2$	Eigenvalue	$h^2$	Eigenvalue	$h^2$	Eigenvalue	$h^2$
1	4.25	53.1	4.69	58.7	4.98	62.2	5.23	65.3
2	0.94	64.9	0.81	68.8	0.62	69.9	0.67	73.8
3	0.75	74.2	0.60	76.1	0.59	77.2	0.59	81.1
4	0.55	81.1	0.52	82.6	0.56	84.2	0.46	86.8
5	0.47	86.9	0.41	87.7	0.43	89.5	0.33	90.9
6	0.42	92.2	0.37	92.3	0.36	94.0	0.28	94.4
7	0.35	96.6	0.34	96.5	0.27	97.3	0.25	97.5
8	0.27	100.0	0.28	100.0	0.21	100.0	0.20	100.0

\* communalities designated by  $h^2$ .

analysis since each of the sets of descriptions was tapping one aspect of one leadership position. The specific hypothesis tested was if the principal factor was accounting for a response set due to the leaders describing the one leadership position there would be as many factors with high loadings as there were leaders (governor and congressman) and aspects (role and behavior description) of leadership combined.

To test the hypothesis the scores for all four sets of LBRDQ scores were grouped together and principal factor analysis was performed. If the hypothesis were true, at least four distinct factors corresponding with the four sets of descriptions would result after rotation. An orthogonal rotation with factors having eigenvalues of greater than one brought out seven factors (See Table XLIII). As hypothesized, there were four rotated factors that did, in fact, match the governor role description, the governor behavior description, the congressman role description, and the congressman behavior description sets. Two of the other factors revealed that role assumption (for role description) consideration (for role description) were independent leadership descriptions. Production emphasis was the only variable which had high loadings for the final factor, indicating that production emphasis was also an independent dimension.

The factor analysis of the four sets of scores indicated that high intercorrelations and high principal factor loadings were a result of the leaders describing the same aspect of the same leadership position.<sup>6</sup> Further, the oblique rotations and the

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<sup>6</sup> For a discussion of further tests for the response set see Appendix F.



TABLE XLIII. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX  
FOR ALL LEADERSHIP POSITION DESCRIPTIONS\*

Variables**	Factor							h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
GB R	0.69							0.72
GB SO	0.78							0.76
GB P	0.80							0.75
GB I	0.78							0.71
GB IS	0.76							0.74
GB PE	0.73						-0.41	0.73
GB C	0.74				--	--		0.76
GB RA	0.68							0.76
GR R		0.80						0.73
GR SO		0.65			--			0.72
GR P		0.77						0.72
GR I		0.77						0.72
GR IS		0.71				--		0.71
GR PE		0.58					-0.52	0.74
GR C						0.76		0.72
GR RA					0.77			0.74
CB R			0.84					0.82
CB SO			0.78					0.76
CB P			0.85					0.78
CB I			0.85					0.79
CB IS			0.84					0.76
CB PE			0.72				-0.48	0.80
CB C			0.68			--		0.71
CB RA			0.67		--			0.63
CR R				-0.73				0.68
CR SO	--			-0.74				0.79
CR P				-0.84				0.78
CR I	--			-0.75				0.80
CR IS	--			-0.63				0.66
CR PE	--			-0.61			-0.47	0.78
CR C				-0.50		0.62		0.75
CR RA				-0.55	0.68			0.81
% Common Variance	19.8	17.7	22.7	18.5	8.1	7.1	5.1	100.0
						Total h <sup>2</sup> =		74.2

\* (--) designates loadings from .3 to .4; loadings under .3 omitted.

\*\* Variables identified with initials: G=governor, C=Congressman, R=Role B=behavior, R=representation, SO=superior orientation, P=persuasion, I=integration, IS=initiation of structure, PE=production emphasis, C=consideration, and RA= role assumption

step-wise regressions demonstrated that the task-categories used in the Philippines were independent, just as the factors found in United States studies were.<sup>7</sup>

## 2. DIMENSIONS OF A NEW TASK-SET

One of the conceptual problems with factor analysis was to determine a cut-off point on the number of factors to rotate. Although there have been suggestions made in this field, there have been no set criteria for doing so.<sup>8</sup> One solution was to rotate factors that had eigenvalues greater than or equal to one. It was argued that those factors below one were not accounting for meaningful variance and that that variance might be attributed to random error. Another method was to rotate all the factors until the residual variance was zero, as Stogdill, Coon and Day had done. However, the decision on the number of factors to rotate depended on the hypothesis tested and the type of data analyzed.

A general criterion which took random error into consideration was the scree test. The cut-off point was determined by a plotting of the eigenvalues of the unrotated factor matrix. The number of factors which preceded the point where the eigenvalues dropped and began to level was used in rotation. This was the criterion that I used to determine the number of factors to extract.

The largest drop in the eigenvalues took place after the fourth factor for all descriptions except for governor's role description.

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<sup>7</sup> Stogdill, Manual for LBDQ-Form XII, op. cit.; Stogdill, et al., "United States Senators," op. cit.

<sup>8</sup> See Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," op. cit., and Harry Harman, Modern Factor Analysis, (Chicago, 1968).

The eigenvalues for governor's role description dropped sharply after the third factor, but the amount of variance explained was only about 75%. The cut-off for the other eigenvalues was the point at which the eigenvalues were greater than 0.45. Selecting 0.45 as the lower limit meant that governor's role description had five factors rotated, while the others had four factors rotated.

The five factors rotated for governor's role description indicated that of the eight dimensions three were still independent while the other five grouped on two factors. The rotated factor which accounted for most of the variance had high loadings for persuasion (.73), initiation of structure (.78) and integration (.79). The factor might be labeled an institution-building factor corresponding to the task-set developed in Chapter II. The governor was expected to specify the role his subordinates were to play, and if integration was looked at from the perspective of working within a political organization it was understandable how the three dimensions would cluster together. (See Table XLIV).

The second factor, representation, similarly matched the representation tasks of the hypothesized task-set. The moderate loadings for persuasion (.43) and for integration (.39) suggested two things, first, representation and superior orientation might require eloquence, and secondly, that the leader's interaction with his subordinates, as well as his superiors, was related to the representation task. As was indicated above, consideration, role assumption, and production emphasis were independent dimensions.<sup>9</sup> Conceptually, in the case of

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<sup>9</sup> When four factors were rotated, the three single dimensions

TABLE XLIV. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR GOVERNOR ROLE DESCRIPTION

Variables	Factor					h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	V	
Representation	0.81	0.35	0.30	0.01	0.04	0.86
Superior Orientation	0.66	0.35	0.06	0.31	0.36	0.79
Persuasion	0.43	0.73	0.16	0.02	0.06	0.75
Integration	0.40	0.79	0.11	0.12	0.15	0.83
Initiation of Structure	0.10	0.78	0.29	0.28	0.20	0.82
Production Emphasis	0.24	0.28	0.88	0.13	0.21	0.97
Consideration	0.10	0.16	0.11	0.95	0.10	0.97
Role Assumption	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.10	0.94	0.97
% Common Variance	22.0	31.0	14.7	16.1	16.1	100.0
					Total h <sup>2</sup> = 86.9	

the governor's role description, rotating five factors offered the clearest solution.

Rotating four factors for Governor Pardo's behavior description revealed the same basis pattern that had been found for role description. The factor which accounted for most of the variance was the representation factor with high loadings for representation (.82), superior orientation (.67) and persuasion (.75). (See Table XLV). The second factor encompassed both the old institution- and support-building tasks. Consideration loaded with the institution-building factor which had been specified for governor role description above. The loadings of role assumption (.87), consideration (.51) and superior orientation (.59) suggested a dimension where the degree to which a leader (governor) exercised his leadership role could be measured by the amount of materials he could obtain from superiors and the level at which he maintained his "pakikisama" with his subordinates. The final factor, production emphasis, still remained independent.<sup>10</sup>

For the congressman's role the first factor was representation, and like the governor, the congressman's representation task included integration and persuasion which loaded more highly (.64) with representation for the congressman than it did for the governor (See Table XLVI).

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remained and the representation and institution-building factors merged.

<sup>10</sup> When the eigenvalue criterion was raised to allow only three factors to rotate, production emphasis merged together with the institution- and support-building dimension.

TABLE XLV. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR GOVERNOR BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

Variables	Factor				h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	
Representation	0.82	0.28	0.23	-0.05	0.80
Superior Orientation	0.67	0.08	0.23	-0.59	0.85
Persuasion	0.75	0.41	0.14	-0.20	0.79
Integration	0.33	0.76	0.22	-0.18	0.77
Initiation of Structure	0.37	0.74	0.15	-0.27	0.78
Production Emphasis	0.31	0.27	0.87	-0.19	0.97
Consideration	0.08	0.59	0.41	-0.51	0.78
Role Assumption	0.15	0.30	0.12	-0.87	0.89

TABLE XLVI. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR CONGRESSMAN ROLE DESCRIPTION

Variables	Factor				h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	
Representation	0.86	-0.13	0.18	0.22	0.83
Persuasion	0.64	-0.43	0.35	0.10	0.72
Superior Orientation	0.66	-0.55	0.11	0.29	0.83
Integration	0.65	-0.53	0.20	0.22	0.80
Initiation of Structure	0.27	-0.80	0.33	0.09	0.83
Production Emphasis	0.25	-0.78	0.10	0.35	0.80
Consideration	0.25	-0.23	0.90	0.20	0.97
Role Assumption	0.27	-0.26	0.20	0.89	0.97

The institution-building dimension was repeated, and consideration and role assumption were shown to be independent as was indicated in the opening section of this chapter.

The representation dimension reappeared again for Congressman Pajarillo's behavior description. The necessity of a two-way movement between superiors and subordinates was underscored by the presence of superior orientation (.79) and integration (.67). The institution-building dimension also had the connotation of a two-way movement with loadings for integration (.44) and representation (.53). Persuasion and initiation of structure loading together suggested that persuasion was also part of institution-building tasks, at least for the Congressman (See Table XLVII).

Consideration, production emphasis, and integration defined a campaign or electioneering dimension. The leaders identified the individual items on the questionnaire for these categories, particularly production emphasis and integration, as campaign-time activities. Role assumption and consideration together formed the fourth independent dimension.<sup>11</sup> The fact that role assumption and consideration did group together for Pajarillo's behavior implied that the leaders seemed to measure Pajarillo's taking a strong leadership role in terms of his relations with his subordinates.

At the start, I listed four task categories of which the LBRDQ

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<sup>11</sup> When rotating only three factors the role assumption-consideration dimension and the electioneering dimension remained, and, as before, institution-building and representation merged.



TABLE XLVII. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR CONGRESSMAN BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

Variables	Factors				h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	
Representation	0.69	0.53	0.10	0.24	0.82
Superior Orientation	0.79	0.25	0.27	0.30	0.85
Integration	0.67	0.44	0.40	0.17	0.83
Persuasion	0.39	0.76	0.24	0.24	0.84
Initiation of Structure	0.30	0.81	0.30	0.19	0.87
Production Emphasis	0.42	0.24	0.82	0.09	0.91
Consideration	0.03	0.38	0.64	0.57	0.88
Role Assumption	0.35	0.19	0.12	0.87	0.93

was to describe three: institution-building tasks, support-building tasks, and representation tasks. The factor analyses of the LBRDQ scores demonstrated that the task-set needed to be revised. As was hypothesized, there was a representation factor which incorporated representation and superior orientation. However, persuasion and integration (the leader's relations with his subordinates) were also linked to representation task-group.

Institution-building tasks remained, but varied for each leader. Initiation of structure and integration were constant through all four cases, and representation was added for the Congressman. Support-building tasks did not exist as defined in Chapter II. In all four descriptions, role assumption, consideration, and production emphasis tended to be three independent dimensions that did not fit into the other categories. A new task-set as defined by the factor analyses would include superior-subordinate relations tasks, institution-building tasks, consideration tasks, role assumption tasks, and production emphasis tasks.

### 3. SUMMARY

Using factor analysis proved the usefulness and reliability of the LBRDQ for leadership descriptions. The seeming paradox between the high intercorrelations and the independent rotated factors was resolved by showing that evaluations of the same leadership positions and the same aspect of a leadership position created a halo effect with the scores clustered around the most general factor. When the description sets were taken together and factor analyzed, distinct

role-behavior-governor-congressman factors were derived verifying the response-set hypothesis. The second problem of determining the number of factors to extract was settled by using a rough approximation of the scree criterion. When the scree criteria was used, the factor analysis revealed patterns of interaction among the task-dimensions which served as the parameters for a revised leadership task-set.

CHAPTER X  
COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT

A number of social scientists in the Philippines have sought to understand why an individual follows or votes for one leader rather than another. One group of researchers based their findings on personal experience in a particular locality, while a second group relied primarily on questionnaires. The studies resulting from the inquiry of the first group indicated that personal ties were of prime importance in deciding whom to support politically. Debts of gratitude (*utang na loob*), extra-familial ties and kinship ties were supposed to have been the bonds used by local politicians to cement their support structure.<sup>1</sup> One of the reasons for the stress on personal ties was that the studies were centered on the municipal or barrio level of politics, and national politics were discussed only in its relationship to the local situation. Specifically, the level of analysis was lider-constituent or sometimes lider-lower lider-constituent.<sup>2</sup> At this level a lower lider usually had no more than thirty people that he influenced, and personal ties were essential for the lower lider to keep a following. Whether the same personal

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<sup>1</sup> For example, see Lande, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-23, 133-148; Grossholtz, *op. cit.*, p. 63-67; Youngblood, *op. cit.*, p. 87-90; Agpalo, "The Political Elite and The People," *op. cit.*, pp. 154-161.

<sup>2</sup> Lower lider was used to differentiate a powerful lider with wealth and land-holdings from a lider who was either a tenant farmer or a small-scale independent farmer.

patron-client associations were important at the leader-lider level was not known and not investigated.

The second group of researchers relying on surveys conducted with questionnaires found that personal ties were not so important. Eufemio Patanne found that 64 per cent of those interviewed said that they voted for a candidate on the basis of his capability.<sup>3</sup> More recently the Rank Corporation observed that an even higher percentage of voters were concerned with capability and issues.<sup>4</sup>

The results of the latter group contradicted the findings of the first group which suggested that personal and social pressures influenced voters a great deal more than the inherent capability of a candidate. Further, discussions of sub-national political structures did not credit the voter with having a mind of his own in deciding for whom to vote. For instance, an observation such as "Control rests with local political leaders [liders] who can deliver the vote in the barrios,"<sup>5</sup> indicated that voters would probably follow their lider blindly.

I was not interested, however, so much in why constituents voted or followed a leader, but rather why a lider, who played a much larger political role, followed a leader. In other words, how did a political

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<sup>3</sup> Eufemio Patanne, "Political Opinion," in The Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Politics, op. cit., pp. 114-118. For others who reached similar conclusions see Gelia Castillo, "The Party Struggle and the People's Mandate," in The Foundation and Dynamics of Filipino Politics, op. cit., pp. 119-128; and Tito Firmalino, op. cit., pp. 40-43.

<sup>4</sup> H. A. Averch, F. H. Denton, and J. E. Koehler, op. cit., pp. 60, 72. Noted that 90% of the respondents voted on the basis of the capability and honesty of the candidate.

<sup>5</sup> Grossholtz, op. cit., p. 152.

leader keep and maintain a following among his subleaders? Examining motivations of leaders differed from voter behavior and attitude studies in that the leaders did more than merely cast anonymous ballots: they were conspicuous in their support by actually campaigning for a leader. The leaders were also considered to control or at least have influence over a number of voters, consequently a leader's support was worth considerably more than a single vote.

The second purpose for the investigation of the components of support between leaders and leaders was to test the hypothesis that development in an electoral system could be conceptualized in a three-dimensional space with the three dimensions defined as support based on deference, support based on particularistic rewards, and support based on ideological concerns. This chapter includes a discussion of the findings using mean scores and other descriptive statistics, and in Chapter XI prospects for the three-dimensional model as a model of electoral political development are presented.

#### 1. THE INQUIRY

Four sets of questions were developed to measure the leaders' reasons for supporting one candidate over another. The first series of questions asked the leader to state in his own words why he supported a candidate for governor or congressman. He was then asked to score his reasons on a one to seven scale where seven represented "extremely important" and one, "not important at all." The second measure used was a list of ten items in which the leader was to score each item on the same "extremely important" to "not important at all" scale. After he finished the scoring, the respondent was handed a

card with the list of ten items. He was asked to pick "the most important" and "the least important" reasons of the ten. Of the remaining eight he was to pick the most and least important, and so on until he had finished the list. The final method placed the respondent in value-conflict situations where he was to select between two candidates who were alike except for one attribute.

Except for "utang na loob," which was added after the Manila pre-tests, the open-ended questions yielded no new reasons for a lider to support a candidate. Specific statements such as, ". . . because he is a good administrator," were placed in a general category, in this case, "capability." The scoring on a one to seven scale permitted the respondents to give tied scores more readily than they could by ranking. The ranking, however, gave a measure of the relative importance of each variable. The paired-comparisons section was based on economic decision-making models.<sup>6</sup> Utils were presented in the form of per cent chances of winning that could be assigned to each of the components. In other words, the utility of winning would be paired with a specific component, and the respondent would have to select the point (per cent chance of winning) at which he would prefer the variable over winning. Fifty-per cent was considered the break-even point for chance of winning. The liders had no trouble understanding per cent chance of winning since most of them frequently attended cock-fights where odds were always used.

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<sup>6</sup> Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis (Reading, Mass., 1968).

## 2. THE FINDINGS

One of the original hypotheses to test was that since the congressman had access to more resources than the governor, particularistic rewards would be more important to a lider in supporting a candidate for congress than for supporting a candidate for the governorship. After a little over thirty interviews it became apparent that two things were wrong.<sup>7</sup> First, the hypothesis did not stand. Spearman rank order correlations indicated that there was no difference between the reasons for supporting a congressional candidate and reasons for supporting a gubernatorial candidate. The second short-coming was even more disturbing: the respondents were obviously hedging on their answers. For instance, while tea or soft drinks were being served, the respondents would request that the formal interview be interrupted for an off-the-record conversation. During these interludes the respondents would relate how important money had been in the last election, or they would remark that the best candidate was not always the candidate who was supported. Yet, when the interview was continued and questions were asked about the importance of capability, issues, money, jobs and so on, the respondents insisted that capability and issues were the most important reasons for them, and that money, projects, and jobs were not important.

After discussing the findings with my assistant who had come up with the same results, I decided that the items had to be improved

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<sup>7</sup> One problem worked out during the pre-tests was that the lidere had to be reminded that promises meant that with absolute certainty the promises would be fulfilled if the candidate won.



or thrown out. In the course of the next ten interviews various methods, from changing the order of the questions to outright disagreement with the respondents, were tried, but the result was the same: "on the record" answers showed that capability and issues were said to be important, and money, projects and jobs were not.<sup>8</sup> Beginning with the forty-fifty respondent, in addition to questions about themselves, we asked the respondents to score what they thought other leaders whom they personally knew considered important reasons for supporting a candidate for governor or congressman. To assure that comparable scores were given for other leaders and self, the leaders were told to consider only leaders like themselves whom they personally knew within their party. The answers changed: "Leaders work for those [candidates] who can do the most . . . and give the most."

When the results began to indicate that capability and issues were not so important and that money, projects and jobs were, I again asked for evaluations on the basis of whether it was the gubernatorial or congressional candidate running for election. Just as before, there was not a significant difference between the scores for governor and the scores for congressman.

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<sup>8</sup> In some cases it may have been true that capability was important, but a considerable number of leaders who were known to have been swayed by money or positions said that money or jobs were not important. For instance, a cousin of former Congressman Pimentel, who had been supported by Pimentel when he ran for municipal council, mayor and vice-governor, switched to Congressman Pajarillo and was subsequently appointed a justice in the Court of First Instance in Daet. When he was asked how important positions were to him, he answered, "Not important at all."

The scoring of the reasons that a lider had for supporting one candidate over another varied depending on whether it was a self or other evaluation. On the one-to-seven scaling, scores differed meaningfully between self and other in every case except party. The mean scores for party were 5.19 (self) and 5.48 (others). Party ranked third for self and fourth for other. When asked why party was so important to them, some lideres said that they had always been in the party and they would never support someone outside. The bulk of the lideres spoke of their commitment to party in personal terms, such as having ties with one of the leaders who had sustained the party. The type of commitment they referred to sounded much like utang na loob,<sup>9</sup> but utang na loob was given a lower priority. (See Table XLVIII). The rank values revealed the same pattern with party-self and party-other evaluations differing only slightly, and utang na loob receiving moderate scores.<sup>10</sup>

Although the mean scores for threat differed between self and other evaluations, the use of threats was always placed last. As was mentioned in Chapter VIII threats had not been used on a wide scale in Camarines Norte. There were instances of a few mayors using threats, but to lideres on this level threats meant little since they were usually somewhat secure economically, and more important, neither

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<sup>9</sup> Hollnsteiner, op. cit., pp. 64-66.

<sup>10</sup> To distinguish between rankings (1 to 10 in order of importance) and scalings (1 to 7), the scalings will be referred to as "scale" and the rankings as "rank." Depending on whether the lideres are ranking themselves or other lideres, the designation self-scale or self-rank and other-scale or other-rank will be used.

TABLE XLVIII. MEAN SCORES AND RANKINGS FOR EVALUATIONS OF THE COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT BASED ON THE SCALE VALUES AND RANK VALUES

Component of Support	1-7 Scale Values				1-10 Rank Values*			
	Self		Other		Self		Other	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Capability	6.53	1	4.56	8	8.89	1	4.29	8
Issues	6.23	2	4.36	9	8.16	2	4.02	9
Party	5.19	3	5.48	4	7.03	3	6.46	4
Family Ties	4.58	4	5.46	5	5.31	5	6.61	3
Compadre Ties	3.58	9	4.69	7	4.09	9	4.08	6
Utang na Loob	4.13	7	5.57	3	4.73	6	5.72	5
Chance of Winning	4.26	6	5.43	6	4.52	7	4.77	7
Projects and Money	4.53	5	5.59	2	5.94	4	7.25	2
Positions and Jobs	3.64	8	5.98	1	4.38	8	7.84	1
Threats	2.16	10	3.34	10	2.16	10	2.72	10

\* To obtain comparable scoring with the scaling, the scores for rank values were derived by subtracting the value from ten, since the raw data score gave the most important variable as a low value and the least important as a high number.

Congressman Pajarillo nor Marcial Pimentel threatened liders at this level.

The paired comparisons matched only seven components, since using all nine components would have taken a considerable length of time.<sup>11</sup> Since threats had been scored last on the pre-tests, it was deleted. Projects and jobs were grouped together because they had always been found to cluster in the pre-tests. Utang na loob came out as first and

TABLE XLIX. MEAN SCORES AND RANKINGS FOR EVALUATIONS OF THE COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT BASED ON THE PAIRED-COMPARISONS

Component of Support	Self		Others	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Capability	4.75	1	2.96	6
Issues	4.10	4	2.56	7
Party	4.12	3	3.78	4
Family Ties	3.97	5	4.36	3
Compadre Ties	2.56	7	3.63	5
Utang Na Loob	4.14	2	4.67	1
Projects, Money & Jobs	3.20	6	4.65	2

second of importance for others and self respectively. Re-examining the other measures, it was noticed that when evaluating others the liders scored utang na loob as being more important. For themselves, capability, issues, party, and projects were first, and then came utang na loob, but the paired comparisons revealed an interesting

<sup>11</sup> Chance of winning was built into the paired-comparisons by the levels at which switching would occur. The closer the mean scores were to 3.50 [7 (variables) x .50 (break-even point)] the more important chance of winning.

pattern with responses, particularly for the description of other leaders' motivations. For instance, when family was matched against party, almost every leader said, "Well, you know, blood is thicker than water." Comparing family and money, others added "Blood is thicker than water, but money is solid." Finally reaching utang na loob, "You can never betray your utang na loob, not even for money." Phrases such as the ones above were made in well over twenty of the interviews throughout the province, indicating that utang na loob was a potent force binding the leaders and leaders. A perfect example of utang na loob was a tie between a former mayoral candidate and former Congressman Pimentel: "He [Pimentel] approached me. He appealed to me. Because I was chosen as a candidate [in 1967], I had to give something in return. I have to reciprocate. When he ran in 1969 he did not have to ask me [to support him]. I don't play hard to get. I have to show that I appreciated the help of Pimentel. When I ran for mayor he appeared in far-flung areas to show me that he wanted me to win. So when he ran he did not ask me anymore. It was understood."

In talking with the leaders I noticed that utang na loob had taken on a new meaning or perhaps a new context over the years. In the past, utang na loob referred to social favors that were expected to be repaid at a future time with other social favors. The political element was not involved.<sup>12</sup> In Camarines Norte the political implications, whether it be an endorsement at election time or a release of

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<sup>12</sup> Kaut, op. cit.

public works funds for a municipality, was there.

Actually, the notion of repaying personal favors was discussed enough in social psychology to discount the suggestion that utang na loob was peculiar to the Philippines alone. For instance, Gamson states: "Many politicians are eager to create obligations to themselves by doing small favors for others; such obligations can be converted into specific inducements at election time or when a crisis occurs."<sup>13</sup> Still others point out that in social intercourse reciprocity is usually expected: "Generally people are grateful for favors and repay their social debts, and both their gratitude and their repayment are social rewards for the associate who has done them favors. . . . A person on whom others are dependent for vital benefits has the power to enforce his demands."<sup>14</sup> In the Philippines, and particularly in Philippine politics, utang na loob is merely the Filipino label for the concept reciprocity that is found in other social systems. Nevertheless, in Camarines Norte reciprocity or utang na loob was an important component of support.

The most surprising finding that appeared in all six evaluations was that the compadre system was not relevant for the lider-leader linkages. The fact that liders had not been supporting their compadres who ran for either governor or congressman hinted that the compadre system was not as vital as it had been thought to be.<sup>15</sup> This is not to

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<sup>13</sup> Op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>14</sup> Blau, op. cit., pp. 16, 22.

<sup>15</sup> See Lande, op. cit., p. 16; Hollnsteiner, op. cit., p. 64; Grossholtz, op. cit., pp. 87, 187.

say that the compadre system was completely finished. Between liders and lower liders or constituents the compadre system was still relied on, but between the top liders who were interviewed and the leaders the compadre system was simply not applicable. The liders commented that just about everybody was somebody's compadre, and the compadrazgo system in most cases was so extended that an individual could not remember for whom he had been a patron, let alone with whom he had compadre ties.

Some of the younger liders insisted that they were not going to become involved in the "vicious cycle" of maintaining compadres. A doctor who was a councilor and aspired to be mayor of one of the municipalities said that he felt that giving hand-outs and participating in weddings, wakes, and the like was a waste of time and money. "It is better that the money feed their children for one month, and not all the relatives [for] one night." In his municipality the incumbent mayor will resign in 1971 and the probable opponent of the doctor will be a fiery, garrulous lawyer-farmer who has cultivated his compadre ties religiously. The election will be an interesting test of how strong compadre ties actually are in determining the outcome of an election between one candidate with a large compadre system and another without any compadres.

Using one's kinship system usually offered a good base of support; however, family relations meant little between the liders and the leaders. For instance, in the last election Ligaya Vinzons, a cousin of Congressman Pajarillo, ran against him, and also Liberal gubernatorial candidate Julian Lukban supported Marcial Pimentel even though

he was related to Pajarillo by affinity. In most cases the leaders had no relatives who had or were planning to run for high office, consequently they had difficulty placing themselves in a perspective where family ties would matter. Even for those leaders who considered family ties as important, for themselves capability and issues went before family, and for others it was money, projects, and jobs that went before family.

Capability and issues, and money, projects and jobs were the components which varied the most between self and other evaluations. For themselves the leaders contended that capability was the most important reason for them to support a candidate for high office. On paired comparisons the leaders insisted that they would stay with the more capable candidate against everything, including projects, jobs and utang na loob, even if the most capable candidate was absolutely not going to win. Only a few times did the leaders' answers seem to be consistent with their past actions. One mayor insisted that capability was the only criterion that he used, but during the merienda (snack break) he showed pictures of his standing with Presidents Quirino, Magsaysay, Macapagal and Marcos, as well as Congressman Eco, Pimentel, and Pajarillo. During the break he said that his party was always the same party as that of the incumbent president and congressman. Asked why, he replied that if he were not a supporter of the incumbents he would not have been able to stay in office since the early 1950's, because he would not have been able to bring improvements to his municipality. When the questionnaire was resumed he said that projects were not important at all to him as a reason for supporting a leader.



The trap that some studies in the Philippines have fallen into was asking an individual a value-laden question in which his self-esteem was involved. If the respondents knew that a university or a scholar was conducting the survey, they would answer the way which would sound correct and proper.<sup>16</sup> Asking a question in the second person was useful in avoiding the respondents' answering in what they considered to be a "proper" manner since it removed them from personal involvement, or as they sometimes saw it, incrimination.

Projects and money were used together for the scaling and ranking sections. For themselves the leaders interpreted projects to mean projects that were for the good of the community and not necessarily for themselves: consequently, for self scoring, money and projects did well. For other leaders, the leaders interpreted the money and projects to mean going more to the individual than the community. Projects and money scored considerably better. The value of projects was underscored by one leader who switched from the Liberals to Pajarillo as a result of projects: "The Congressman [Pajarillo] built five Marcos-type school rooms last year. . . . Pimentel gave nothing."

Jobs and positions were scored poorly in self-evaluation, but first for other-evaluation. The difference in response seemed to be a result of a negative connotation involved in obtaining a position in

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<sup>16</sup> One of the visiting research associates at the Local Government Center conducting a study of cadets passed out the questionnaire for them to complete. When he collected the questionnaires he found that the answers were almost identical. He later discovered that the cadets had collaborated on the questionnaire to make sure they had the "right" answers.

exchange for support. Still in one municipality a lider said that Pajarillo had promised to make him chairman of the Nacionalista Party in the municipality if he would switch; the lider switched. As was noted in Chapter VII the leaders in the province, particularly the Congressman, could and did use the power and resources of their offices to induce lideres to support them.

The paired comparisons section was an excellent means for testing their propensity to switch if one candidate had a better chance of winning. In the value-conflict situations, the respondents would become noticeably tense.<sup>17</sup> The lideres were not as concerned with changing chances of winning as much as they were with the actual conflict between two components. On the whole, the lideres would have to be classified as not being economic minded in the sense of maximizing their utility, in this case, winning. The chance of winning was not particularly important to the lideres. Immediate rewards or adherence to a commitment once it was made undermined the lideres' willingness to switch away from a losing candidate. Even if the candidate was less desirable, if the lider had said that he would support him he could not do otherwise.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The anxiety was more prevalent if the lider was deciding what others would do, than if he was deciding for himself.

<sup>18</sup> The epitome of honoring a commitment, although in a slightly different context, was a mayor who had promised one of his barrios that he would build a bridge for them across a river so they could have easier access to the poblacion. He said, "Congressman Pajarillo obtained the releases for me, and I could use them either in the poblacion or build the bridge for the barrio. Well, I promised that I would build the bridge, so I did. They don't have a road yet, but the bridge is there."

### 3. SUMMARY

Based on my informal discussions with a number of leaders and studies done by others who did not rely heavily on an administered questionnaire (e.g. Hollnsteiner, Lande, Youngblood, and Agpalo), it seemed that in describing why they personally supported a candidate the leaders were not being honest except in a few cases. The second-person evaluations were far more consistent with what had been said on informal occasion and with what I had observed. As for the four sets of questions, the open-ended questions were a necessary check on the list of components of support. The rankings and the scaling revealed results similar to each other. The paired comparisons placed the respondents in a more natural situation, albeit hypothetical with per cent chance of winning known and all but two components constant. The leaders were not able to remain as consistent in their answers as they had been with the other sets of questions. The paired-comparison questions, in fact, offered a new, and potentially more useful, way to understand how a political leader obtains support from subleaders in an electoral system.

Based on the leaders' evaluations of other leaders, the promise of and the giving of positions and jobs was the most important reason for a leader to support a candidate for the office of governor or congressman. Projects and money followed closely behind. Utang na loob was also vital, and in some instances, actually took preference over money, projects, and jobs. Family ties were somewhat important, but since few of the leaders could actually think of any of their relatives as a candidate for governor or congressman, scores were lower. Party

alliances, which were largely based on personal loyalties ranked closely with family. Low on the list of priorities for support between a lider and a leader were compadre ties. Capability was generally thought of as synonymous with issues, but at the present time both have little relevance to the liders in Camarines Norte. The chance of winning was not considered important, because prior commitments or immediate pay-offs restricted switching on the basis of who was going to win. As of yet threats were not used widely in the province, but the liders were fearful of that prospect developing in the next few elections.

CHAPTER XI  
COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
ELECTORAL POLITICS

In the previous chapter it was noted that particularistic rewards in the form of jobs, projects, and money were prime factors in motivating the leaders of Camarines Norte to support a candidate running for governor or congressman. The leaders themselves exercised control over from thirty voters to three thousand voters through the use of patron-client ties such as, familial alliances, utang na loob, or employment. One leader with several hundred hectares commented, "I take care of my tenants, they can keep the money from growing their vegetables, but when it comes politics, they vote the way I tell [them] or else they move away." The dependence of the individual on the "ward heeler" was a common phenomenon, not only in Camarines Norte, but throughout the Philippines.<sup>1</sup>

The leaders played the part of the precinct captains, acting as intermediaries between the "boss" and the constituents. In the case of Camarines Norte the leaders were favor-buyers who swapped their influence over voters for particularistic rewards.<sup>2</sup> The parallels between early English and American electoral politics were striking.<sup>3</sup> The dependence of the tao on someone of higher status or income rein-

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<sup>1</sup> Grossholtz, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter I, Part 2.

<sup>3</sup> See Banfield and Wilson, op. cit.; and Jennings, op. cit.

forced the existence of the boss network and the accompanying patron-client relationships.

The model of change in electoral politics presented by James Scott suggested a lateral, although not deterministic, movement from support based on deference to support based on reward, and finally to support based on ideological concerns.<sup>4</sup> It was suggested earlier that the components of support might be a means by which to plot the development of an electoral system in a three-dimensional space where the three dimensions would correspond with the three phases outlined by Scott. All of the various measures for the components of support were factor analyzed with three factors rotated.<sup>5</sup> The three-factor rotations gave low total per cent of common variance explained, and the communalities (per cent of explained variance for a variable) for party, chance of winning, and threats were so low that it was obvious that additional factors were involved in the pattern.

A subsequent rotation with four factors was made. Only the scale values for others revealed a pattern that approximated the three dimensional model. A final set of rotations was made on the basis of the scree tests applied to the eigenvalues. A general pattern was found in all the rotated solutions, but other-scale scores gave the clearest pattern. Other-scale eigenvalues greater than 0.7 were selected and six factors were rotated. Capability and issues loaded highly together. This factor was labeled the ideological or issue-oriented

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<sup>4</sup> Scott, op. cit., pp. 1145-1149.

<sup>5</sup> All rotations are orthogonal unless otherwise stated.

dimension. (See Table L.) The second rotated factor was personal loyalty with high loadings for family, compadre and utang na loob.<sup>6</sup> Projects, money, and positions composed the third factor, particularistic reward. The first three factors corresponded to the three-dimensional model developed above; however, the three dimensions accounted for 62.5 per cent of the common variance and only 54 per cent of the total variance. The residual variance was taken up by threats, chance of winning, and party, all of which were independent factors.<sup>7</sup>

Of the measures used, the scale scores yielded the best pattern for the ten components of support when factored. One reason for the better results with the scaling was perhaps that the leaders were not compelled to rank order or select one component over another. One improvement on the scale, however, would be to increase the value range from 1-7 to 0-9 while still allowing for tied scoring. Although it could not be said conclusively at this point, it seemed that the scaling technique offered the best manner in which to obtain scores for the components.

The results of the factor analyses suggested that a model could be developed where the three phases could be represented by three

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<sup>6</sup> Rather than use support through deference, personal loyalty seemed a more fitting description for the dimension.

<sup>7</sup> With fewer factors extracted, party loaded with family, compadre, and utang, but the communality for party was about half of what it had been when party was taken as an independent dimension. The communalities for threats and chance of winning were less than 40 per cent for rotations where less than six factors were used.

TABLE L. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF OTHER-SCALE VALUES FOR COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT

Components of Support	Factors						h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	
Capability	0.93	-0.16	-0.03	0.07	-0.03	0.09	0.91
Issues	0.93	-0.01	-0.10	0.07	-0.16	0.05	0.90
Family Ties	-0.08	0.86	0.14	0.05	-0.09	0.10	0.79
Compadre Ties	-0.12	0.86	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.13	0.77
Utang na Loob	0.07	0.57	0.10	0.40	0.41	0.01	0.66
Projects and Money	0.07	0.13	0.94	-0.03	-0.05	-0.09	0.91
Positions and Jobs	-0.39	0.13	0.77	0.24	-0.06	0.17	0.84
Threats	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.95	0.06	0.10	0.93
Party	0.14	0.11	-0.03	-0.03	-0.94	0.13	0.93
Chance of Winning	0.12	0.20	0.01	0.10	-0.13	0.95	0.98
Total Variance	19.5	19.1	15.1	11.3	11.1	10.0	86.1
Common Variance	22.7	22.2	17.6	13.1	12.8	11.6	100.0



empirically independent dimensions. In small group interaction Robert Bales gave further justification for the three factor model. He found that in small group interaction studies three dimensions of feelings toward leaders emerged: affective, power, and task.<sup>8</sup> Bales' three factors matched the personal loyalty, reward, and capability-issue orientation dimensions derived here. Since Bales had been dealing with small groups rather than a political system, it was understandable how threats, party, and chance of winning were not included in his findings.

In applying the three-dimensional model it should be understood that the three dimensions explain only a little more than half of the total variance as to why a lider would support a leader. Yet, even with this retriction, the model could be useful, at least as a heuristic device. Political systems or individuals could be located and compared using their distance as a measure of their difference. To show how the comparisons could be made, the scale scores for self and other were plotted. The coordinants for each point were determined by taking the average of the contributing scores for each dimension. For instance, the personal loyalty score for self would be calculated by adding family (4.6), compadre (3.6), and utang na loob (4.1), and then dividing by three to arrive at the average (4.1). Once the scores were computed, the points were plotted in the three-dimensional space. (See Figure 5.) The distance between the points was calculated by using the Pythagorean Theorem of summing the squares of the differences

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<sup>8</sup> Robert Bales, "Interaction Process Analysis", in David Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. VII (New York, 1968), 465-470.




Figure 5. Plot of Self and Other Scale Values for Components of Support in Three Dimensional Space

between the scores for each axis, and then taking the square root of the sum. In this case the distance between the self and other scores on the components of support scaling was 2.8. This same procedure could be used to locate individuals or systems and calculate the difference between them, if there were comparable data.

As for the other three factors, chance of winning was shown to be of less importance due to prior personal commitments or immediate rewards. The fact that party loaded with the personal loyalty dimension seemed logical since the majority of the leaders had said that their party ties were personal ties, rather than ideological commitments. However, the actual independence of the party dimension suggested that party was not necessarily related to the other dimensions, and that party was perhaps in a transitional stage. Going back in time it would be reasonable to assume that party would have been connected more closely with the personal loyalty dimension. In the future, if issues were adopted by the parties, party would be less independent and might begin to load more highly with capability and issues.

Reliance on threats of violence or terrorism represented still another dimension, but one that was not yet relevant for Camarines Norte. In other provinces in the Philippines threats have become a standard political practice. A methodological problem of investigating a province with a high incidence of violence would be gaining access to the leaders. Even still, the effect that threats would have on a political support system and the three-factor model would be worth studying in order to find out whether the three dimensions would stand as such, or collapse into one threat-dimension.

## CHAPTER XII

### CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON PHILIPPINE POLITICS AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

#### 1. LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR AND ROLE DESCRIPTION

A perusal of the literature of Philippine politics revealed gaps in the description and understanding of the positions of the governor, the congressman and the lider in provincial politics. Studies of subnational Philippine politics were further hampered by the lack of an adequate leadership framework. With these shortcomings in mind, two goals of this study were 1) to introduce a leadership framework within which to analyze local political leadership linkage patterns between leaders and subleaders, and 2) to analyze the positions of the provincial governor, congressman, and lider.

It was found that the position of congressman had greater potential to exert a strong leadership role in provincial politics than the position of governor. Whether this would be the case in a multi-district province would be an interesting question to ask in future studies of provincial governors and congressmen. The leaders in Camarines Norte who served as congressmen used their pork-barrel and patronage positions to strengthen their support structures. They were also able to recover their campaign expenses more easily than the governors due to their alleged business dealings while in Congress. On the other hand, the governors had fewer resources, and as a consequence were handicapped in the efforts to assume full leadership of their faction, party, or province.

The leadership behavior and role description questions (LBRDQ) further suggested that the congressional position was potentially more powerful than the governor's. The congressman was expected to perform more frequently on each task dimension than the governor. The leaders specified superior orientation, integration, and persuasion as the three tasks which the congressman should exercise most frequently. For the governor, persuasion and superior orientation were still top priorities, but initiation of structure was added. Since the governor's position was generally viewed as being administrative, it was understandable how initiation of structure, which entailed delineating roles for subordinates and establishing clear lines of authority, was included.

The behavior descriptions based on the LBRDQ indicated that Governor Pardo exercised strong leadership. In fact, he had fulfilled the leaders' expectations much better than Congressman Pajarillo had. Production emphasis and representation were Pardo's strengths. Integration and persuasion tasks were scored the lowest, reflecting Pardo's lack of speaking ability and lack of a support-organization. Congressman Pajarillo scored best in production emphasis, consideration, and integration. All three task-dimensions were related to Pajarillo's party organization in the province which he had built and sustained since the late 1950's. Surprisingly, representation and persuasion, the two tasks usually associated with legislators, were scored lowly by both Congressman Pajarillo's supporters and non-supporters.

Before the study, it was hypothesized that the role evaluations of the positions would be independent of the occupant of the positions.

As it turned out, the role descriptions for both the governor and congressman of the supporters and non-supporters did not discriminate. Yet, for the behavior descriptions, the supporters differed significantly from the non-supporters in their evaluations. As was suggested, the dislike for the particular leader became manifest in the description of the behavior of that leader.

To further test the LBRDQ, factor analysis was run on the results to determine if the hypothesized dimensions were in fact empirically independent leadership task-dimensions. The factor solutions revealed that there had been a response-set which caused the dimensions to become highly intercorrelated. Fortunately, the response set was a result of describing the same aspect of the same leadership position, and a rotated factor solution yielded eight leadership dimensions that were independent. When the criteria for factor rotation were changed to reduce the number of factors, five task-dimensions were found. The first task-group, superior-subordinant relations tasks, referred to the leader's interaction with his role set. Institution-building tasks included integrative and initiative tasks. In a sense, the institution-building tasks could also be construed as organization-building tasks. Role assumption was the degree to which the leader used the position to exert his influence in the political system. Consideration, the leader being solicitous of his followers, was also shown to be an independent dimension.<sup>1</sup> Production emphasis was the final dimension

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<sup>1</sup> Stogdill and Coons, Leadership Behavior, op. cit., contains a number of studies which also derived consideration as an independent factor.

revealed by factor analysis.

The LBRDQ was more than adequate to describe and compare leadership positions in this Philippine study. The fact that the role descriptions were independent of the occupant of the position meant that other studies using the LBRDQ would probably produce results that could be readily used for comparing leadership positions. The factor analyses were useful in both verifying the independence of the leadership task dimensions and in composing new task-categories. The application of the LBRDQ in the Philippines and other political systems would provide a wealth of data for comparing political leaders at different levels within the same system and political leaders across political systems.

## 2. THE COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT

Studies of local politics in the Philippines have not fully described the relationship between the leaders (congressmen and governors) and the liders. The sub-leader level in Philippine politics has been of prime importance for the leaders in the maintenance of their support structures. Why a lider supported a leader also has not received proper attention in the Philippine politics literature. It was assumed that the same patron-client ties that had bound the constituent to the barrio captain or the municipal councilor would still hold true for the liders and the leaders.

The series of questions designed to measure the importance of various reasons for support had one serious flaw. The questions asked the liders why they personally supported a candidate for governor or congressman. The liders said that the most important reason for

them to campaign for a candidate was his capability and issues. The least important reasons were money, projects, and jobs. It was soon obvious that the leaders' answers were inconsistent with what they had done during the past elections, and with what they revealed in informal discussions. When the questions were changed to ask about "the other leaders like them whom they knew personally," the leaders replied that money, projects, and jobs were most important, and that capability and issues were least important. It seemed unlikely that in a province where the number of top leaders was estimated to be no more than two hundred, of which half were interviewed, that those leaders interviewed could have been referring solely to those leaders who were not interviewed. In fact, leaders who had been identified by the leaders as those who switched sides because of positions or money denied that anything other than capability was important to them.<sup>2</sup> It was apparent that questionnaires that contained value-laden items resulted in the respondents telling what they thought the "correct" answer should be. To avoid that trap questions in the second person were added to the components of support section.

The components of support section was also used to test for the prospect of using the means of support as a model to plot the development of electoral political systems. It was suggested that the various types of control (through personal loyalty, through reward, and through issue-orientation) that a leader uses could be conceptualized

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<sup>2</sup> The leaders were asked to designate those leaders who had switched in the last election and tell why they switched.



as a three-dimension model in which systems or individuals could be located. All of the sets of questions were factor analyzed and three factors were rotated. The amount of variance explained for party, threats and chance of winning was so small that it was apparent that there were other dimensions involved in the pattern. On subsequent rotations, extracting the number of factors designated by the scree test, a clear pattern developed. Three of the factors corresponded to the hypothesized dimensions. The three dimensions also closely matched the three factors (affective, power, and task) that Robert Bales had discovered in small group interaction theory. However, there were three other factors produced (threats, chance of winning, and party) which were peculiar to the political system and would not be expected to show up in small group interaction. Using the first three factors a model could be constructed as outlined above, but a portion of the reasoning of why a political leader is supported by a lider would also have to be explained by measuring party, threats, and chance of winning.

The most surprising discovery of the components of support was that the use of compadre ties as a means of support was considered to be irrelevant at the lider-leader level. For the liders the compadre system had become meaningless because of the number of compadres one possessed. Just because a lider happened to be a compadre of the leader no longer automatically guaranteed the support of that lider. Other, more tangible inducements took precedence over even first-degree compadre relationships.

On the whole, the entire series of questions was useful in determining the manner in which a leader obtained the support of liders. Although it was found that the liders hedged on their answers, putting the question in the second person alleviated this difficulty. The findings in this study confirmed that the individual actually mattered little in the provincial political system since his vote was bought and sold by a lider with whom he had allegiance. A boss system, and all that went with it, existed in Camarines Norte, and as long as it persists the individual voters are going to be of small consequence because the liders will control their votes. The liders were precisely what Anthony Downs referred to as "favor buyers" who sold their influence over voters for personal or general rewards.<sup>3</sup>

### 3. PROVINCIAL POLITICS

The liders in Camarines Norte were particularly proud of their record of no violence during the campaign periods. Provincial politics had always been peaceful, and those who opposed each other as candidates were usually friends after the elections. However, the liders were fearful of the future. The province, and the country as a whole, was approaching a crisis stage. The liders said that money was spent in past elections to cover campaign expenses, but they deplored the massive vote- and lider-buying in 1969. Pessimism was widespread even among the liders of the Nacionalista Party. The liders felt a change for the worse had occurred in provincial politics, and they believed that politics was not going to become better.

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<sup>3</sup> Downs, op. cit., p. 88.

The liders were skeptical about President Ferdinand Marcos' intentions. The Constitution prohibits him from running for another term of office, but with the constitution convention approaching the liders felt that Marcos might try to intervene in the delegate elections or try to manipulate the constitutional convention itself. If Marcos chose to involve himself in the constitutional convention, the 1971 elections, or the 1973 elections, it was feared that there would be violent uprisings in Manila, and even Camarines Norte. Whether the liders would ever reach the point of open revolt was not totally clear. The liders in the province were disenchanted with the Marcos administration because of the devaluation and the manner he ran the campaign in 1969, but they reasoned that they could wait until 1973 to elect a new president.

Any potential for revolt in Camarines Norte would come from the liders and not from the "tao" or common farmer. Of the liders interviewed only a few would actually participate in a break with the government; the rest of the liders would wait until the future would become a little clearer before choosing sides. There were two factors that mitigated against a revolt in the immediate future, first, the liders had faith in the electoral process, but more important, there was no significant national leader who would or could be a catalysist for a revolution. One disillusioned lider summed up the situation, "If Marcos does not change, I am willing to believe there will be a revolution. It will be violent. If the constitution convention satisfied [the] needs of the people the agitators might be modified [sic]. But a revolt will occur if a leader can be found. The situation

is getting explosive--but there is a lack [of a leader]."

In the province itself, barring a national political catastrophe, the composition of the two political factions would probably not change within the next ten years. In spite of the efforts of Pardo, Pajarillo and Pimentel will remain the only two leaders capable of actively maintaining a support organization with money, time, and employment. As long as the province remains economically backward, there is little prospect for a change in either the roles of the leadership positions or the types of inducements offered.

#### 4. PROSPECTS FOR RESEARCH ON SUBNATIONAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

Robert Dahl said of politics in New Haven, ". . . the relations between leaders, subleaders and constituents produce in the distribution of influence a stubborn and pervasive ambiguity that permeates the entire political system."<sup>4</sup> In Camarines Norte there was no ambiguity in the distribution of influence or in the maintenance of subleaders by leaders. The fact is that between leaders and liders, "It is this [money] which makes the machine run. A car can not run without gas, this [money] is the gas for the politics machine." Whether this was the case in other provinces in the Philippines could not be established in this study. I tend to think that it probably is. One lider summed up the situation: "He [a candidate] can have 100 relatives and 1000 compadres, but without this [money] he is nothing."

Since political leadership on the subnational level in the Phil-

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<sup>4</sup> Dahl, Who Governs?, op. cit., p. 102.

ippines has been an untapped area, I considered this study to be a starting point toward the development of a general framework for studying sub-national political leadership. The development of the political system at the lower levels could well be traced by the type of roles the leaders or other influentials in a province consider to be important for the political leaders to carry out. The LBRDQ offers an excellent tool by which meaningful comparisons across provinces and across time could be made. Leadership description is just one part of leadership studies though. An even more basic question is how a leader maintains his following among subleaders. In the Philippines the components of support section would be helpful in determining the parameters of the leader-leader linkages.

The research instruments and the methodology used here should serve as a guideline for those investigating subnational political leadership. The field of leader-leader relations or subnational leadership description is still virtually unexplored. From a social science perspective, the next few years would be the best time to complete as comprehensive and reliable a study as could be done of Philippine politics and political leadership, because within ten to fifteen years from now Philippine politics will be faced with its greatest crisis: overpopulation. Already in areas like Negros Occidental politics has changed. The relations between the tenant or laborer and the haciennero or wealthy families is explosive.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Report on Atendo de Manila research project on the life of the sugar worker presented orally by Father Frank Lynch in Spring 1970. Ideas for this section were also brought out in discussions with Mr. Douglas Tinsler of United States Agency for International Development in Manila.

The compadre system had become extended to the point that the patrons had too many clients to care for due to a greater population increase among the poor as compared to the rich. The patron, in this case the hacendero, either was forced to give too little to satisfy his clients, or chose not to help at all. As a result, the tenant farmer or laborer had become alienated from the wealthy, and the polarization was continuing. In less extreme cases like Camarines Norte, the compadre system had also begun to break down because of increased number of clients for whom a patron would have to care. It would seem logical that the movement of politics would indeed be away from reliance on personal loyalty to particularistic rewards as the population increased.

The questions now facing the Philippines are when will it become uneconomical to pay off supporters, and when it does become uneconomical, what will leaders use to maintain their support structure and influence patterns? The Philippine politicians can select between adopting the use of threats and terrorism or adopting issue-oriented politics. Throughout the Philippines the point at which the politicians will have to decide is fast approaching. For the political scientist it is an ideal opportunity to witness the transformation of an electoral political system.

**APPENDIX**

## APPENDIX A. QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED TO LIDERS

This is a study to find out what you think about political leaders and politics. Your anonymity is guaranteed and your answers are all strictly confidential. If you have any questions or do not understand anything be sure to stop me and ask.

## PART I. PERCEPTIONS OF PROVINCIAL POLITICS AND PROVINCIAL POLITICIANS

- 1.1 In this section we are interested in getting your impression of politics.

When you hear the term "politics" what comes to your mind?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?

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- 1.2 When you hear the term "provincial politics" what comes to your mind?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?

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- 1.3 Looking at provincial politics, if you were to describe the best possible provincial politics, what would it be like?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Please don't think of things necessarily as they are. Think of what could be missing that would make provincial politics measure up to your ideal.

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- 1.4 Looking at the other side of the picture, sir, if you were to describe the worst possible provincial politics, what would it be like?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Please don't think of things as they are. Imagine the worst possible kind of provincial politics.

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- 1.5 Here is a picture of a ladder (Show Guide I: The Ladder). Suppose we say that the top (POINTING) represents the best possible provincial politics which you have described and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible provincial politics. Where on this ladder (MOVING UP AND DOWN THE LADDER) would you place politics in the province at the present time?

Step number indicated by Respondent ( )

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- 1.6 Suppose we look back, now. Where on this ladder would you place the provincial politics before the 1965 elections?

Step number ( )

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- 1.7 Now suppose we look ahead, sir. Where would you place the provincial politics just after the 1973 elections?

Step number ( )

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- 1.8 When you hear the term "politician", what things come to your mind?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?

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- 1.9 When you hear the term "provincial politician", what things come to your mind?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?

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- 1.10 If you were to think of the best possible or ideal provincial politician, what would be his qualities or characteristics?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Any other qualities?

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- 1.11 If you were to think of the worst possible provincial politician, what would be his qualities or characteristics?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Any other qualities?

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- 1.12 Now think of most provincial politicians (SHOW PICTURE OF LADDER). Suppose we say that the best possible politician you mentioned is at the top of the ladder (POINTING), the worst possible politician you mentioned is at the bottom (POINTING). Now, in your personal experience and observation where on this ladder (MOVE FINGER UP AND DOWN LADDER) would you place most provincial politicians at present?

Step number ( )

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- 1.13 Suppose we look back, now. Where on this ladder would you place the politicians before the 1965 elections?

Step number ( )

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- 1.14 Now suppose we look ahead, where would you place the politicians just after the 1973 elections?

Step number ( )

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## PART II. REPORTED AND EXPECTED LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

- 2.1 One of the purposes of this study is to find out what you think the governor and congressman do and what they are supposed to do. Would you please tell me what things you think the governor should do? What should his attributes be?

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?

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- 2.2 What things does the governor really do? What are the governor's attributes?

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- 2.3 Turning to the congressman, what should the congressman do? What should his attributes be?
- 
- 2.4 What things does the congressman really do? What are his attributes?
- 
- 2.5 In politics leaders might switch from one party or candidate to another. Sometimes some type of inducement is necessary, while other times it is not. Can the governor or a candidate for governor use projects or money to induce a leader to switch? If yes, what projects and how much money?
- 
- 2.6 Can appointed positions be used by the governor or a candidate for governor to induce a leader to switch? If yes, what are the positions?
- 
- 2.7 Can threats be used to force a leader to switch? If yes, what kinds of threats?
- 
- 2.8 Now looking at a congressional campaign. Can the congressman or a candidate for congress use projects or money to induce a leader to switch? If yes, what projects and how much money?
- 
- 2.9 Can appointed positions be used by the congressman or a candidate for congress to induce a leader to switch? If yes, what are the positions?

---

2.10 Can threats be used to force a leader to switch? If yes, what kinds of threats?

---

In the next section there are items that may be used to describe what the governor and congressman actually do and what they ought to do. Each item is a separate description, and there is no right or wrong answer. This is not a test of ability or consistency in making answers, its only purpose is to make it possible for you to describe, as accurately as you can, what the congressman and governor from Camarines Norte Province actually do and what they ought to do. The term "supporter" used in the statements refers to those people in the province that campaign for a candidate during an election, and are considered to be loyal to the candidate.

I would like you to listen to each item carefully. Think about how frequently the leader acts in the manner described by the item.

(HAND RESPONDENT (R) GUIDE II)

---

GUIDE II: Frequency

A) Always B) Often C) Occasionally D) Seldom E) Never

---

Decide whether he A) Always, B) Often, C) Occasionally, D) Seldom, or E) Never, acts as described by the item. Then tell me which one of the letters, A, B, C, D, or E, you have selected. Next, you will hear a statement about how frequently the leader OUGHT to behave as described by each item. Tell me which one of the letters, A, B, C, D, or E, shows how frequently he OUGHT to behave as described by the item.

2.11 Let us now think about the governor, remember that no one will see your answers and your anonymity is guaranteed. All that is required is for you to describe the governor's behavior as accurately as possible.

	2.11 Gov.	2.12 Cong.
	DOES OUGHT	DOES OUGHT
	( ) ( )	( ) ( )
1. He acts as spokesman of the province.		
He should act as spokesman of the province.		

- |   | DOES | DOES | DOES | DOES |
|---|------|------|------|------|
|   | ( )  | ( )  | ( )  | ( )  |
| 2. He argues persuasively for his point of view.        | ( )  | ( )  | ( )  | ( )  |
| He should argue persuasively for his point of view.     |      |      |      |      |
| 3. He lets supporters know what is expected of them.    | ( )  | ( )  | ( )  | ( )  |
| He should let supporters know what is expected of them. |      |      |      |      |

Instead of two statements I will now only read one. For each statement tell me how frequently the governor does act in the way described, and then tell me how frequently the governor ought to act in the way described. (Note to Interviewer: Prompt interviewee with "How frequently should he?" for "ought" response until E. understands.)

- |  |     |     |     |     |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 4. He lets some people have too much of his authority instead of keeping it. | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 5. He is friendly and approachable.  | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 6. He keeps the work moving at a rapid pace.                                 | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 7. He settles political conflicts when they occur in the province.           | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 8. He gets along well with the people above him.                             | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 9. He publicizes the activities of the province.                             | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 10. He is very skillful in an argument.                                      | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 11. He asks that everyone follow standard rules and regulations.             | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 12. He fails to take necessary action.                                       | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 13. He does personal favors for his supporters to make it pleasant.          | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 14. During a campaign he asks supporters to work harder.                     | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |
| 15. He sees to it that the work in the province is coordinated.              | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) |

	DOES	OUGHT	DOES	OUGHT
16. He keeps the province in good standing with higher authority.	( )	( )	( )	( )
17. He speaks as the representative of the province.	( )	( )	( )	( )
18. He is an inspiring talker.	( )	( )	( )	( )
19. He decides what shall be done and how it shall be done.	( )	( )	( )	( )
20. He is easily recognized as the leader of the province.	( )	( )	( )	( )
21. He treats everyone in the province as his equal.	( )	( )	( )	( )
22. He drives hard when there is a job to be done.	( )	( )	( )	( )
23. He helps settle differences between people in the province.	( )	( )	( )	( )
24. His word carries weight with his superiors.	( )	( )	( )	( )
25. He speaks for the province when visitors are present.	( )	( )	( )	( )
26. He persuades others that his ideas are to their advantage.	( )	( )	( )	( )
27. He makes sure that his job in the province is understood by the people in the province.	( )	( )	( )	( )
28. He backs down instead of standing firm.	( )	( )	( )	( )
29. He looks out for the personal welfare of people in the province.	( )	( )	( )	( )
30. He keeps his supporters working up to capacity.	( )	( )	( )	( )
31. He maintains a closely knit group of supporters.	( )	( )	( )	( )
32. He gets what he asks for from his superiors.	( )	( )	( )	( )

- |   | DOES | OUGHT | DOES | OUGHT |
|---|------|-------|------|-------|
|   | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |
| 33. He represents the province at outside meetings.                             | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |
| 34. He can inspire enthusiasm for projects.                                     | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |
| 35. He makes his attitudes clear.   | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |
| 36. He lets others in the province take away his leadership in the province.    | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |
| 37. He refuses to explain his actions.  | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |
| 38. During a campaign he permits supporters to take it easy in their work.      | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |
| 39. He encourages people in the province to feel and act united.                | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |
| 40. He gets his superiors to act for the welfare of the people in the province. | ( )  | ( )   | ( )  | ( )   |

2.12 Let us now turn to the congressman. (NOTE: Reread items 1-40 marking score in "congressman" column).

PART III. COMPONENTS OF SUPPORT

3.1 In this section we are interested in seeing what you consider to be important reasons for supporting one candidate over another. Could you tell me what you think are the important reasons for you to support a candidate for governor or congressman? 3.2 SCORES

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

OBLIGATORY PROBE: I see, are there any more?

\_\_\_\_\_

## 3.2 (HAND R. GUIDE III)

GUIDE III: Degree of Importance						
7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Extremely Important		Somewhat Important			Not Important At All	

On this seven point scale where 7 is extremely important, 1 is not important at all, and 4 is somewhat important, would you tell me how important each of the reasons above is.

- 3.3 Now could you tell me what you think are the important reasons for a lider like you, that you know personally, to support a candidate for governor or congressman? 3.4 SCOPES

OBLIGATORY PROBE: Are there any others?

- 3.4 Using the same seven point scale how important do you consider the above reasons to be for other lider in supporting a candidate for Congress? (FOLLOW SAME PROCEDURE AS IN 3.2)

- 3.5 I have read a great deal about Philippine politics, and there is a wide range of opinion as to why a lider supports a candidate. Below are a list of reasons which some people say are important and others say are not. I want your opinion. Still using this seven point scale from extremely important to not important at all, please tell me how important each of the following reasons is for you to support a candidate for governor or congressman.

	3.5 Self		3.6 Other	
	Score ( )	Rank ( )	Score ( )	Rank ( )
1. Kinship or family ties	( )	( )	( )	( )
2. Compadre ties	( )	( )	( )	( )
3. Party membership	( )	( )	( )	( )
4. Capability of the candidates	( )	( )	( )	( )
5. Candidate's stand on important issues	( )	( )	( )	( )
6. Projects or money	( )	( )	( )	( )
7. Appointment to positions	( )	( )	( )	( )
8. Threats made against a lider	( )	( )	( )	( )
9. Chance of winning	( )	( )	( )	( )
10. Utang na loob	( )	( )	( )	( )



3.6 Please tell me how important each of the following reasons is for leaders like you whom you know, to support a candidate for governor or congressman (repeat above).

---

3.7 Now on this paper (HAND R. GUIDE WITH LIST OF 10 REASONS) write the number one by a reason to indicate which is most important for you, write ten by the least important, of the eight remaining which is most important, which is least important. (Note: continue until all ten are marked and repeat for "others.")

---

3.8 The next set of questions deals with situations with which a leader, like you, might be faced. Let us suppose that two candidates for governor or congress approach a leader to ask for his support in an election campaign. In each of the following situations the two candidates will be exactly the same in all characteristics and abilities except one, and their chance of winning. Their chance of winning will be indicated on this scale. (HAND R. GUIDE IV)

---

## GUIDE IV

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
absolute defeat		slight chance			even chance			good chance		absolute victory
Chances of winning										

---

At one end (POINTING) is no chance of winning at all, absolute defeat, indicated by 0% chance. At the other end (POINTING) is certain chance of winning, absolute victory, indicated by 100% chance. In the middle (POINTING) is even chance or 50% chance of victory. The chance of the other candidate is just the opposite. So, if for one candidate his chance of winning was 20%, or slight chance, the other candidate would have 80% chance of winning, or a good chance. Do you understand? (IF R. DOES NOT UNDERSTAND, REPEAT INSTRUCTIONS AND THEN GO TO SITUATION ONE.)

To see how this works let us take Situation 1. The two candidates for governor or congress are exactly the same in all characteristics. The only difference between them is their chance of winning. (HAND R. GUIDE V)

---

GUIDE V: Candidate X and Candidate Y are exactly the same.

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
absolute defeat		slight chance			even chance			good chance		absolute chance
Chances of Candidate Y Winning										

---

(INTERVIEWER: The following series of questions is to make sure R. understands the scale and percentages. If R. does not answer "X" for chances less than 50% ask him why he selected candidate Y. At 50% answers like "I don't know" or "It doesn't matter" are acceptable. If after 50% R. switches to support "Y" ask "Then would you say candidate Y would be supported the rest of the way?" If R. says "Yes", continue to question 3.9, if he says "no" ask why.)

At 0% chance of Y winning (POINTING), whom would you say the lider would support, Candidate X or Candidate Y?

At 50% chance of Y winning (POINTING), whom would he support?

At 60% chance of Y winning (POINTING), whom would he support?  
(INTERVIEWER: If R. switches at 60% ask. Then would you say Candidate Y would be supported the rest of the way? If R. did not switch continue with the same format as above until he does.)

- 3.9 For the next situation let us suppose that Candidate X and Candidate Y are running for governor or congress. Candidate X and Candidate Y are exactly the same in all characteristics except that Candidate X is a member of the lider's party and Candidate Y is not a member of the party. Given this is the only difference between Candidate X and Candidate Y, whom would most lideres you personally know support if the candidate of the other party had 100% chance of winning?

(HAND R. GUIDE IV)

(NOTE: If R. says "party" record "100" for score, if he says "other party" continue going down the per cents (90%, 80%, etc.) until he says "party", and record that per cent for score).

Score \_\_\_\_\_

- 3.10 Let us take another situation. Suppose that two candidates are exactly the same in all characteristics, except that Candidate X has no compadre ties and Candidate Y has compadre ties with the lider, whom would the lider support if the candidate without compadre ties had a 100% chance of winning?

(NOTE: Follow same procedure to derive score as in 3.9)

Score \_\_\_\_\_

- 3.11 Let us assume that there are two candidates for governor or congress. Candidate X is the lider's relative, while Candidate Y is not. They are the same in all other attributes. Whom would most lideres you know support if the candidate who was not a relative had a 100% chance of winning?

Score \_\_\_\_\_

- 
- 3.12 Let us assume that the lider must choose between two candidates running for governor or congress where the only difference between them is that Candidate Y is clearly more capable than Candidate X. Whom would the lider support if the less capable candidate had a 100% chance of winning?

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.13 Suppose that Candidate X and Candidate Y are running for governor or congress, and Candidate X's stand on important issues is more like the lider's stand than is Candidate Y's. The two candidates are exactly the same in all other respects, whom would the most lidrs support if the one with bad issues had a 100% chance of winning?

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.14 Suppose that Candidate X and Candidate Y are running for governor or congress. Candidate X will give more projects or money than Candidate Y. The two candidates are exactly the same in all other respects, whom would most lidrs support if the one who will give less has a 100% chance of winning?

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.15 Let us assume that a lider must choose between two candidates running for governor or congress where the only difference between them is that Candidate Y will give better or more positions for the lider and the lider's followers than Candidate X. Whom would most lidrs support if the one who will give less jobs has a 100% chance of winning?

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

The next set of questions pairs the attributes used above. For each pair you will first be asked to state which Candidate lidrs like you would support. Then, changing the chance of the candidates' winning, you will be asked to state whom the lidrs would support.

- 3.16 Suppose that of the two candidates Candidate X is a member of the lider's party, and Candidate Y is a compadre. Whom would the lider support, party or compadre?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

(HAND R. GUIDE IV) If Candidate (the Candidate not selected above) had a better chance of winning, is there a point between 51% and 100% at which the lider would switch from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_?

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.17 Suppose that Candidate X is a member of the lider's party, and Candidate Y is a relative. Whom would the lider support, party or relative?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

(Follow same procedure as above.)

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.18 Suppose that Candidate X is a member of the lider's party, and Candidate Y is clearly more capable. Whom would the lider support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.19 Suppose that Candidate X is a member of the lider's party, but Candidate Y's stand on important issues is more like the lider's. Whom would the lider support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.20 Suppose that of two candidates Candidate X is in the lider's party but Candidate Y offers more money or projects. Whom would the lider support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.21 Suppose that Candidate X is in the lider's party, but Candidate Y promises the lider more and better positions for him and his followers. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.22 Suppose that Candidate X has a compadre tie with the lider, but Candidate Y is a relative. Whom would the lider support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.23 Suppose that Candidate X has a compadre tie with the lider, but Candidate Y clearly is more capable. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.24 Suppose that Candidate X has a compadre tie with the lider, but Candidate Y's stand on issues is more like his. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.25 Suppose that of the two candidates Candidate X has a compadre tie, but Candidate Y promises the lider more money and projects. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.26 Suppose that Candidate X has a compadre tie, but Candidate Y promises more and better positions. Whom would the lider support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.27 Suppose that Candidate X is a relative, and Candidate Y is clearly more capable. Whom would the lider support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.28 Suppose that Candidate X is a relative and Candidate Y's stand on issues is more like the lider's. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.29 Suppose that of two candidates, Candidate X is a relative and Candidate Y promises the lider more money or projects. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.30 Suppose that Candidate X is a relative, but Candidate Y promises the lider more or better positions. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.31 Suppose that Candidate X is more capable than Candidate Y, but Candidate Y's stand on important issues is more like the lider's. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.32 Suppose that Candidate X is clearly more capable and Candidate Y promises the lider more money or projects. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.33 Suppose that Candidate X is clearly more capable, but Candidate Y promises the lider more projects or money. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.34 Suppose that Candidate X's stand on important issues is more like the lider's but Candidate Y promises him more projects or money. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.35 Suppose that Candidate X's stand on important issues is more like the lider's than Candidate Y's but Candidate Y promises him more or better projects. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

- 3.36 Suppose that of two candidates, Candidate X promises the lider more projects and money than Y, but Candidate Y promises him more or better positions. Whom would he support?

Answer \_\_\_\_\_

Score \_\_\_\_\_

---

#### PART IV. PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE

- 4.1 We would like to know how much you discuss politics. Some people do not discuss politics at all, while others talk about nothing but politics. When you were growing up to what extent was there discussion of politics in your family? (HAND R. GUIDE II)

5. Always 4. Often 3. Occasionally 2. Seldom 1. Never

---

Using the same scale of frequency, how often were you involved in serious discussions of political affairs and elections during the past year, including the last election campaign:

- 4.2 with your family? ( )  
 4.3 with friends and compadres? ( )  
 4.4 with party officials or candidates? ( )  
 4.5 with other provincial politicians? ( )
- 

- 4.6 In Philippine politics some people have more influence than others, not only with officials, but over how people vote. Would you consider yourself a person who has influence over people so as to determine the way they vote? If yes, about how many people would you say you have influence over? \_\_\_\_\_
- 

- 4.7 How many lidars do you have? ( )
- 

- 4.8 Along these same lines, whom do you consider to be the most influential politicians in this province? In what way are they influential? Would you rank them from most influential to least influential?

---

4.9 How about the influential politicians in the Liberal Party. Whom do you consider to be the most influential politicians in the province who are members of the Liberal Party? Would you rank them as to who has most influence?

---

4.10 Whom do you consider to be the most influential provincial politicians in the Nacionalist Party? Would you rank them as to their importance?

---

4.11 Some people have more influence than others.  
(HAND R. GUIDE II - Frequency)

How frequently do you consider yourself to be influential?

- 4.11 in barrio politics? ( )  
 4.12 in municipal politics? ( )  
 4.13 in provincial politics? ( )  
 4.14 in national politics? ( )

---

4.15 Oftentimes office holders are able to do political favors for others. If you had a political favor to ask would you go to a politician? If yes, what politician in the province would you go to and why?

---

4.16 We would like to know how often you are able to contact officials in seeking their assistance. For instance, when you had a political favor to ask, how frequently were you able to contact the governor and receive his help?  
(HAND R. GUIDE II)

5. Always ( ) 4. Often ( ) 3. Occasionally ( )  
 2. Seldom ( ) 1. Never ( ) 9. NA ( )

---

4.17 How frequently were you able to contact the congressman and receive his help?

5. ( ) 4. ( ) 3. ( ) 2. ( ) 1. ( ) 9. ( )
-



4.18 How often were you able to contact a Senator and receive his help?

5. ( ) 4. ( ) 3. ( ) 2. ( ) 1. ( ) 9. ( )

---

4.19 If you had a political favor to ask, how often were you able to contact the President and receive his help?

5. ( ) 4. ( ) 3. ( ) 2. ( ) 1. ( ) 9. ( )

---

PART V. SOCIAL BACKGROUND

5.1 Sex

1. Male ( )  
2. Female ( )

5.2 Date of Birth \_\_\_\_\_

5.4 Number of living children \_\_\_\_\_

5.3 Civil Status

1. Single ( )  
2. Married ( )  
3. Widowed ( )  
4. Divorced ( )  
9. NA

5.5 Place of Birth \_\_\_\_\_

5.6 May I know your religion?  
\_\_\_\_\_

---

5.7 How important is religion in your life?

5. Extremely important ( ) 4. Very important ( ) 3. Important ( )  
2. Not very important ( ) 1. Not important at all ( ) 9. NA ( )
- 

5.8 What was the first language you learned to speak? \_\_\_\_\_

---

5.9 What Filipino languages/dialects do you know well enough to carry on a conversation? \_\_\_\_\_

---

5.10 What foreign languages do you speak well enough to carry on a conversation? 1. English 2. Spanish 3. French \_\_\_\_\_

---

5.11 What is your educational background?

1. No formal ed. ( ) 2. Grade School ( ) 3. Secondary School ( )  
4. College and beyond ( ) 9. NA ( )
-

5.12 What kinds of news interest you most?

Rank

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Would you please rank these sources as to their relative importance to you? \_\_\_\_\_

5.13 How do you get most of your information?

Rank

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Would you please rank these sources as to their relative importance to you? \_\_\_\_\_

5.14 How frequently do you read the Manila newspapers? (HAND R. GUIDE II)

5. Everyday ( ) 4. A few times a week ( ) 3. Once a week ( )  
2. Once a week ( ) 1. Never ( )

5.15 How frequently do you read provincial newspapers?

5. Every issue ( ) 4. ( ) 3. Every other issue or other ( )  
2. ( ) 1. Never ( )

5.16 What is your regular occupation? \_\_\_\_\_

5.17 Do you hold a government position? \_\_\_\_\_ If so, what? \_\_\_\_\_

5.18 (HAND R. GUIDE XIV: INCOME)

GUIDE VI: INCOME

- A) Less than 2000 per year
- B) 2001 to 7000
- C) 7001 to 15,000
- D) 15,001 to 49,000
- E) 50,000 and above

Which income category would you place yourself?

1. A ( ) 2. B ( ) 3. C ( ) 4. D ( ) 5. E ( )
- 

- 5.19 What was your father's occupation up to the time you were eighteen (18) years old? (INTERVIEWER: Check the income category R. selects)

Income Category

4. "Upper" -- owners of major businesses: land owners with more than 150 hectares.  
 3. "Upper Middle" -- professionals (other than grade school teachers), executives in large businesses or government, owners of import-export businesses, or large retail businesses, land owners with 25 to 150 hectares.  
 2. "Lower Middle" -- those with white-collar or technical skills, grade school teachers, first level supervisors, owners of retail businesses with a few employees, landowners with less than 25 hectares but with some tenants.  
 1. "Lower" -- unskilled and semi-skilled laborers: businessmen without employees (i.e. peddlers and sari-sari owners), tenant farmers and owner cultivators without tenants.
- 

- 5.20 Financially speaking, how would you compare your financial standing now with that of your father when you were eighteen (18) years old?

1. I'm worse off than my father was. ( )  
 2. I'm about the same as my father was. ( )  
 3. I'm better off than my father was. ( )  
 4. No answer. ( )
- 

- 5.21 Do you own or rent the house in which you are residing now?

4. Own ( ) 3. Rent ( ) 2. Live with parents ( ) 1. Other \_\_\_\_\_
- 

- 5.22 Do you own or have access to a car?

5. Own ( ) 2. Have access ( ) 1. Neither ( ) 0. NA ( )
- 

- 5.23 How many days a month do you spend in the province?

4. More than 21 ( ) 3. 15-21 ( ) 2. 8-14 ( ) 1. 7 or less ( )
- 

- 5.24 Have you ever been overseas?

2. Yes ( ) 1. No ( )
-

5.25 Where did you live most of the time during your first six years?

1. barrio ( ) 2. poblacion ( ) 3. city ( ) 9. NA ( )
- 

5.26 Where did you live most of the time from age 7 to 12?

1. barrio ( ) 2. poblacion ( ) 3. city ( ) 9. NA ( )
- 

5.27 How many clubs, organizations, or civic groups are you a member of?

---

How many of these organizations, which you are a member of are you also an officer? \_\_\_\_\_

---

5.28 Which of the following categories describes your party preference?

1. I consider myself a member of the Liberal Party ( )  
 2. I lean more towards the Liberal Party ( )  
 3. I consider myself a member of the Nacionalist Party ( )  
 4. I lean more toward the Nacionalist Party ( )  
 5. I am independent ( )  
 6. Other ( )  
 9. NA ( )
- 

5.29 Are you a relative of the governor, or a recent candidate for governor? If yes, did you support your relative?

1. Yes to relative and yes to support ( )  
 2. Yes to relative and no to support ( )  
 3. No ( )  
 9. NA ( )
- 

5.30 (Using the previous question, substitute congress for governor)

Score ( )

---

5.31 Do you have compadre ties with the governor or a recent candidate for governor? If yes, did you support your compadre tie?

(Same scale as above) ( )

---

5.32 (Substitute congressman for governor)

Score ( )

---

5.33 Did you support the candidate of your party for the governorship during the last election?

1. Yes ( )    2. No ( )    9. NA ( )

---

5.34 (Substitute congress for governorship) ( )

---

Thank you for your help. Your time and interest have added a great deal to the study of politics in Camarines Norte Province.

## APPENDIX B: Key for leadership description items.

The following key is for the leadership description items in Part II (2.11 and 2.12) of the questionnaire.

Dimension	Items
Representation	1,9,17,25,33
Persuasion	2,10,18,26,34
Initiation of Structure	3,11,19,27,35
Role Assumption	4*,12*,20,28*,36*,
Consideration	5,13,21,29,37*
Production Emphasis	6,14,22,30,38*
Integration	7,15,23,31,39
Superior Orientation	8,16,24,32,40

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\* Reverse Scoring.

## APPENDIX C. THE POLITICAL FAMILIES OF CAMARINES NORTE.

In practically every study of Philippine subnational politics it has been noted that politics was dominated by one or two families. Lande referred to it as bi-factionalism in politics. In Camarines Norte, the politics has tended to be highly competitive, therefore, no one faction has been able to keep all the political power to itself. Since Camarines Norte came into existence in 1919 provincial politics has been run by families from two towns, Daet and Vinzons (formerly Indan).

The first governor of Ambros Camarines after the turn of the Century was Don Juan Pimentel of Daet, a wealthy landowner. Juan Pimentel's first daughter, Marcosa, married Gabriel Hernandez who was the governor and representative to the National Assembly a number of times. Don Juan Pimentel's brother, Ramon, was a judge in the Court of First Instance. One of Ramon's sons, Pablo, ran a provincial newspaper and another son, Froilan, served in the National Assembly from 1936 to 1941 when he was defeated by Wenceslao Vinzons of Indan. Vinzons was supported by Gabriel Hernandez who was the leader of the old Radical-Democrata Party. A grandson of Ramon Pimentel by his second daughter was the councilor and mayor of Daet (early 1960's) under the sponsorship of then Congressman Marcial Pimentel, the only son of Froilan Pimentel. (See Figure 6. The Pimentel Family on adjoining page.)

The other prominent families in the province were centered in Vinzons. The names of the families were Lukban, Vinzons, Balce, and Pajarillo. At the turn of the century there were four Lukban brothers who were active in politics in one way or another. The eldest was General Don Vicente Lukban who had been a Revolutionary War hero and




Figure 6. Pimentel Family \*  
with connections to Hernandez, Fernandez, and Lukban

\*Several sons and daughters who were not involved in politics were excluded for the sake of clarity.

\*\*Gil Fernandez was Councilor and Mayor of Daet and candidate for Vice-Governor on the Liberal ticket sponsored by Marcial Pimentel. In 1969 Fernandez switched away from Pimentel to Pajarillo and was appointed Judge in the Court of First Instance, Daet, under the sponsorship of Congressman Pajarillo.



was the Governor of Lucena Province (now Quezon Province). Cayetano Lukban was a justice in a Court of First Instance and also an Assemblyman from Camarines Norte. Justo Lukban was the first Mayor of Manila. The youngest, Dr. Miguel Lukban, was the first elected governor of Camarines Norte. He had moved to the province from Lucena Province and married Rosario Balce. In the next generation the eldest son of Don Vicente, Agustin Lukban served one term in the Assembly and was a political enemy of his uncle, Miguel Lukban.

The sons of the pre-war Lukban politicians all chose professions other than politics, except two sons of Miguel Lukban. One, who was married to Congressman Pajarillo's sister, worked with the Nacionalista Senator from the Bicol region and the other, Julian, was a provincial Board Member from 1963 to 1967 and ran for governor in 1967 on the Liberal Party ticket. It was interesting that in addition to his brother, one of Julian's sisters married a brother of Congressman Pajarillo, head of the Nacionalista Party, and a second brother married a cousin of Marcial Pimentel, head of the Liberal Party. (See Figure 7. The Lukban Family.)

The Balce family was active in politics in the province before the arrival of the Lukbans. The Balces were a large family with connections in several other municipalities. Just before the end of the Spanish period the patriarch was Municipal Captain Francisco Balce of Indan. His daughter of his first marriage, Rosario, married Miguel Lukban. Don Francisco's son by a second marriage, Carlos, was governor from 1928-1931. Francisco's second son, Patricio, married into another wealthy and (to become) politically active family, the Pajarillos.




Figure 7. The Lukban Family  
with connections to Balce, Pajarillo, and Pimentel

One of the sons of the Patricio Balce-Pajarillo marriage, Jose Balce, married Ligaya Vinzons who was a candidate for congresswoman in the 1969 elections. (See Figure 8. The Balce Family.)

The Vinzon Family was traced back to the 1880's when a Chinese, Serafin Vinzons, married a Filipina, Valdomera Venida. They had two boys and two girls, but none of the children was directly active in politics. The third generation had the politicians in abundance. The oldest of Serafin's sons, Felipe, was the father of Fernando Vinzons, who is now a wealthy merchant and co-chairman of the Liberal Party in Camarines Norte. Gavino, the second son, was father to the World War II martyr-hero Wenceslao Vinzons. The eldest of Gavino's offspring married Esmeralde Eco who served as Congressman from 1940 to 1953 and Governor from 1956 to 1959. The second daughter married Pegino Guinto who was appointed governor after the war. The youngest offspring was Ligaya who married Jose Balce and ran for congresswoman in 1969. The hero, Wenceslao, was a student activist in the pre-war days and had organized the Young Philippines Party against President Manuel Quezon. Vinzons was elected Governor in 1940 and Congressman in 1941. He and part of his family were executed by the Japanese during the war. Of his three surviving children his son Wenceslao Vinzons, Junior, was elected Governor in 1963 for one term.

As for the Pajarillos, the sons of Felicidad Vinzons and Pedro Pajarillo are now the Congressmen from Camarines Norte (Fernando), the Vice-Governor of Camarines Norte (Amado), and the Mayor of Vinzons (Aming). Other sons or sons-in-law work in customs, the diplomatic corps or other similar professions. As was noted before two Pajarillos of this gener-




Figure 8. The Balce Family with connections to Lukban, Pajarillo, and Vinzons

ation are married to Lukbans. (See Figure 9. The Vinzons Family.)

As far as the research could ascertain from the interviews with the various prominent families, the families had to inter-marry with other wealthy families either inside or outside the province. It was socially unacceptable to marry below their status. In other words, there were no vertical ties. The closed-class structure accounts for the inter-connections between the families. For those in the prominent families who stayed in the province it was logical to become involved in politics either to follow family tradition or to advance their financial interests.

In the present political arrangement the Pajarillos are Nacionalistas, Julian Lukban and most of his brothers and sisters are Liberals, and the Pimentals are Liberals. The former Nacionalista Congressman Pedro Venida is also from Vinzons and is related to the Vinzons-Balce-Lukban family by way of Valdomera Venida, his aunt who married Serafin Vinzons. The Vinzons-Daet families account for almost all of the past and present politicians in power. No one outside these families has gained high office except through the sponsorship of one of the families. The present governor, Nicolas Pardo, is an example.

Governor Pardo was unlike the other politicians in that he had to rise through the ranks. Governors Jose Zenarosa, Rafael Carranceiza, Wilfredo Panotes and Domenader Asis were like Pardo in that they were not part of the prominent families. Also like Pardo they were sponsored by someone within one of the families. Pardo differs from the others because he was not from Daet or Vinzons and he was without personal wealth. He was not born with a name like Vinzons or Pimentel, nor did




Figure 9. The Vinzons Family with connections to Pajarillo, Venida Lukban, Eco, and Guinto

he have the money of the Pajarillos. In fact, Pardo was the first in his family to become active in politics. He rose from a humble origin through the sponsorship of Fernando Pajarillo.

Pardo was from Labo and had extensive family connections in the municipality. In trying to track the governor's family, I continually found that virtually everyone in the municipality was related. The families were always traced back to Villafuerte, Villaluz, and Villagomez. Since Pardo was the first from Labo, and outside the dominant families, to be elected to such a high provincial office he stands as an exception to the rule and represents an example of an individual outside the prominent families breaking into the top political echelons of the province. Although Pardo's being an outsider perhaps could be a hallmark of changing alliances in provincial politics, it is doubtful that he could survive without the support of either Pimentel or Pajarillo.

TABLE II. GOVERNORS AND CONGRESSMEN FROM CAMARINES NORTE

GOVERNORS			CONGRESSMEN		
Years	Party*	Incumbent	Years	Party*	Incumbent
1919-22	R-D	Miguel Lukban	1919-22	R-D	Gabriel Hernandez
1922-25	R-D	Gabriel Hernandez	1922-25	R-D	Jose B. Zenarosa
1925-28	R-D	Miguel Lukban	1925-28	R-D	Lafael Carranceja
1928-31	C	Carlos Balce	1928-31	C	Agustia Lukban
1931-34	R-D	Gabriel Hernandez	1931-34	R-D	Miguel Lukban
1934-40	R	Miguel Lukban	1934-35	R-D	Gabriel Hernandez
			1935-36	R	Cayetano Lukban
			1936-41	R	Froilan Pimentel
1940	Y	Wen. Vinzons, Sr.	1941	Y	Wen. Vinzons, Sr.
WORLD WAR II					
1943-46	R	Froilan Pimentel (app'd)			
1946-47	L	Sejino Guinto (app'd)	1946-54	L	Esmeraldo Ece
1947-50	R	Melfredo Panotes			
			1954-58	R	Fernando Pajarillo
1950-60	L	Esmeraldo Ece			
			1958-62	R	Padre Venida
1960-64	L	Domador Asis			
			1962-66	L	Marcial Pimentel
1964-68	Y	Wen. Vinzons, Jr.			
			1966-74	R	Fernando Pajarillo
1968-72	R	Nicolas Pardo			

\* Parties indicated above: R-D=Radical-Democrata, C=Consolidado, N=Nacionalista, Y=Young Philippines, and L=Liberal.

Source: Camarines Norte Golden Jubilee Yearbook, 1969.



APPENDIX D. INTERCORRELATION MATRICES

GOVERNOR ROLE DESCRIPTION

VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Representation	1.000							
2. Persuasion	0.599	1.000						
3. Initiation of Structure	0.508	0.552	1.000					
4. Role Assumption	0.292	0.293	0.370	1.000				
5. Consideration	0.208	0.253	0.396	0.276	1.000			
6. Production Emphasis	0.503	0.477	0.529	0.419	0.300	1.000		
7. Integration	0.620	0.693	0.659	0.346	0.318	0.481	1.000	
8. Superior Orientation	0.565	0.531	0.568	0.441	0.385	0.475	0.601	1.000

## APPENDIX D. INTERCORRELATION MATRICES (continued)

## GOVERNOR BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Representation	1.000							
2. Persuasion	0.650	1.000						
3. Initiation of Structure	0.543	0.585	1.000					
4. Role Assumption	0.348	0.417	0.505	1.000				
5. Consideration	0.398	0.496	0.607	0.592	1.000			
6. Production Emphasis	0.507	0.509	0.520	0.431	0.556	1.000		
7. Integration	0.499	0.532	0.620	0.483	0.554	0.537	1.000	
8. Superior Orientation	0.561	0.629	0.526	0.561	0.496	0.526	0.497	1.000

## APPENDIX B. INTERCORRELATION MATRICES (continued)

## CONGRESSMAN ROLE DESCRIPTION

VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Representation	1.000							
2. Persuasion	0.569	1.000						
3. Initiation of Structure	0.474	0.574	1.000					
4. Role Assumption	0.409	0.437	0.473	1.000				
5. Consideration	0.462	0.536	0.530	0.458	1.000			
6. Production Emphasis	0.493	0.541	0.631	0.532	0.443	1.000		
7. Integration	0.635	0.692	0.662	0.569	0.517	0.667	1.000	
8. Superior Orientation	0.642	0.696	0.646	0.589	0.473	0.644	0.775	1.000

## APPENDIX D. INTERCORRELATION MATRICES (continued)

## CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Representation	1.000							
2. Persuasion	0.690	1.000						
3. Initiation of Structure	0.634	0.774	1.000					
4. Role Assumption	0.533	0.536	0.485	1.000				
5. Consideration	0.475	0.553	0.571	0.569	1.000			
6. Production Emphasis	0.536	0.590	0.593	0.431	0.569	1.000		
7. Integration	0.720	0.742	0.675	0.526	0.546	0.678	1.000	
8. Superior Orientation	0.717	0.631	0.617	0.557	0.517	0.582	0.739	1.000

APPENDIX E. ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES FOR EIGHT FACTORS

VARIABLES	FACTORS								h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	
1. Representation	0.88	0.24	-0.17	0.10	0.06	0.20	0.20	0.21	1.0
2. Persuasion	0.25	0.87	-0.19	0.10	0.09	0.18	0.25	0.18	1.0
3. Initiation of Structure	0.18	0.21	-0.85	0.15	0.18	0.22	0.23	0.20	1.0
4. Role Assumption	0.08	0.08	-0.11	0.95	0.11	0.16	0.09	0.15	1.0
5. Consideration	0.05	0.07	-0.13	0.11	0.97	0.10	0.08	0.12	1.0
6. Production Emphasis	0.19	0.17	-0.19	0.19	0.12	0.90	0.13	0.15	1.0
7. Integration	0.26	0.32	-0.28	0.20	0.13	0.17	0.80	0.23	1.0
8. Superior Orientation	0.23	0.19	-0.20	0.20	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.86	1.0
% Common Variance	13.0	13.2	13.2	12.8	12.0	12.2	12.9	10.8	100.0

APPENDIX E. ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES FOR EIGHT FACTORS (continued)

VARIABLES	FACTORS								h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	
1. Representation	-0.83	0.25	0.18	-0.10	0.10	0.19	0.17	-0.20	1.0
2. Persuasion	-0.29	0.83	0.20	-0.13	0.16	0.18	0.22	-0.25	1.0
3. Initiation of Structure	-0.21	0.20	0.84	-0.20	0.24	0.18	0.24	-0.17	1.0
4. Role Assumption	-0.09	0.11	0.16	-0.90	0.23	0.14	0.16	-0.21	1.0
5. Consideration	-0.11	0.15	0.22	-0.26	0.86	0.22	0.20	-0.15	1.0
6. Production Emphasis	-0.19	0.15	0.16	-0.15	0.21	0.89	0.19	-0.18	1.0
7. Integration	-0.18	0.20	0.23	-0.18	0.20	0.20	0.86	-0.15	1.0
8. Superior Orientatation	-0.23	0.23	0.16	-0.25	0.16	0.20	0.15	-0.85	1.0
2 Common Variance	11.9	13.2	11.8	12.9	12.5	12.3	13.2	12.2	100.0

APPENDIX E. ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES FOR EIGHT FACTORS (continued)

CONGRESSMAN ROLE DESCRIPTION

VARIABLES	FACTORS								h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	
1. Representation	<u>-0.89</u>	-0.19	-0.14	0.17	0.18	-0.17	0.18	0.17	1.0
2. Persuasion	-0.22	<u>-0.84</u>	-0.20	0.17	0.23	-0.19	0.21	0.20	1.0
3. Initiation of Structure	-0.16	-0.20	<u>-0.85</u>	0.17	0.22	-0.26	0.20	0.18	1.0
4. Role Assumption	-0.17	-0.15	-0.15	<u>0.90</u>	0.18	-0.19	0.15	0.15	1.0
5. Consideration	-0.17	-0.18	-0.19	0.17	<u>0.91</u>	-0.14	0.13	0.10	1.0
6. Production Emphasis	-0.18	-0.18	-0.25	0.22	0.16	<u>-0.87</u>	0.16	0.17	1.0
7. Integration	-0.28	-0.28	-0.27	0.23	0.20	-0.23	<u>0.75</u>	0.26	1.0
8. Superior Orientation	-0.29	-0.30	-0.26	0.26	0.15	-0.26	0.28	<u>0.73</u>	1.0
% Common Variance	10.3	13.5	13.2	13.7	13.9	13.0	13.0	9.4	100.0

## APPENDIX E. ROTATED FACTOR MATRICES FOR EIGHT FACTORS (continued)

## CONGRESSMAN BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

## FACTORS

VARIABLES	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	$R^2$
1. Representation	0.26	0.24	0.26	0.21	0.14	0.18	0.21	0.29	1.0
2. Persuasion	0.25	0.78	0.31	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.23	0.20	1.0
3. Initiation of Structure	0.26	0.28	0.81	0.17	0.23	0.23	0.18	0.20	1.0
4. Role Assumption	0.17	0.15	0.13	0.90	0.23	0.13	0.12	0.18	1.0
5. Consideration	0.12	0.16	0.10	0.25	0.88	0.24	0.13	0.15	1.0
6. Production Emphasis	0.16	0.17	0.19	0.14	0.24	0.97	0.19	0.19	1.0
7. Integration	0.28	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.31	0.72	0.31	1.0
8. Superior Orientation	0.28	0.28	0.20	0.23	0.17	0.22	0.22	0.81	1.0
% Common Variance	12.6	13.8	13.8	12.4	13.3	11.8	12.6	9.6	100.0



## APPENDIX F. LEADERSHIP DESCRIPTION TESTS FOR RESPONSE SET

As a test for the degree of agreement in describing the same aspect of the same leadership position I mixed combinations of the sets of the LBRDQ scores. Since role descriptions for role assumption and consideration were found to be independent factors, I chose the congressman role and the governor role descriptions together. Four factors with eigenvalues greater than one were rotated yielding four clear factors. As had been found earlier two factors corresponded to congressman role description and governor role description. The other two factors again confirmed the independence of role assumption and consideration. (See TABLE LII).

A visual representation of the congressman role and a governor role descriptions was made by plotting the task-categories according to their factor loadings on the two principal factors of the unrotated factor matrix. The only exceptions to the position (congressman vs. governor) clusters were role assumption and consideration which were shown to be independent of the governor and congressman role description dimensions. (See Figure 10).

The behavior descriptions for the governor and congressman were brought together and factor analyzed in the same manner as the role descriptions. Three factors with eigenvalues greater than one were rotated. As can be seen in Table LIII, a clear distinction was found between descriptions of the governor's and congressman's behavior. A third factor discovered was role assumption and consideration. A plot of the factor loadings on the two unrotated principal factors

TABLE LII. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR ROLE DESCRIPTIONS

Variables	Factor				$h^2$
	I	II	III	IV	
1. GR R	0.78	0.23	0.09	-0.05	0.67
2. GR SO	0.62	0.37	0.26	0.22	0.63
3. GR P	0.81	0.20	-0.09	0.07	0.70
4. GR I	0.80	0.27	0.07	0.17	0.74
5. GR IS	0.73	0.20	0.16	0.29	0.68
6. GR PE	0.64	0.16	0.41	0.08	0.61
7. GR C	0.22	0.10	0.13	0.90	0.87
8. GR RA	0.23	0.15	0.90	0.15	0.84
A. CR R	0.16	0.76	0.18	0.16	0.63
B. CR SO	0.33	0.78	0.25	0.14	0.80
C. CR P	0.20	0.80	0.05	0.22	0.72
D. CR I	0.29	0.80	0.22	0.13	0.79
E. CR IS	0.31	0.71	0.08	0.22	0.65
F. CR PE	0.45	0.58	0.02	0.08	0.64
G. CR C	0.08	0.47	0.18	0.75	0.83
H. CR RA	0.08	0.49	0.73	0.16	0.81
% Common Variance	33.3	35.0	16.2	14.5	100.0
				Total $h^2 =$	72.4

\* First number or letter identifies variable for plotting in Figure 10.




Figure 10. Plot of Role Descriptions on the Two Unrotated Principal Factors

TABLE LIII. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTIONS

Variables	Factor			h <sup>2</sup>
	I	II	III	
1.GR R	0.80	0.10	-0.20	0.69
2.GR SO	0.80	0.00	0.10	0.64
3.GR P	0.84	0.13	-0.09	0.73
4.GR I	0.77	0.10	0.11	0.62
5.GR IS	0.77	0.18	0.13	0.66
6.GR PE	0.68	0.12	0.30	0.56
7.GR C	0.64	0.02	0.60	0.77
8.GR RA	0.57	0.10	0.59	0.68
A.CR R	0.20	0.84	-0.10	0.76
B.CR SO	0.14	0.83	-0.04	0.72
C.CR P	0.20	0.84	0.07	0.74
D.CR I	0.17	0.88	-0.03	0.80
E.CR IS	0.13	0.83	0.08	0.71
F.CR PE	-0.01	0.77	0.15	0.61
G.CR C	-0.07	0.69	0.50	0.72
H.CR RA	-0.08	0.66	0.43	0.63
% Common Variance	40.9	46.3	12.7	100.0
			Total	h <sup>2</sup> = 68.9




Figure 11. Plot of Behavior Descriptions on the Two Unrotated Principal Factors

readily brought out the distinction made by the rotated factors between the governor and the congressman. (See Figure 11.)

It was obvious that the high loadings on the first factor were a result of the respondents describing the same leader. However, the factor analysis of the combination of the four sets of scores suggested that the role and behavior descriptions were also contributing to the strong principal factor when each set of scores was taken separately. The governor's role and behavior descriptions were taken together and factor analyzed and three factors were rotated. The first two rotated factors were governor behavior and governor role. The third rotated factor was role assumption and (role description) consideration.

TABLE LIV. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR GOVERNOR'S ROLE AND BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTIONS

Variables	Factor			$h^2$
	I	II	III	
GB R	0.70	0.46	-0.15	0.72
GB P	0.81	0.20	-0.14	0.71
GB SO	0.73	0.18	0.25	0.62
GR I	0.79	0.07	-0.00	0.63
GB IS	0.81	0.06	0.05	0.66
GB PE	0.73	0.17	0.08	0.56
GB C	0.76	-0.06	0.25	0.65
GB RA	0.66	-0.17	0.58	0.80
GR F	0.15	0.84	-0.04	0.73
GR SO	0.00	0.69	0.44	0.67
GR P	0.18	0.82	0.01	0.71
GR I	0.11	0.82	0.17	0.72
GR IS	0.08	0.72	0.34	0.64
GR PE	0.10	0.64	0.32	0.52
GR C	-0.04	0.25	0.64	0.49
GR RA	0.08	0.33	0.70	0.60
% Common	43.8	38.1	17.1	100.0
Variance				Total $h^2 = 65.2$

The plot of the factor loadings on the two unrotated principal factors also showed the same clusterings as had been found in the cases cited above.

The final combination was the congressman's role and behavior descriptions. Only two factors had eigenvalues greater than one. The two clear patterns that emerged perfectly matched the role and behavior descriptions respectively. The plot of the factor loading portrayed the extent to which role and behavior descriptions were in separate clusters. (See Table LV and Figure 12.)

On the basis of these analyses it was concluded that the large number of highloadings for the unrotated principal factor could be attributed to interaction or response-set effect of the leaders describing the same aspect of the same leadership position.

TABLE LV. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR CONGRESSMAN'S  
ROLE AND BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION

Variables	Factor		$h^2$
	I	II	
1. CB R	0.84	-0.09	0.72
2. CB SO	0.77	-0.35	0.71
3. CR P	0.37	-0.04	0.76
4. CR I	0.85	-0.21	0.77
5. CR IS	0.85	-0.08	0.73
6. CB PE	0.73	-0.22	0.59
7. CB C	0.70	-0.21	0.54
8. CB RA	0.66	-0.22	0.49
A. CR R	0.24	-0.71	0.56
B. CR SO	0.21	-0.86	0.78
C. CR P	0.05	-0.82	0.67
D. CR I	0.10	-0.83	0.76
E. CR IS	0.28	-0.74	0.63
F. CR PE	0.10	-0.78	0.62
G. CR C	0.31	-0.62	0.48
H. CR RA	-0.00	-0.76	0.58
% Common Variance	51.5	48.5	Total $h^2 = 64.8$




Figure 12. Plot of Congressman's Role and Behavior Descriptions

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